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ABSTRACT
ăisPhDthesis is concernedwith authenticationprotocols using portable lightweight devices
such as RFID tags. ăese devices have lately gained a signiđcant attention for the diversity of
the applications that could beneđt form their features, ranging from inventory systems and
building access control, to medical devices. However, the emergence of this technology has
raised concerns about the possible loss of privacy carrying such tags induce in allowing tracing
persons or unveiling the contents of a hidden package. ăis fear led to the appearance of
several organizations which goal is to stop the spread of RFID tags. We take a cryptographic
viewpoint on the issue and study the extent of security and privacy that RFID-based solutions
can oﬀer.
In the đrst part of this thesis, we concentrate on analyzing two original primitives that were
proposed to ensure security for RFID tags. ăe đrst one, HBž, is a dedicated authentica-
tion protocol that exclusively uses very simple arithmetic operations: bitwiseANDandXOR.
HBž was proven to be secure against a certain class of man-in-the-middle attacks and conjec-
tured secure against more general ones. We show that the latter conjecture does not hold by
describing a practical attack that allows an attacker to recover the tag’s secret key. Moreover,
we show that to be immune against our attack, HBž’s secret key size has to be increased to be
more than   bits. ăis is an unpractical value for the considered applications.
We then turn to SõUASH, a message authentication code built around a public-key en-
cryption scheme, namely Rabin’s scheme. By mounting a practical key recovery attack on the
earlier version of SõUASH,we show that the security of all versions of SõUASH is unrelated
to the security of Rabin encryption function.
ăe secondpart of the thesis is dedicated to the privacy aspects related to theRFID technol-
ogy. We đrst emphasize the importance of establishing a framework that correctly captures
the intuition that a privacy-preserving protocol does not leak any information about its partic-
ipants. For that, we show how several protocols that were supported by simple arguments, in
contrast to a formal analysis, fail to ensure privacy. Namely, we target ProbIP, MARP, Auth,
YA-TRAP, YA-TRAP+, O-TRAP, RIPP-FS, and the Lim-Kwon protocol. We also illustrate
the shortcomings of other privacy models such as the LBdMmodel.
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ăerest of the dissertation is thendedicated toour privacymodel. Contrarily tomostRFID
privacy models that limit privacy protection to the inability of linking the identity of two
participants in two diﬀerent protocol instances, we introduce a privacy model for RFID tags
that proves to be the exact formalization of the intuition that a private protocol should not
leak any information to the adversary. ăe model we introduce is a ređnement of Vaudenay’s
one that invalidates a number of its limitations. Within these settings, we are able to show that
the strongest notion of privacy, namely privacy against adversaries that have a prior knowledge
of all the tags’ secrets, is realizable. To instantiate an authentication protocol that achieves this
level of privacy, we use plaintext-aware encryption schemes. We then extend ourmodel to the
case of mutual authentication where, in addition to a tag authenticating to the reader, the
reverse operation is also required.
Key words: Cryptography, Cryptanalysis, RFID, Authentication protocols, Message Au-
thentication Codes, HB, SõUASH.
RESUMÉ
Cette thèse de doctorat s’intéresse aux protocoles d’authentiđcation utilisant des marqueurs
tels que des puces à radio-identiđcation, plus communément désignés par marqueurs RFID.
Ces puces ont récemment connus un intérêt grandissant grâce à leur versatilité et les avantages
qu’elles présentent pour plusieurs applications telles que la gestion d’inventaire, le contrôle
d’accès et les dispositifs médicaux embarqués. Cependant, l’émergence de cette technologie
induit certaines réserves quant à l’éventuelle fuite de données privées telle que la possibilité
de suivre une personne d’une manière automatisée ou de reconnaître la nature d’un paquet
dissimulé en accédant à distance à la puce RFID qui le caractérise. Ces craintes ont conduit
à la constitution d’un certain nombre d’organisations dont le but avoué est de contrer le dé-
veloppement de la technologie RFID. Tout au long de cette thèse, nous étudions le problème
du point de vue de la cryptographie et analysons les aspects de sécurité et de vie privée liés aux
solutions basées sur des systèmes RFID.
Dans la première partie de ce document, nous nous concentrons sur l’analyse de deux solu-
tions cryptographiques dédiées aux puces RFID et censées garantir leur sécurité. La première
de ces solutions est un protocole d’authentiđcation, appelé HBž, qui présente la particulari-
té de n’utiliser que deux très simples opérations booléennes, le ET et XOR (OU exclusif ) lo-
giques.Malgré queHBž soit prouvé sûr contre certaines attaques de l’intermédiaire, sa sécurité
contre l’ensemble des attaques de l’homme du milieu n’est supportée que par une conjecture.
Nous démontrons que cette conjecture n’est pas valide en illustrant une attaque qui permet
à un attaquant de retrouver la clé secrète stockée dans un marqueur RFID. Par ailleurs, nous
montrons que pour être immunisé contre notre attaque, les secrets partagés de HBž doivent
avoir une taille supérieure à   bits. Pour des appareils aussi simples que les marqueurs
RFID, ceci n’est pas envisageable.
Après cela, nous nous tournons vers SõUASH, un code d’authentiđcation de message bâti
autour du système de chiﬀrement à clé publique de Rabin. En dépit de l’hypothèse commu-
nément admise que les chiﬀrements à clé publique sont plus lourds à implémenter que les so-
lutions classiques, SõUASH présente la singularité de pouvoir être implémenté sur des puces
ayant des capacités aussi restreintes que celles des marqueurs RFID. Cependant, nous demon-
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trons que la sécurité de SõUASH est indépendante de celle du chiﬀrement de Rabin. Ađn
d’arriver à ce résultat, nous illustrons une stratégie contre la version antérieure de SõUASH
permettant à un adversaire de retrouver la clé secrète et cela sans avoir recourt à factoriser le
modulus hérité de la fonction de Rabin. Bien que notre attaque ne s’applique pas à la version
đnale de SõUASH, toutes les versions de ce dernier reposent sur la même analyse de sécuri-
té. En conséquence, notre attaque, étant indépendante du problème de factorisation qui est
étroitement lié au chiﬀrement de Rabin, invalide les arguments de sécurité accompagnant
SõUASH.
La seconde partie de cette thèse est dédiée aux aspects de vie privée liés auxmarqueurRFID.
Dans un premier temps, nous motivons l’importance d’étudier le degré de protection de vie
privée qui est oﬀert par un protocole RFID dans un formalisme qui comporte une déđnition
reĔétant l’étendue de ce concept. Pour cela, nous demontrons que plusieurs protocoles, plus
explicitement ProbIP,MARP,Auth, YA-TRAP, YA-TRAP+,O-TRAP, RIPP-FS et celui de
Lim-Kwon, échouent à prévenir des attaques de traçage, où le but de l’adversaire est de pouvoir
suivre un tag donné entre plusieurs sessions d’authentiđcation. En parallèle, nous montrons
les limites du modèle LBdM en illustrant des attaques de traçage réalistes sur des protocoles
pourtant prouvés respectueux de la vie privée dans ce dernier modèle.
Le reste de ce document est dédié à notre modèle de vie privée dans les systèmes RFID.
Contrairement aux modèles précédents qui réduisent le respect de la vie privée à un certain
nombre de propriétés telle que l’incapacité de tracer unmarqueur, nous estimons qu’un proto-
cole RFID respecte la vie privée si aucune information ne peut être déduite par un adversaire
interagissant avec des marqueurs et le lecteur. Le modèle que nous développons est une cor-
rection de celui proposé par Vaudenay, aﬀranchi de certaines de ses limites. Concrètement,
notre modèle admet la possibilité d’obtenir la forme la plus absolue de respect de la vie pri-
vée en faisant appel à des chiﬀrements “plaintext-aware”. Dans un souci de complétude, nous
proposons aussi une extension de notremodèle pour le cas de protocoles avec authentiđcation
mutuelle, dans lesquels le lecteur doit aussi s’authentiđer auprès des marqueurs.
Mots-clés :Cryptographie, Cryptanalyse, RFID, code d’authentiđcation de message, Proto-
coles d’authentiđcation. HB, SõUASH.
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1
INTRODUCTION
ăe invention and subsequent widespread of the Internet and its underlining World Wide
Web has provoked the development of new cryptographic applications well beyond its his-
torical purpose of concealing transmitted messages. In this context, the problem of authen-
tication, i.e., being ensured of the party one is communicating with, became a very central
issue. ăe seminal work of Diﬃe and Hellman [DH] paved the way for even further de-
velopment. Besides introducing public-key encryption, Diﬃe and Hellman showed how to
build a conđdential channel from an authenticated one, named aĕer them. Not only that
but they also gave the idea of using digital signature schemes to construct that authenticat-
ed channel. All these primitives were combined to construct protocols dedicated to speciđc
tasks. Among those tasks, protocols for authentication and identiđcation arguably represent
one of themost used cryptographic protocols. In short, they provide one party, called the ver-
iđer, a way to decide whether another entity withwhom she is communicating is who it claims
to be, or assure that a device is a trusted one. ăat other party is usually called the prover.
Authentication protocols are used in many contexts that essentially apply in all cases a hu-
man being needs to prove his identity. ăis can happen at the entrance of a sensitive building,
at the borders of a country, on thephone for a secure bank transaction, or online to access some
features of awebsite. Fortunately, several technologieswere introduced to simplify these oper-
ations such as đngerprint recognition, smartcards, and RFID tags. While the đrst technology
uses features that are beyond pure cryptography, as it calls for image capturing and pattern
recognition, cryptographers considered two-factor authentication methods where, for exam-
ple, a password has to be given in conjunction with the biometric data.
Despite being invented in , research on cryptography for smartcards only started in
the late ’s [Schb, Scha] with the development of processing units in smartcard chips.
However, these devices attained their maturity and have most of their original limitations
waived as they became capable of carrying rather heavy computations such as public-key en-
cryption [PKC]. Some of them even embed a Java Virtual Machine to execute Java byte-
code [Jav].
      
  Antenna
  Chip
Figure 1.1: An RFID tag composed of an integrated circuit for storing and processing information,
modulating and demodulating a radio-frequency signal and an antenna for receiving and
transmitting radio signals.
õuite surprisingly, the RFID technology dates from World War II, where it was used to
identify aircraĕs, vehicles, or forces as friendly, making itmore than  years older than smart-
cards, their wired equivalent. However, this technology did not get a practical impact until
recently with the introduction of biometric passports and the industry’s move towards replac-
ing barcodes by a more eﬃcient and equally cheap alternative. RFIDs are also widely used
in animal identiđcation, electronic vehicle registration, and public transportation payments.
Other applications of the technology are also commonly found in supply-chains and address-
ing counterfeiting, especially in the pharmaceutical and luxury industries.
An RFID system is usually composed of a set of RFID tags that communicate with readers
which in their turn are connected to a back-end database server. Tags are devices whose size
can range from hundreds of m2’s to a few cm2’s. Internally, they comport a radio-frequency
antenna for emitting and receiving, most commonly Ultra-High Frequency (UHF), radio-
signals and a chip that includes a modulator and demodulator for the signal, along with an-
other circuit for memory, processing information, and possibly functionalities dedicated to
speciđc tasks such asmeasuring the scale of a physical phenomenon. Most of today’smassively
deployed RFID tags do not carry a battery and are powered by a magnetic resonance induc-
tion đeld generated by the reader’s signal. ăese are known as passive tags and represent the
large majority of currently deployed tags. Active tags are the ones that carry a battery and op-
erate independently from the reader’s signal. Being expensive, these type of tags are reserved
for high-end applications, such as theUSDepartement ofDefense’s tracking system for its in-
ventory [oD]. Hybrid tags, refered to as semi-active, only use their battery to perform internal
operations but rely on the reader’s signal to power their antenna and modulator.
ăe current dissertation consists of two parts, corresponding to two diﬀerent subjects re-
lated to RFIDs, security and privacy. In the đrst one, we study the security of two dedicated
 . 
  
Back-End 
Dattabase
Server
RFID ReaderRFID tags
Figure 1.2: An RFID System composed of a set of RFID tags communicating wirelessly with a reader
that is in itself connected to a back-end database server.
proposals for RFID tags, namely, the authentication protocol HBž and themessage authenti-
cation code SõUASH. Concretely, we exhibit cryptographic attacks that enable an attacker
to recover the tag’s secret key. ăe second part of the dissertation is then dedicated to assess
the need of a privacy model. We contribute to this ediđce by proposing a privacy model for
RFID tags that admits several levels depending on the needs of the application and the type
of tags used in it.
1.1 The Need for Dedicated Cryptographic Primitives for RFID Tags
To ensure the protection of an RFID system, the đrst thing to do is to look back in the litera-
ture of cryptographic primitives and protocols and test whether any of the already proposed
solutions can be applied. Unfortunately, it turns out that implementing classical algorithms is
far beyond the capabilities ofmost encountered types ofRFID tags. ăe standardunit ofmea-
sure for this capability is the Gate Equivalent (GE).ăe Gate Equivalent is a unit of measure
which allows to specify manufacturing-technology-independent complexity of digital elec-
tronic circuits. In today’s Complementary metal–oxide–semiconductor (CMOS) technolo-
gy, one GE refers to (the area taken by) one NAND Gate with two inputs and one output.
For example, the circuit implementing the boolean function a^ b needs 2NAND gates, one
for NAND and one for boolean inversion, and therefore costs 2GE. For low-end RFID tags,
it is commonly agreed that no more than 2 000 GE can be dedicated to security [JWa].
However, to date, the best implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
needs 3 600GE[FDW], which can be reduced to 3 100GE in an encryption-only architec-
ture [HAHH]. Similarily, a variant of theDigital Encryption Standard (DES), inwhich all
S-boxes are identical, can be implementedwithin 1 848GE [LPPS]. On another hand, cur-
rently deployed hash functions proved too heavy to be considered for RFID tags [FR]. For
instance, having SHA- on an RFID chip requires 8 120GE, SHA- requires 10 868GE,
MDdemands 7 350GE, andMDđts in 8 400GE. In a recent work,Hutter, Feldhofer, and
.         
      
Wolkerstorfer [HFW] achieved an implementation of AES and SHA- restricted to -
bit messages for a processor dedicated to producing ECDSA signatures in 2 387 GE. Con-
cerning stream ciphers, the eStream portfolio for hardware oriented ciphers, currently con-
sisting of the two ciphers MICKEY [BDa] and Trivium [CP] require approximatively
3 400GE and 2 300GE respectively (we do not include G [HJMM] in the list since
it was broken by Dinur and Shamir [DS]). While we are not aware of any cryptanalysis
result onMICKEY, Trivium has been able to resist Dinur and Shamir’s cube attack [DS].
Having said that, implementing public-key cryptography is an even greater challenge. Two
diﬀerent directions were taken in this line of research. On one side, elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy was shown to be feasible on an RFID tag, although it requires more than 10 000 GE to
be implemented [HWF]. Similar results were obtained for hyperelliptic curve cryptogra-
phy using approximatively 14 500GE [FBV]. On the other side, the lattice-based NTRU
public-key encryption scheme [HPS] can have its encryption algorithm implemented in
2 800GE [ABF+]. A diﬀerent approach was taken by Calmels, Canard, Girault, and Sib-
ert [CCGS]. In an eﬀort to circumvent the issue of the cost of implementing modular
arithmetic in hardware, they proposed to adapt the GPS identiđcation scheme [GPS] by
loading the tag with a set of precomputed data, called coupons. ăis trick allowed them to
reduce the amount of operations a tag needs to carry out for authentication to a small number
of arithmetic additions. However, besides needing a large memory to retain all the coupons,
the GPS-with-coupon scheme is susceptible to availability issues and vulnerable against De-
nial of Service (DoS) attacks (Calmels et al.’s proof of concept used 2 600GE for security and
stored eight coupons that would be used for eight authentications).
ăe shortcomings of classical cryptographic primitives to meet the needs of RFIDs led to
the rise of new proposals with innovative designs. Among those proposals, we mention the
block ciphers KATAN and KTANTAN [CDK] which can be implemented in less than
800GE. Another interesting proposal was made by Guo, Peyrin, and Poschman who simpli-
đed the AES design to propose a block cipher, called a L [GPPR], and a one-way hash
function, called P [GPP] that can đt in less than 1 000 GE. Other proposals in-
clude the hash functions õuark [AHMNP] and S [BKL+]. However, relying
on simpliđed designs is error prone as the conđdence in the security of several newly proposed
primitives is put under question. ăat was the case for schemes such as P [BKL+]
for which the most recently published cryptanalysis succeeds in performing a key recovery
attack on reduced rounds of the cipher [CS, KCS], and PRINTcipher, a block cipher
proposed in [KLPR] and fully cryptanalyzed in [LAAZ]
In the đrst part of this thesis, we analyze the security of twoof themost innovative proposals
for RFID tags, namely, HBž [GRSb] and SõUASH [Sha, Sha].
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.. ąeHB Family of Authentication protocols
One of the most interesting directions that was taken in đnding well suited primitives for
RFID chips is theHB family of protocols. Contrary to other proposals which focused on de-
signing a general-purpose lightweight cryptographic primitive such as an encryption scheme,
a MAC, or a hash function, HB-like protocols do not serve any other purpose than authenti-
cating one prover to a veriđer. Moreover, by relying on a hard computational problem called
LPN for learning parity with noise, the protocols oﬀer a well-deđned security guarantee.
Increasingly secure versions of the protocol were successively proposed. ăe original HB
protocol, due toHopper andBlum [HB], wasmeant for human communicating over chan-
nels that an attacker can only eavesdrop, such as a phone communication channel, and there-
fore requires very simple computations that can be performed by pen and paper. Motivated
by its simplicity, Juels andWeis had the idea to use the protocol in RFID tags and proposed a
stronger variant called HB+ that is secure against adversaries who can directly communicate
with the two parties [JWa]. However, the protocol was shown to be insecure if an attacker
could alter messages going from the reader to the tags [GRS]. ăis led to the proposal of
HBž which is provably secure in that model [GRSb]. Not only that, but HBž was conjec-
tured to be secure against adversaries who can interact with both parties at the same time, i.e.,
modify messages going in both directions: from the reader to the tag and vice versa. Such
adversaries are generally referred to as man-in-the-middle adversaries.
Our main contribution regarding these protocols is to show that the latter conjecture does
not hold. ăat is, we illustrate an attack that is carried out by a man-in-the-middle attacker
who succeeds in recovering the parties’ shared secret. Our attack is practical as the adversary
only needs to trigger 220 or 235 protocol sessions, depending on the parameter set by Gilbert
et al. proposed. We further study possible đxes of the protocol, such as limiting the num-
ber of errors the problem is putting in its answers, but it turns out that even these variants
do not stand against other variants of the attack. ăese results were published at AsiaCrypt
 [OOV].
Regarding the structure, we divided this analysis into two chapters. In Chapter , we give a
more detailled presentation of the LPN problem and its properties. We also present the main
protocols of the HB protocols, namely HB andHB+. We leave HBž and its security analysis
to Chapter .
.. From Public-Key Cryptography to MACs: ąe SQUASH Proposal
Another proposal we study is rather unusual as it builds a symmetric-key cryptographic prim-
itive, a MAC, from a function that represents the core of one of the oldest and most studied
cryptosystems: ăe Rabin encryption scheme [Rab]. ăis MAC, called SõUASH, for
SõUAre haSH, was proposed by Shamir [Sha, Sha]. SõUASH was claimed to provide
at least the same level of security Rabin’s scheme provides as it consists of encrypting a mixing
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function of amessage and the key using Rabin’s function and only releasing a small number of
consecutive bits from the ciphertext. Although it strips theMAC from an inversion property,
which is mandatory in an encryption scheme, this last feature allowed SõUASH to be suit-
able for constrained environments. Pushing this reasoning even further, Shamir proposed to
use Mersenne numbers of unknown factorization for the Rabin function as the special form
of such numbers induces a signiđcant simpliđcation of Rabin’s modular reduction. All these
optimizations allowed Shamir to estimate the number of gate equivalents needed for the đ-
nal proposal SõUASH- to be around half the number of gates needed by the hardware-
oriented stream cipher G- [HJMM], i.e., around 850GE. Nevertheless, all those
simpliđcations were claimed to not aﬀect the security of theMAC. As a proof, Shamir gave a
“blame-game” argument which consists of saying that any successful attack against SõUASH
could be translated in an attack against the Rabin cryptosystem. ăerefore, if there was any
weakness in SõUASH’s design, it is Rabin’s scheme that should be blamed for. With the lat-
ter’s security having tight bounds with the factorization problem, SõUASH was backed up
with solid arguments.
Besides the practical SõUASH- proposal, two theoretical versions were proposed, the
đrst one whichwe call SõUASH-, proposed to use a Linear Feedback ShiĕRegister (LFSR)
that is loaded with the XOR of the key and the message to MAC.ăis version was proposed
in [Sha]. As it was quickly shown to be insecure when no window truncation was used,
i.e., if all the Rabin ciphertext was released, Shamir proposed to replace the LFSR by a non-
linear function [Sha]. Still, both versions stood on the same security arguments. Note that
SõUASH- is an aggressive proposal for which the blame-game argument does not hold.
In Chapter , we challenge SõUASH’s blame-game argument by mounting a key recov-
ery attack on the đrst version, SõUASH-0. We show that when using the recommended
Mersenne number 21 277  1 for the modulus of Rabin’s function, the secret key can be recov-
ered aĕer 210 pairs consisting of messages and their MACs. Of course, our attack does not
rely on factoring the modulus and works by manipulating the entries of the mixing function.
Unfortunately, the attack does not extend to the version in which the mixing function is a
non-linear mapping. Despite that, our attack leads to the conclusion that the security guar-
antees behind SõUASH do not hold. So, although there is no concrete attack on the đnal
SõUASH proposal, its exact level of security is unknown.
ăese results were part of an earlier research paper published at EuroCrypt  [OV].
1.2 Privacy Issues in RFID Systems
Besides needing dedicated cryptographic primitives to ensure security, the massive deploy-
ment of contactless devices such as RFID tags introduced a whole set of new threats related
to the privacy of their wielders. Indeed, the particularity of these devices of communicating
over the air presents several attractive advantages. Unfortunately, it also makes them much
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more vulnerable as this feature permits any entity in a reasonably close distance to monitor
all their communications. Not only that, but those attackers can also access the device and
interact with it at will. In spite of the speciđcations thatmay claim otherwise, this treat is even
more serious to consider as the distance fromwhich a tag can be accessed ranges from around
cm for passive tags to more than m for active ones.
AsAvoine andOechslinnoted [AO], theprivacyofRFIDs is a problemexceeding a single
layer and needs to be addressed in every layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)
model. In this dissertation, we concentrate on the higher ones and study privacy at the level
of protocols.
ăe traditional cryptographic requirement was limited to security, which roughly summa-
rizes in prohibiting the adversary from having access to sensitive content she should not have
had access to. ăe nowadays availability of contactless devices introduced the possibility for
a malicious adversary to trace or track an RFID tag. Being able to track such a tag constites a
mean to automatically trace its holder. It was the threat caused by this leakage of privacy that
led to the constitution of several organizations devoted to thwart the spread of this technolo-
gy such as the Boycott Benetton campaign [Ben] and the CASPIAN groups’s protest against
the introduction of RFID chips in supermarkets [CAS].
In the second part of this thesis, we discuss and study howprivacy can be protected inRFID
authentication protocols. For that, we study the problemof formalizingwhat is a privacy leak-
age. We claim that this formalism is needed and is the reason of the failure of many authen-
tication protocols. Aĕer that, we consider the protocols that can be used to obtain privacy
preserving protocols that can be used in RFID systems.
.. ąeNeed of a Privacy Model
Tomotivate the need of a privacy model, we show in Chapter  how several RFID protocols,
whose security are either based on adhoc arguments or were proven in an inadequate mod-
el, fail to protect the privacy of the tag. More explicitly, we mount tracing attacks on Pro-
bIP [CS], MARP [KYK], Auth [TSL], and Tsudik’s YA-TRAP [Tsu] along with
its variants YA-TRAP+ and O-TRAP [LBdM]. We stress that all these protocols have the
common property of not being supported by a rigorous security proof, but were based on
rather informal arguments. ăe point of these cryptanalysis is mainly to demonstrate how
crucial it is for protocols in general, and lightweight ones in this context, to be supported by
a sound proof that quantiđes the expected security.
Still, using an inappropriate model for assessing the privacy of schemes opens the door to
attacks leading to privacy leakage. To illustrate this point, we give tracing attacks for the Lim-
Kwon protocol [LK] which used an adhoc model presented in the same paper to prove
that the scheme is both forward and backward private (Forward privacy deals with the priva-
cy of the scheme before the tag’s secrets leak to the adversary while, backward privacy looks
at sessions occurring aĕer that leakage). We also show limitations of corruption in the model
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proposed byVanLe, Burmester anddeMedeiros [LBdM]. For that, we prove thatO-FRAP
and O-FRAKE, proposed in the same paper as an illustration of how the framework would
apply to prove privacy, do not provide Forward privacy. ăe conclusion from this analysis is
to emphasize the importance of having a model whose deđnitions correctly mirrors the re-
quirements of privacy.
ăese results, with others not covered in this thesis, were published in two papers presented
at ISPEC  [OPa] and ACNS  [OPb]. Some parts of them also appeared in an
article published in theWireless Personal Communications journal [OPSW].
.. Our Privacy Model
Chapters  to  are devoted to present our privacy model. Our starting point is Vaudenay’s
work [Vau] aswe retain its underlying intuition that privacy is the inability for any adversary
in extracting any information from protocol messages. We start by recalling and adapting
some of its deđnitions in Chapter . We also compare the model with other proposals we
describe in Chapter , namely Juels andWeis model [JW] and the zero-knowledge privacy
model introduced in [DLYZ]. Our conclusion from this comparison is that any privacy
leakage detected in the previous two models is detected in Vaudenay’s model.
However, Vaudenay’s deđnitions induce one unnatural result in the impossibility of de-
signing a protocol that provides privacy protection against adversaries who have an a priori
knowledge of the tag’s secrets and have access to the result of protocol sessions. In Chapter ,
we argue that this impossibility is the result of a mismatch between the actual deđnition of
privacy and the notion it aims to implement. ăerefore, we update the deđnition to đll that
gap. Moreover, we show that using a plaintext-aware public-key encryption scheme leads to
a protocol achieving this level of privacy. On a side note, we show that the same level of pri-
vacy cannot be achieved by a public-key encryption scheme secure against chosen ciphertext
attacks (IND-CCA), hence, giving one of the sole applications of plaintext-awareness that
is independent from IND-CCA.
ăat impossibility result also had implications for protocols with mutual authentication,
i.e., in which the reader is also required to authenticate to the tag. In a critical work of Paise
and Vaudenay’s model, Armknecht, Sadeghi, Scafuro, Visconti, and Wachsmann [ASS+]
showed that no protocol with mutual authentication achieves security and privacy with re-
spect to adversaries who have knowledge of all the tags’ secrets, but do not see the result of
protocol instances (Such a level of security and privacy is achievable in unilateral authenti-
cation protocols by an IND-CCA secure encryption scheme). ăis result comes as a di-
rect contradiction to Paise and Vaudenay’s IND-CCA based protocol that was supposed to
achieve it. Although we agree with Armknecht et al. on their results, we still show that Paise
and Vaudenay’s scheme is Forward private. We also argue why their results do not hold un-
der our corrected model and demonstrate that the strongest form of privacy is achievable in
conjonction with security formutual authentication protocols by proposing a concrete RFID
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protocol. Again, we rely on plaintext-aware encryption schemes to instantiate this protocol.
ăis extension is the subject of Chapter .
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2.1 Notations
In all this dissertation, we deđne a probabilistic algorithm to be an interactive Turing ma-
chine running on two tapes, one containing its inputs and the other one its randomness. An
algorithm is said to be polynomial or to run in polynomial-time if it stops aĕer a polynomial
number of steps in the size of it entry tape. Algorithms can also be deterministic: ăose are
the ones that can be modeled by a Turing machine that only runs on a tape that contains its
explicit inputs.
We use the notationA(x; y) ! z to refer to running the algorithmA with input x and y
and obtaining z as an output. When the algorithm is interactive and has access to an oracleO,
we shall denote itAO. Finally, we deđne the view of an interactive algorithm to be its random
tape and all the answers that it got from interacting with the oracles it had at its disposal. All
the other messages can be computed from this view and the algorithm’s description. For an
algorithmA, its view is denoted viewA.
For a discrete set X , jXj refers to its cardinality, i.e., the number of elements it contains.
A vector v whose components are bits is called a binary vector. We also deđne the Hamming
weight of a binary vectors as the number of 1’s that it contains.
Finally, we let N denote the set of natural numbers, 0 inclusive, and N? denote the set of
natural numbers greater than0. Likewise,Z is the set of integers. Zp denotes the set of positive
integers smaller than p and Z?p is a subset of the former that only includes integers that a co-
prime with p.
2.2 Probabilities and Negligible Functions
We đrst start by recalling some basic deđnitions for probabilities. ăe probability mass func-
tion of a discrete probability distribution is a function f such that f(x) = Pr[x = x]. We
also recall the deđnition of the cumulative distribution function F (x) = Pr[x  x].
ăroughout this dissertation, we will explicitly use four probability distribution. For the
sake of completeness, we describe them inhere.
 ăe Uniform Distribution. Over a discrete set, the uniform distribution assign to
every entry an equal probability. ăat is, its probability mass function is a constant
function that sums to 1 over all elements ofX , i.e.,
8x 2 X : f(x) = jXj 1:
Even if it constitutes an abuse of notation, we write x 2R X to express the fact that x
is chosen fromX according to the uniform distribution.
 ăe Bernoulli Distribution. ăis distribution is deđned over the binary set f0; 1g
and models the success of an experiment that is controlled with a probability p. ăat
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is, a random variable x following the Bernoulli distribution with parameter , denoted
x  Ber(), takes the value1with success probability and the value0withprobability
1  .
 ăe Binomial Distribution. Simply put, the binomial distribution is counting how
many Bernoulli trials succeed: It consists of repeating n times an experiment that suc-
ceedswithprobability andcountinghowmanyof those experiments succeeded. ăere-
fore, the law admits two parameters, n and , and is noted Binom(n; ). For this dis-
tribution, the mean and variance compute as n and m(1   ) respectively. ăe
probability mass function is given by
fn;(x) =

n
x

x(1  )n x
 ăeGaussian Distribution. Also known as the normal distribution, this distribution
is oĕen used as a đrst approximation to describe random variables that tend to cluster
around a single mean value  resulting in a bell-shaped distribution curve which width
depends on another paramater 2 called the variance.
';2(x) =
1p
22
e 
(x )2
22
Its corresponding cumulative distribution function is denoted(x).
2.3 Classical Cryptography
Let us consider two parties, traditionally refered to as Alice and Bob, who share a secret bit-
stringK , called the key. Alice sends a messagem to Bob through a communication channel
thatmay be under the control of amalicious entity, thatwe callMalice. Bob receives amessage
m^ that may be diﬀerent fromm. Depending on the needs of Alice and Bob, they may want
to materialize some of the properties below.
 Integrity. A communication channel is integer if whenever m^ 6= m, Bob detects it.
ăat is, no one canmodify messages transiting through a noiseless channel without be-
ingdetected. Note that this property does not preventMalice from inserting or deleting
messages.
 Authenticity. In an authenticated channel, Bob only receives messages that come from
Alice andwheneverMalice inserts ormodiđes amessage transiting through the channel
it is detected.
 Conđdentiality. ăis property aims at preserving the secrecy of the message. ăat is,
it ensures that no one except Bob deduces any information about the message.
In the following sections, we describe classical cryptographic tools for achieving each one
of these properties.
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Figure 2.1:Components of a symmetric encryption scheme.
.. Symmetric Encryption
Depicted in Figure ., symmetric encryption schemes are used to achieve conđdentiality.
Deđnition . (Symmetric-Key Encryption)
A symmetric-key encryption system is a set of three algorithms deĖned as follow.
 Key Generation. KeyGen ! K is an algorithm for generating the symmetric keyK that
will be used by Alice and Bob to communicate privately.
 Encryption. For a messagem, denoted plaintext, EncK(m) ! c produces a ciphertext.
ąis ciphertext is sent to Bob.
 Decryption. Decryption is the inĂerse operation of encryption. ąat is, DecK(c) ! m
produces the plaintext that was encrypted to c using the same keyK .
Symmetric encryption schemes are divided into two categories: stream ciphers and block
ciphers. Stream ciphers are inspired by the one-time pad, the only perfectly secure encryption
scheme in the Shannon model [Sha], with the key diﬀerence between the two being that
in a stream cipher the stream that is XORed with the plaintext is only pseudo-random. Con-
sequently, stream ciphers can encrypt messages of virtually arbitrary length. Popular stream
ciphers include RC, that is used in many protocols such as SSL,WEP andWPA, and A/,
used in the GSM cellular telephone standard. On the other side, block ciphers impose a
đxed length for the plaintext so that even shorter messages need to padded before encryp-
tion. Today’s most used block ciphers include DES, DES, both standardized in [NIS],
AES [DR], IDEA [LM], and IDEA-NXT [JV]. However, techniques, known as
modes of operations, were proposed to extend the maximal length of plaintexts. ăe CBC
mode is an example of such mode of operation.
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Figure 2.2:Components of a MAC.
Regarding their security, a stream cipher is secure if the generated bit sequence is indistin-
guishable from a truly random sequence. More detail on this deđnition will be given in Sec-
tion ... ăe security of block ciphers is a more elaborated case which has been subject of
several deđnitions, ranging from Vaudenay’s decorrelation theory [Vau] to Bellare-Desai-
Jokipii-Rogaway’s indistinguishability based deđnitions [BDJR]. In this work, we keep the
most general and simple deđnition for its security, namely indistinguishability from a random
permutation. ăat is, a block cipher is said to be secure if for a randomly chosen permutation
C?, a uniformly distributed keyK and every distinguisherD, we havePr[DC?() ! 1]  Pr[DEncK() ! 1]  2 
.. Message Authentication Codes
While an encryption scheme ensures the conđdentiality of a communication channel, it does
not guarantee that Mallory cannot manipulate ciphertexts that would induce a transforma-
tion of the underlying plaintext (Note that Mallory only changes the content of the message
in a certain way but this does not mean that she learnt any information about it). Message
authentication codes (MACs) are tasked with achieving authentication in a communication
channel . As it is depicted in Figure ., aMAC is composed of the following three algorithms.
Deđnition . (Message Authentication Codes - MAC)
AMAC is a triplet of algorithms (KeyGen,MAC, Verify) deĖned as follow
 Key Generation. ąe setup is delegated to an algorithm KeyGen that outputs the keyK
that will be used by Alice and Bob.
 MAC. Using the secret key K , this algorithm generates a tag t for a messagem given as
input, i.e.,MACK(m)! t.
 Verify. ąis last algorithm is used by the recipient to assert whether a tag t authenticates
a message m. In other words, VerifyK(m; t) outputs 1 if t is a tag corresponding to the
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messagem for the secret keyK , otherwise, it outputs 0. Note that it should be that every
tag generated byMAC passess Verify keyed with the same key.
ăe standard security requirement forMACs is called existential unforgeability under cho-
sen message attacks. In short, it assumes that the adversary has access to an oracle to which
she can submit a set of adaptively chosen messagesM = fm1; : : : ;mng to a MAC oracle
that when queried withmi returns t  MACK(mi). (In this context, adaptive refers to the
adversary’s ability to choose the (i+ 1)th message aĕer receiving the oracle answer regarding
the ith message.) In parallel, the adversary may also access an oracle for MAC veriđcation,
i.e., an oracle to which she can submit (m; t) pair and learn about the bit VerifyK(m; t). In
the end, the adversary wins if she manages to produce a pair (m?; t?) such thatm? was not
submitted to the MAC oracle and VerifyK(m; t). A MAC is then said to be secure if every
such adversary limited to 2 basic operations does not win with a probability better than 2 .
Equivalently, the MAC security experiment can be written as follow.
Pr

VerifyK(m
?; t?) = 1
 K 2R f0; 1g(m?; t?) AMACK();VerifyK(;)

 2 
AfewdedicatedMACswereproposed. Instead,MACsare generally built fromother symmetric-
keyprimitives using standard transformations. For instance, theHMAC[BCK] andUMAC[BHK+]
constructions allow tobuild aMACfromahash function. Otherproposals, such asOMAC[IK]
and PMAC [BR], build a MAC from a block cipher. Finally, some constructions even al-
low to combine encryption and MAC in a single primitive called authenticated encryption.
Examples of such constructions include the EAXmode of operation [BRW].
.. Cryptographic Hash Functions
Besides ensuring data integrity, cryptographic hash functions are cryptography’s Swiss army
knife, serving many purposes and appearing in almost all constructions.
A hash function family is a set of functions mapping arbitrary large strings to a đxed size
output called the hash. Mathematically, for a keyK 2 f0; 1g, we consider a set of functions
HK : f0; 1g? ! f0; 1gn. ăe usual security requirements for hash functions are listed below
in increasing strength order.
 First Pre-image Resistance. A hash function is said to be (đrst) preimage resistant
if for a randomly chosenK , given a hash y, it is infeasible to đnd a x such that y  
HK(x). In other words,
Pr

HK(A(y)) = y
 K 2R f0; 1gy 2R Range(HK)

 2 n
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 Second Pre-image Resistance. ăis deđnition is similar to the đrst pre-image resis-
tance except that the adversary is already given one pre-image of the hash y and is tasked
with đnding another one. ăat is, a hash function is secure against second pre-image
attacks if
Pr
24 HK(x) = HK(x0) ^ x 6= x0

K 2R f0; 1g
x0 2R Domain(HK)
x A(x0)
35  2 n
 CollisionResistance.ăis is the strongest attack as it grants to the adversary the power
to choose the hash for which she has to provide two diﬀerent values x1 6= x2 such that
HK(x1) = HK(x2). Contrarily to the two attacks before, there exists an attack in 2n/2
due to the birthday paradox (ăis attack consists in picking two random values and
checking whether they are mapped to the same value and repeating until the condition
is satisđed). A hash function family is then said to be collision resistant if no adversary
can do better than the birthday attack.
Although considering a family of functions is essential for the correctness of the deđnition
of collision resistance, widely used hash functions such as SHA-, SHA- [NIS], and even
the current SHA- đnalists, consist of a single function. Clearly, when only pre-image resis-
tance is required those hash functions can đt the
.. Universal Hash Functions
In many situations, the hardness of đnding collisions is a too strong requirement and we only
need that collisions for two random values happen with a small enough probability. ăis is
the case for example in hash tables and for extracting randomness [ILL]. ăe functions
satisfying this notion are called universal hash functions.
Deđnition . (Universal Hash Function Family)
A universal hash function family is a family of functionsHK2f0;1g : f0; 1g` ! f0; 1gn that
satisĖes the following property.
8x; y 2 f0; 1g`; s:t:x 6= y : Pr
h2H
[HK(x) = HK(y)jK 2R f0; 1g]  2 n:
Note that contrarily to most cryptographic primitives universal hash functions does not
need to rely on any assumption. Instead, they can be instantiated using simple modular arith-
metic as in the Carter-Wegman construction [CW].
.. Pseudo-Random Functions
As true randomness is diﬃcult to obtain, it is essential to have a mean to generate sequences
that look random to the adversary. Two cryptographic primitives can be used to implement
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Figure 2.3:Components of a Public-key encryption scheme.
such functionality: Pseudo-random functions (PRF) and pseudo-randomnumber generators
(PRNG).
Deđnition . (Pseudo-Random Function - PRF)
Let FK2f0;1g : f0; 1g` ! f0; 1gn be a family of functions indexed by a keyK . We say that F
is a family of pseudo-random functions if it satisĖes
 For everyK 2 f0; 1g and everyx 2 f0; 1g`,FK(x) is computable in polynomial-time.
 For a randomly chosen K , FK is indistinguishable Ěom a function R, chosen randomly
among the set of functions Ěom f0; 1g` to f0; 1gn. In other words, for every distinguisher
D, we have that
2.4 Public-Key Encryption Schemes
Public-key encryption, also known as asymmetric encryption, is one of the greatest achieve-
ments ofmodern cryptography. It allows one sender to encryptmessages that only a particular
receiver can decrypt and that with only having a public key. On the other hand, the receiver
is given a secret key that is used for decryption. ăat is, anyone with access to the public key
can encrypt messages that only the receiver can decrypt.
Deđnition . (Public-Key Encryption Scheme)
A public-key encryption scheme is a triplet of algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) deĖned as follows
 KeyGen(1k) ! (sk; pk). ąis is the key generation algorithm. On input a security pa-
rameter k, written in unary, this algorithm generates in polynomial-time a secret key sk
that is securely transmitted to its intended owner, while a public key pk is published. ąe
latter also characterises a, usually Ėnite, message spaceM . Note that this algorithm has to
be probabilistic.
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Figure 2.4:ăe IND-CPA Security Experiment.
 Encpk(m) ! c. ąis, usually probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm is used to encrypt
a messagem 2M under the public key pk by forming a ciphertext c.
 Decsk(c) ! m. ąis last algorithm is used to decrypt a ciphertext c. ąat is, given c and
the secret key sk, the algorithm recoĂersm in a polynomial-time number of steps.
Obviously, these algorithms have to be consistent with each other in the sense that using a secret
key sk to decrypt a ciphertext c that is the encryption of a message m under the corresponding
public key pk yieldsm. In other words,
8k 2 N : Pr
24 Decsk(c) = m

KeyGen(1k)! (sk; pk)
m 2R M
Encpk(m)! c
35 = 1
Regarding the security of encryption schemes, we retain the two classical notions of se-
mantic security and non-malleability. Semantic security formalizes the fact that ciphertexts
conceal all information about their underlying plaintexts. ăis property is captured by indis-
tinguishability under chosen message attacks, commonly abbreviated IND-CPA [GM].
Deđnition . (IND-CPA Security)
We consider the IND-CPA security experiment shown in Figure .. A scheme is called IND-
CPA secure, if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary wins the IND-CPA experiment with
an advantage greater than a negligible function of the security parameter. In other words, for
every probabilistic polynomial-time two-stage algorithm (A1;A2), IND-CPA security requires
that Pr
2664A2(c; st) = b

KeyGen(1k)! (sk; pk)
A1(pk)! (m0;m1; st)
b 2R f0; 1g
Encpk(mb)! c
3775  12
 = negl(k)
IND-CPA secure encryption schemes include classical examples such as the Goldwasser-
Micali cryptosystem [GM], Elgamal’s encryption scheme [Elg], and Paillier’s encryption
scheme [Pai].
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Figure 2.5:ăe IND-CCA Security Experiment.
Non-malleability is a stronger notion, not only requiring that no adversary can learn any
information on the message but also mandating that it is not possible to transform the en-
crypted plaintext by applying someoperations. ăis level of security is clearly higher andmore
diﬃcult to attain than IND-CPA security. More formally, it was shown to correspond to in-
distinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks, IND-CCA for short [RS]. In short,
this notion is similar to the IND-CPA property except that the adversary, in both phases, can
query a decryption oracle on every ciphertext but c. A weaker notion in which only A1 is
granted that access has been considered by Naor and Yung [NY]. To distinguish both vari-
ants, the former notion is commonly refered to as IND-CCA security and the later one by
IND-CCA security. We give the formal deđnition of IND-CCA security.
Deđnition . (IND-CCA Security)
Let us consider the IND-CCA security experiment depicted in Figure .. A public-key encryp-
tion scheme is called IND-CCA secure if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary wins the
IND-CCA experiment with an advantage greater than a negligible function of the security pa-
rameter. In other words, for every probabilistic polynomial-time two-stage algorithm (A1;A2),
IND-CCA security requires that
Pr
2664AODec2 (c; st) = b

KeyGen(1k)! (sk; pk)
AODec1 (pk)! (m0;m1; st)
b 2R f0; 1g
Encpk(mb)! c
3775  12
 = negl(k)
When the probability aboĂe only holds for adversaries that are such that A2 does not query
ODec, then the scheme is said to be IND-CCA secure.
RSA-OAEP [BRa] and Rabin-SAEP [Bon] are two examples of systems that achieve
IND-CCA security (in the RandomOracle model explained in Section .). ăe Cramer-
Shoup [CS] cryptosystem is also IND-CCA secure, but in the standard model.
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2.5 Hybrid Encryption
Public-key encryption has contributed to the simpliđcation of keymanagement, reducing the
number of keys in a network of n users from n(n   1) to n. Despite that, the price to pay
for this simpliđcation is that encrypting with a public-key scheme is much slower than doing
so with a symmetric encryption scheme. Another limitation of public-key encryption relates
to the đxed length of plaintexts: While it is possible to encrypt arbitrary long message us-
ing modes of operations, there is no generic way to extend the message space of a public-key
encryption scheme.
ăerefore, to combine the advantages of both types of encryptions, a dual mechanism of
key encapsulationmechanism (KEM) coupled with a data encapsulationmechanism (DEM)
was proposed. Simply put, this systemworks by having a random symmetric key encrypted in
a ciphertext which is used in a symmetric scheme to encrypt the data to send. More explicitly,
we give the following deđnition.
Deđnition . (ăeKEM/DEMParadigm of Hybrid Encryption)
A KEM consists of the following algorithms
 KeyGen(1)! (sk; pk):ąis Ėrst probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm generates the
pair of keys.
 KEM:Encpk() ! (K;C): Taking no input, this algorithm produces a symmetric key K
for the DEM deĖned below and outputs its corresponding ciphertextC .
 KEM:Decsk(C) ! K: Via this algorithm the receiver makes use of his secret key sk to
recoĂer the symmetric keyK .
A DEM is then deĖned as for a symmetric encryption scheme without key generation.
 DEM:Enc(K;m)! c:Using this algorithm, the sender encrypts the messagem.
 DEM:Dec(K:c) ! m: By this algorithm, the receiver decrypts c and gets the underlying
ciphertextm.
From a very high level, a KEM/DEM can be seen as a public-key encryption scheme. Since
they mimic public-key and symmetric-key encryption schemes, it is rather easy to deđne sim-
ilar security properties for KEMs and DEMs.
2.6 The Random Oracle Model
ăe Random Oracle (RO) model consists of replacing hash functions by black-box oracles
that produces uniformly distributed outputs [BR]. ăe ROmodel has been useful in prov-
ing the security of many schemes with fairly simpler design than comprable ones with securi-
ty proofs in the standard model. ăere is however a separation between the two as Canetti,
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Goldreich, andHalevi demonstrated [CGH]. Nevertheless, their construction is rather ar-
tiđcial and the impact of replacing the random oracle by a traditional hash function in amore
conventional design is yet to be clearly outlined.
Deđnition . (RandomOracle)
Arandomoracle overf0; 1gn is an algorithmmanaging a tableT , initially empty, which receives
bit-strings x of arbitrary length as queries and answers as follow:
 If T already contains an entry (x; y), then it simply returns y.
 Otherwise, it picks a random y 2 f0; 1gn, inserts the pair (x; y) in T m and Ėnally
returns y.
2.7 Proof Techniques
.. Hard Problems
Proofs of security in cryptography are usually reductions. ăat is, they transform an algorithm
performing an attack on a system in a certain model to an adversary against a believed-to-be-
hard computational problem, in the sense that noprobabilistic polynomial-time adversary can
solve it. However, in some sense cryptographic hard problems are harder thanNP-Complete
problems in the sense that they require that a randomly chosen instance of the problem is hard
to solve whereNP-Completeness deals with the same issue but for all problems. It then fol-
lows thatP 6= NP is not a suﬃcient condition for the existence of these problems. However,
ifP = NP then no such problem would exist.
Typical conjectured hard problems include
 ăe Factorization Problem. For two prime numbers p and q, deđne n = pq. ăe
factoring problem is to recover p and q from n. Rabin’s cryptosystem is based on the
assumption [Rab]. Recovering the secret key in RSA [RSA] is also as hard as solv-
ing this problem.
 ăeRSA Problem. ăis is also known as the eth-root problem. Given a hard to factor
integern, an integer e < n such that gcd(e; '(n)) = 1, and y 2R Z?n, compute x such
that xe = y (mod n). ăe reason this problem is named this way is because it is the
computational assumption on which the security of the RSA cryptosystem stands.
 ăeDiscrete Logarithm Problem. Given a generator g of a cyclic groupG (typically
the multiplicative group of a đnite đeld or an elliptic curve group) and y 2R G, đnd
x such that gx = y. ăe security of the Elgamal cryptosystem against key recovery
attacks rests on this problem.
 ăeDiﬃe-Hellman Problem.ăis is the problem induced by the Diﬃe-Hellman key
agreement protocol. In this problem g a generator of a cyclic groupG and x, y are two
integers. ăe problem is, given g, gx, and gy , to recover gxy .
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 ăe Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman Problem. ăe DDH problem is to distinguish be-
tween aDiﬃe-Hellman triplet, i.e., (gx; gy; gxy), whereg is a generator of a cyclic group
G and x, y are randomly chosen integers, from a triplet (gx; gy; R), whereR is a ran-
dom uniformly distributed overG. ăe semantic security of the Elgamal cryptosystem
relies on the hardness of this problem.
In the next two sections, we review classical techniques to reduce the security of a cryptosys-
tem to a certain mathematical problem.
.. ąe Simulation Paradigm and Hybrid Arguments
Intuitively, the best way to express the property that a secure cryptographic functionality is
required to not leak any information to an attacker interacting with it in a non-predictable
way. ăe classical way to approach the problem is due to Goldwasser and Micali [GM]
who formalized this requirement by saying that the adversary does not learn any information
from interacting with a system then it should be possible to replace all the responses comput-
ed by the system by adequate “fake” messages without eﬀectively disturbing the output of the
adversary. Being independent from the cryptographic system, these fakemessages can be gen-
erated by a third party that is called the simulator. For instance, we expect from a secure block
cipher that ciphertexts are indistinguishable from random bit-strings so that we can deđne a
simulator that replaces those ciphertexts by random elements.
ăis simulation is suﬃcientwhen the adversary has only one access to the functionality, e.g.,
to an encryption oracle. However, the situationmay bemore complicated when the adversary
produces adaptively chosen queries. ăe common technique to deal with these issues is to
consider intermediate adversaries.
Now assume that the adversary is making a polynomially-bounded q queries to that encryp-
tion oracle and the goal is to obtain an adversary who only gets access to random elements
and produces an indistinguishable output. We deđne q+1 intermediate adversaries, denoted
A0; : : : ;Ai; : : : ;Aq , called hybrids, such that the i đrst queries ofAi are handled by the en-
cryption oracle and the rest of them are processed by the simulator. ăe idea is to show that if
Ai andAi+1 produce indistinguishable distributions, in the sense that the distance between
the two output distributions is negligible, then by triangle inequalityA0 andAq produce in-
distinguishable distributions. To conclude, the latest two algorithms respectively correspond
to the one that only accesses the “real” oracle and to the one that accesses the simulator. ăe
proof technique in its whole is called a hybrid argument.
.. ąeGame Proof Methodology
It is oĕen the case that a cryptosystem relies onmore than one assumption to be proven secure.
For these kind of systems, the simulation paradigm shows its limitations as it results in proofs
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that are oĕen complex to follow and verify.
Instead, the gameproofmethodology allows to treat each case at once by considering anum-
ber of “intermediate games”. ăe proof starts by considering a game, denoted Game , played
by an adversaryA against a challenger that simulates the environment forA and ensures that
she follows the game description. ăe adversary thenwins at the end if an eventS0 occur. ăe
proof consists of iteratively tweaking the game until we obtain an adversary literally attack-
ing a mathematical problem. Si denotes the event that the adversary wins in Game i. ăree
diﬀerent types of transitions are usually considered [Sho].
 Transitions basedon indistinguishability. In such a transition, a small change ismade
that, if detected by the adversary, would imply an eﬃcient method of distinguishing
between two distributions that are indistinguishable (either statistically or computa-
tionally).
 Transitions based on failure events. In such a transition, we argue that Games i and
i + 1 proceed identically unless a certain “failure event” E occurs. Using the diﬀer-
ence Lemma, it can be shown that the statistical distance between the two games, i.e.,
Pr[Si]  Pr[Si+1], can be bounded by Pr[E]. ăerefore, as long asE occurs with neg-
ligible probability, the transition goes unnoticed to the adversary.
 Bridging Games. ăese transitions are generally used to make the proof simpler by
reformulating how certain quantities or variables are computed.
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With the limitations of theoretically secure cryptography, it was natural to try to design
cryptographic primitives that rely on problems that are computationally hard to solve. ăe
choice of NP-Complete problem.
In this Chapter, we review the
3.1 The LPN Problem
.. DeĖnition of the Problem
We consider the problem of recovering a secret k-bit vector x. For that purpose, we are given
an oracleOx which knows the vectorx and, on each request, answers with a uniformly chosen
k-bit vector a and a bit equal to a  x, where the operation  is the scalar product. In other
words, the output distribution of the oracle is
f(a; a  x) : a 2R f0; 1gkg:
ăis problem is simple to solve using algebraic techniques such as Gauss elimination. All
that is needed for such an algorithm to recover x is k linearly independent vectors a. ăe cost
of an unoptimized algorithm implementing Gaussian elimination is roughly O(k3). As the
vectors are chosenuniformly and independently byOx, theprobability thatk vectors returned
by this latter are linearly independent is equal to
k 1Y
i=1
(1  1
2i
):
According to Euler’s Pentagonal number theorem, this probability tends to the number
(1/2)1 ' 0:2887 when k tends to inđnity. From this, it results that the attack consisting
of querying k times the oracleOx and solving the resulting linear system usingGaussian elim-
ination succeeds with a probability bounded by (1/2)1 in time complexityO(k3).
Suppose now that the oracle Ox adds noise to the bit it outputs. ăat is, instead of out-
putting a  x, it may Ĕip that bit and output a  x  1. When this Ĕipping occurs for every
returned bit, the attack above can still be applied by adding an extra step. Namely, the algo-
rithmhas to Ĕip all the bits that it obtained before usingGaussian elimination. ăe casewhere
the decision to Ĕip each bit is random ismore diﬃcult to deal with. A popular variant consists
in Ĕipping the answer according to a probability that follows a Bernoulli distribution.
Fromnowon,wewill consider the following variant conditionedby a parameter 2]0; 1/2[:
On each query,Ox; picks a uniformly chosen k-bit vector a outputs a pair of the form (a; a 
x  ), where  is a bit chosen following a Bernoulli distribution of parameter , denoted
 .       
  
Ber(). In this particular case, the answers of the oracleOx; follow the probability distribu-
tion
f(a; a  x ) : a 2R f0; 1gk; Pr[ = 1] = g:
ăis problem has proven to be very hard to solve and lies in the NP-hard class of com-
plexity as it will be detailled later. Although it has many formulations, the problem, as it
is stated above, is commonly known as the Learning Parity with Noise problem, abbreviated
LPN [Hås].
Deđnition . (ăe LPN problem)
Let x be a binary vector of length k and  2]0; 1/2[ a real number. We deĖneOx; to be an oracle
that outputs independent samples according to the distribution
f(a; a  x ) : a 2R f0; 1gk; Pr[ = 1] = g:
We say that an algorithmA solĂes the LPN problem with parameters (k; ) with probability 
if
Pr[x AOx; (1k)jx 2R f0; 1gk]  :
Here, the probability is taken over the random choice of x and the random tape ofA.
ăe LPN problem can be equivalently reformulated as a pure computational instance in
which the problem is to đnd an assignment for a q-bit vector x in a system of q linear equa-
tions that satisfy q0  q equations. From this perspective, the problem is best known as the
minimum disagreement problem, or its abbreviationMDP problem [CKS].
Deđnition . (ăeMDPProblem)
Let q and k two positive integers,A an q k binary matrix, and z a binary vector of length q. If
q0 denotes a positive integer smaller than or equal q, Ėnd a k-bit vector x satisfying q0 equations
of the systemA  x = z.
.. ąeAverage Hardness of the LPN Problem
As a special case of a general decoding problem for linear codes, the NP-hardness of the LPN
problem follows from thework of Berlekamp,McEliece, and vanTilborg [BMT]. In short,
they reduced the general decoding problem for linear codes to the three-dimensional match-
ing problem, the  NP-Complete problem in Karp’s list [Kar]. A stronger result was
found by Håstad [Hås]: He proved that it is NP-hard to đnd an algorithm that succeeds
in đnding solutions to the general decoding problem for linear codes better than the trivial
algorithm which tests random values.
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Table 3.1: Complexity of Solving the LPN problem for diﬀerent values of  and k. Values taken from
Leveil’s thesis [Lev].
k
 128 256 512 768
0:1 219 238 272 297
0:125 224 243 273 2105
0:25 232 251 285 2121
0:4 240 262 2101 2143
However, NP-Completness only considers the worst-case hardness of solving decisional
problems and does not guarantee that a randomly chosen instance of the problem cannot
be solved by a polynomial-time algorithm. Unfortunately, it is the latter property that is re-
quired in cryptography. ăerefore, we need to consider the average-case complexity of solving
the LPN problem. Of course, no proof regarding the average hardness of the LPN problem
was found. (ăis would prove the existence of one-way function!) Still, some arguments acts
in favor of its hardness. Among them, we mention Regev’s result concerning the the self-
reducibility of the problem with respect to x [Reg] : ăe complexity of solving the LPN
problem is independent from the choice of the secret vector x. (ăis property is shared with
the discrete logarithmproblem.) Another result due toKearns [Kea] relates the LPNprob-
lem to a learning problem where the solver is restricted to “statistical queries”. In this paper,
Kearns demonstrated that the class of parity functions cannot be eﬃciently learned by statis-
tical queries. As learning algorithms that comply to the restriction of “statistical queries” form
the majority of learning problems, this result rules out a large class of learning algorithm that
can be used to attack the LPN problem. We đnally mention a surprising result concerning
the hardness of solving the LPN problem when the adversary does not know : Laird [Pđ]
showed a technique that allows to revert in polynomial-time to the case where the adversary
is given . ăerefore, from a complexity classiđcation point of view, both variants are equiva-
lent.
Algorithms to Solve the LPNProblem To date, the best method for solving the LPN prob-
lem is byusing theBKWalgorithm, namedaĕer its authorsBlum,Kalai, andWasserman [BKW].
Fromahigh level point of view, this algorithm implements the following idea: by picking care-
fully a few well-chosen vectors in a quite large set of samples and computing the xor of these
vectors, we can đnd basis vectors, i.e., vectors of Hamming weight equal to . ăe advantage
of đnding this vector is that it readily yields a bit of the LPN’s secret vector when the number
of errors introduced in the answers is even. ăerefore, the algorithm relies on đnding enough
independent combinations of vectors equals to the same basis vector, and use a majority vote
enables to recover the correct value of the bit at the same position of the vector’s . Note that
this vote can only be eﬃcient when the number of vectors to sum is small as the error bias of
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the đnal equation becomes too small. For that the number of these vectors is set in practice to
be equal to 24 or 26.
Compared to exhaustive search algorithms on the correct equations [CTIN], or on the
errors introduced in the equations [GMZZ], which run in strict exponential time, the
BKW algorithm has the advantage of running in (slight) sub-exponential time. However,
Levieil and Fouque [LF] noted that the BKW algorithmmakes unnecessary queries to the
LPNoracle and proposed to use aWalsh transform to reduce the number of these queries. In-
dependently, Lyubashevsky [Lyu] adapted the BKW algorithm to produce a strict polyno-
mial number of requests to the LPN oracle at the cost of a slightly greater overall complexity.
Table ., that was compiled by Leveil for his PhD thesis [Lev] gives the best attack com-
plexities from all the previously mentioned algorithms to attack the LPN problem with vari-
ous parameters.
.. Extensions of the LPN Problem
Another branch of research was started by Regev [Reg] from generalizing the LNP prob-
lem to the ring Z?p, for a prime p, and called the generalized problem the learning with error
problem (LWE). It turned out that this problem enjoys tight relations with lattice reduction
problems. On one hand, Regev showed that the decision version of LWE is hard assuming
quantum hardness of the gap shortest vector problemGapSVP and the shortest independent
vector problem SIVP. On the other hand, Peikert [Pei] proved a similar result assuming
only the classical hardness of an easier version of the GapSVP problem.
ăe LWE problem proved to be very useful in serving as the basis for secure public-key
encryption under both chosen-plaintext [Reg, PVW] and chosen-ciphertext [PW,
Pei] attacks, oblivious transfer [GPV], identity-based encryption [CHKP], leakage-
resilient encryption [AGV, ACPS], and more.
More recently, Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev [LPR] extended the LWE problem to
the ring of integer polynomials modulo a cyclotomic, irreductible over the rationals, polyno-
mial, and used its hardness to propose the đrst truly practical lattice-based public-key cryp-
tosystem with an eﬃcient security reduction.
Another variation of the LPN and the LWE problems, known as the subspace LPN and
LWEproblemhas been introduced byPietrzak [Pie]. Among others, these problems served
to construct a MAC from the LPN problem [KPC+].
3.2 Security Models for the HB Family
Before going into the description of HB-like protocols, we review the main security models
for these protocols. All these protocols are symmetric-key based. ăat is, the prover and the
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veriđer receive a keyK uniformly distributed over the set of all possible secret keys.
As many probabilistic protocols, protocols from theHB family admit a false rejection rate.
ăat it, it is possible that a legitimate prover gets rejected by the veriđer even if the instance
went undisturbed. We shall refer to the probability of this event happening byPFR. Of course,
for practical reasons, we will require this probability to be negligible.
Conversely, it is also possible that a trivial adversary who only produces randomly gener-
ated protocol messages succeeds in authenticating as the prover. We denote the probability
of this event occurring by PFR. Again, for obvious security reasons, this probability has to be
negligible in the security parameter.
For simplicity, we assume the most devastating attack in which the adversary’s goal is to
recover the shared key. For these adversaries, we diﬀerentiate multiple attack scenarios.
 Passive Adversaries. ăis is the commonly assumed weakest adversarial model. A
passive adversary can only eavesdrop on communications between two parties. ăis
is usually formalized by giving to the adversary the access to an oracleO that returns
honestly generated protocol transcripts.
 ăe DET Model. Better known as the active adversarial model, it assumes that the
adversary is able to interact with the two parties independently. ăat is, the adversary
is given a black-box access to one oracle implementing the prover’s and the veriđer’s
strategies with the secret key as input. A đrst INIT message speciđes which party the
adversary wants the oracle to simulate. Note that the adversary cannot concurrently
launch two sessions with the oracle.
 ăe MIM Model. ăis model considers the most powerful type of adversaries. At-
tackers in this model are called man-in-the-middle for their ability to “sit” between the
prover and the veriđer and have complete control the communication channel. Con-
cretely, a man-in-the-middle has the power to insert a message in the channel (as an
active adversary would do), but can also modify any message sent by one of the parties.
 ăeGRS-MIMModel. For reasons thatwill bemade clearer inSection., a restricted
man-in-the-middle adversary in which the adversary can only modify messages going
from the veriđer to the prover.
Finally, we say that a scheme is secure in a certain model if every probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary who belongs to the associated class of adversaries does not recover the keyK
with a probability better than PFA + negl(k).
3.3 The HB Protocol
ăe đrst protocol based on the LPN problem is due to Hopper and Blum, who proposed the
HB protocol in  [HB]. Contrarily to its descendants, the aim of theHB protocol is to
reach extreme simplicity to be used by humans for authentication. Along with this imposed
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Prover Veriđer
Secret: x Secret: x
a         Choose a 2R f0; 1gk
Choose   Ber()
Compute z = a  x  z       !
Accept if a  x = z
Figure 3.1:One round of the HB protocol. ăe protocol consists of r such rounds.
simplicity, introducing a human parties induced substantial limitations for the adversarial
model because, as in SAS-based cryptography [Vaub, PV, LP] that is also intended
for humans, the existence of an authenticated channel, such as the voice of the participants is
much easier materialize than for electronic devices.
ăe HB protocol assumes that a prover and a veriđer share a k-bit secret vector x. ăe
authentication procedure, depicted in Figure ., consists of repeating r times the following
operation: the prover đrst picks a random k-bit vector a and sends it the veriđer. ăis latter
picks a bit  according to the bernoulli distribution of parameter , i.e., Pr[ = 1] =  and
computes the answer z = a  x   to be sent back to the prover. At last, the prover veriđes
whether the equality z = a  x holds. If, aĕer the r repetitions, the equality z = a  x was
satisđed at least t times, for a threshold t 2 [r; r/2[, then the veriđer acknowledges the prover.
Otherwise, authentication fails. Hence, a legitimate prover gets rejected if he introduced at
least t+1 errors in its answers. ăis event, known as false rejection, happens with probability
PFR =
kX
i=t+1

r
i

i(1  )r i
On the another side, the probability that a random answer z gets accepted by the veriđer has
to be low to guarantee security. ăis probability, called the false acceptance rate, is given by
PFA = 2
 r
tX
i=0

r
i

In the original paper, Blum andHopper proved that, as long as the LPN assumption holds,
the HB protocol is secure against passive adversaries. ăe proof comes from the observation
that a adversary has only access to the transcript of diﬀerent protocol instances and get pairs
of the form (a; z = a  x  ). As pairs correspond exactly to the output of theOx; oracle
from the LPN problem, any adversary deducing information on the shared secret of HB can
be used to deduce information on the LPN secret.
ăe formal security reduction runs as follows. Given a passive adversary AHB against the
HB protocol, we construct an adversary ALPN against the LPN problem that succeeds with
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Prover Veriđer
Secret: x; y Secret: x; y
Choose b 2R f0; 1gky b       !
a         Choose a 2R f0; 1gkx
Choose   Ber()
Compute z = a  x b  y   z       !
Accept if a  x b  y = z
Figure 3.2:One round of the HB+ protocol. ăe protocol consists of r such rounds.
the same probability. ăat is, AHB interacts with a prover and a veriđer, relaying messages
between the two andALPN interacts with an oracleOx; .
3.4 HB+
Starting from the idea that RFID protocols, like human protocols, should be as simple as pos-
sible, Juels andWeis proposed to use the HB protocol as an RFID protocol [JWa]. How-
ever, HB’s security properties are insuﬃcient in front of adversaries able to access RFID tags
and perform the attack described in the end of the previous section. For this purpose, they
proposed the HB+ protocol whose goal was to design an HB-related protocol secure against
active adversaries.
To thwart the attack against the HB protocol, Juels and Weis used a randomization tech-
nique in HB+ consisting of an extra message added to each round of the protocol, sent by
the prover at the beginning, and denoted by b. ăe shared secret between the prover and the
veriđer is then composed of two vectors x and y of size kx and ky respectively. LikeHB,HB+
consists of repeating r times the following procedure: ăe prover đrst sends a uniformly cho-
sen ky-bit vector b and sends it to the veriđer. ăis latter also generates a random kx-bit vector
a and sends it to the veriđer. ăen, aĕer generating a bit   Ber(), the veriđer computes
z = a  x b  y  . Upon reception of z, the veriđer checks the equality z = a  x b  y.
In the end, the veriđer authenticates the prover if a least t authentication rounds succeeded,
for t 2 [r; r/2[.
Not onlyHB+ fulđlls its purpose of denying the active attack againstHB, but it is provably
immune to attacks performed by active adversaries as that was demonstrated in the paper of
Juels andWeis [JWa]. However, their result only hold in the sequential case, i.e., when the
adversary has to terminate a session before provoking another one. A later paper by Katz and
Shin [KSa] showed that the reduction holds when the adversary is allowed to launch paral-
lel instances with the parties of the protocol if  < 1/4 . ăis result was further generalized for
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any  < 1/2 by Katz and Smith [KSb]. It should be noted that in all those security proofs,
ky and  are only the parameters on which depend the resulted adversary against the LPN
problem, the other parameters only aﬀect the gap of the reduction.
3.5 The GRS Attack
Soon aĕer its publication, Gilbert, Robshaw and Sibert exhibited an attack against HB+ that
can be carried by a man-in-the-middle adversary [GRS]. Before going any further, it is
worth noting that such an adversary is stronger than the active adversary considered in the se-
curity analysis ofHB+. So, theGRS attack does not contradict the security claimsmentioned
in [JWa, KSa, KSb]. In the same time, the adversary considered byGilbert et al. is also
weaker than the usual man-in-the-middle adversary as, to carry out the attack, the adversary
is only required to manipulate messages going from the veriđer to the prover. For this reason,
such adversaries are called GRS adversaries and a protocol secure against any GRS adversary
is said to be secure in the GRS model.
ăe GRS attack against HB+ consists in changing the a value sent by the veriđer. Taking a
constant kx-vector , the adversary replaces each a of the r rounds of the protocol by a  .
Upon reception of each of these message, the prover computes
z = a  x   x b  y  :
Hence, the veriđer accepts when   x   = 0. In the case where   x = 0, the success
probability is not altered and the prover authenticates successfully with probability 1   PFR.
In the other case, i.e., when   x = 1, all the noise bits become Ĕipped and the probability
that the veriđer acknowledges the prover is
tX
i=0

r
i

r i(1  )i =
rX
j=r t

r
j

j(1  )r j < PFR:
Depending on the outcome of the protocol, the adversary deduces one linear equation in x.
ăat equation is correct with a probability of at least (1 PFR). ăe secret vectorx can then be
recovered by launching kx instances of the protocol and altering the amessages with diﬀerent
i to obtain kx linear equations and then solve the linear system. ăis way, the adversary is
able to recover xwith probability (1 PFR)k
Qk 1
i=1 (1 2 i), that tends to (1/2)1 when k !
1, in time complexityO(k3x), corresponding to the complexity of solving the linear system.
Note that this attack can be optimized by carefully choosing the vectors i. For instance, the
adversary can choose i as being the vector with only the bit at position i set to  and the
others set to 0. In this case, i  x = xi so the adversary deduces this bit from the outcome of
the protocol. ăe complexity of the attack becomes linear in kx and the success probability
increases to (1  PFR)k that tends to 1 when k !1.
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Once the adversary has obtained x, she can interact with the veriđer, impersonating the
prover and provoking the launch of protocol instances by sending the same vector b during
the r rounds. In the last step of each round, the adversary sends z = a  x. As the veriđer
checks that z = a  x b  y, the adversary deduces that b  y = 0 when the veriđer accepts.
In contrary, she deduces that b  y = 1 when the veriđcation fails. As before, this deduction
is wrong with probability (1   PFR). ăe adversary can then recover y by the same method
as x. Hence, she succeeds in time complexityO(ky) and probability (1   pFR)k. We remark
that this second phase is not mandatory for all attack scenarios. If, for example, the goal of
the adversary is to impersonate the prover to the veriđer, then recovering y is unnecessary:
Once the adversary learns x, she only has to choose b = 0 so that the đnal response z does not
depend on y.
As Juels andWeis [JWb] noted, it may be possible to counter this attack by introducing
extra defense mechanisms. For instance, the veriđers can have a detection mechanism that
consists of stopping the system from performing authentications or revoking the shared key
aĕer a đxed number of authentication failures is reached. As the manipulations of the adver-
sary induce an acceptance rate of 1/2 for the kx protocol sessions needed to recover x, setting
a threshold lower than kx/2 for the number of failed authentications would limit the success
probability of the attack.
3.6 Attempts to Thwart the GRS Attack
Aĕer the publication of the GRS attack on HB+, several HB-related candidates were pro-
posed to obtain a lightweight protocol based on the LPN problem secure in the GRSmodel.
In this section, we review a certain number of these protocols.
.. HB++
HB++ was proposed by Bringer, Chabanne, and Dottax [BCD] to yield an HB-related
protocol that is secure in the GRS model.
ăe protocol is depicted in Figure .. It works in two phases. In the đrst phase, two par-
ties who share a secret key Z agree on a session key consisting of a quadruplet (x; x0; y; y0).
For that, both participants exchange k-bit vectors A and B and compute (x; x0; y; y0)  
h(A;B;Z), where h is a universal hash function. ăe second phase of the protocol is similar
to HB+, i.e., the two parties exchange k-bit vectors a and b. ăen the prover picks two bit
noises ;  0 following the bernoulli distribution with parameter . He then sends to the veri-
đer z = a  x b  y  , as in HB+, and z0 = f(a)i  x0  f(b)i  y0   0. ăe veriđer
then accepts the session of both relations hold. As for HB+, both participants run the proto-
col for r rounds and authentication succeeds if more than t sessions get accepted. HB++ can
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Prover Veriđer
Secret: Z Secret: Z
Session Key Derivation
ChooseB 2R f0; 1gk B       !
A         ChooseA 2R f0; 1gk
(x; x0; y; y0) h(A;B;Z) (x; x0; y; y0) h(A;B;Z)
ith Authentication Round
Choose b 2R f0; 1gk b       !
Choose ;  0  Ber() a         Choose a 2R f0; 1gk
Compute z = a  x b  y  
z0 = f(a)i  x0  f(b)i  y0   0 z;z0       ! Accept if
a  x b  y = z and
f(a)i  x0  f(b)i  y0 = z0
Figure 3.3:ăeHB++ protocol. One complete protocol instance consists of one session key derivation
protocol and r authentications. such rounds. f is a permutation and f()i refers to the
bit rotation by i bits to the leĕ in little endian notations.
be seen as two parallel instances of the HB protocol with independent secrets but correlated
challenges.
Concerning its security in the GRS model, the authors of HB+ gave arguments regard-
ing adversaries who modify the amessage of all rounds of a protocol instance. Despite this,
Gilbert, Robshaw, and Seurin [GRSa] proposed an adversary who only disturbed the đrst
s rounds by adding a constant vector  to each vector a in a way similar to the GRS attack
againstHB+. ăeir subsequent analysis proved that this attack succeeds in producing a linear
equation in the session secrets x and x0 if the attacker disturbs s 2 J t r
1 2 ; 2
t r
1 2 K rounds. As
for the sake of correctness, false rejections have to happen with small probability, it must be
that t   r is large so that we can đnd values of s in the interval. ăerefore, HB++ is inse-
cure when no session key is established, i.e., if (x; x0; y; y0) is the long term key. Nevertheless,
Gilbert, Robshaw, and Seurin were able to extend the attack to the case in which session keys
are used.
.. HB?
HB? was proposed by Duc and Kim [DK]. Again, this protocol consists of running r
rounds and authentication succeeds when at least t of these rounds succeed. However, the
protocol diﬀers for HB+ in that participants are given an extra k-bit secret vector s that is
used in the beginning of the protocol to securely send a bit . ăis is done by having the
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Prover Veriđer
Secret: x; y; s Secret: x; y; s
Choose b 2R f0; 1gk
  Ber0
w = b  y   b       !
a         Choose a 2R f0; 1gk
Choose   Ber()
if  = 0 then
z = a  x b  y  
else
z = b  x a  y   z       ! ifw = b  s then
Accept if z = a  x b  y  
else
z = b  x a  y  
Figure 3.4:One round of the HB? protocol. ăe protocol consists of r such rounds.
prover generate a random bit  following a Bernoulli distribution of parameter  0 along with
a k-bit vector b and sending b withw = b  s  . With the knowledge of s, the veriđer can
easily recover . Aĕer that, the veriđer generates its k-bit challenge a and send to the prover.
Depending on , the latter either computes z as a xb y or as z = a yb x. ăe
veriđer then veriđes whether the z he receives is consistent using the appropriate equation.
Regarding its security, Duc and Kim provided a heuristic analysis. Concretely, they argued
that since no adversary can recover  (ăis leads to a direct attack against the LPN problem),
the GRS attack does not apply as the adversary cannot know whether it is adding   x or
  y to z. However, Gilbert, Robshaw, and Seurin [GRSa] demonstrated that the success
probability of the GRS manipulation applied to HB? is dependent on x and y. In short,
every value for the pair (  x;   y) induce a diﬀerent success probability which can be easily
computed. Hence, it is suﬃcient to run the same attack several times to deduce the success
probability of the protocol with the manipulation, and therefore deducing the value of   x
and   y. Repeating the whole attack k times, the adversary obtains two well deđned systems
of linear equations which she can solve to retrieve x and y.
.. PUF-HB
Hammouri and Sunar [HS] proposed to combine HB+ and physically unclonable func-
tions (PUF) to obtain a tamper-resilient authentication protocol secure against GRS-like at-
tacks.
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Prover Veriđer
Secret: y Secret: y
Choose b 2R f0; 1gky b       !
a         Choose a 2R f0; 1gkx
Choose   Ber()
Compute z = PUF(a) b  y   z       !
Accept if PUF(a) b  y = z
Figure 3.5:One round of the PUF-HB protocol. ăe protocol consists of r such rounds.
A PUF is a function that is embodied in a physical structure and is easy to evaluate but
hard to predict [GCvDD]. Moreover, an individual PUF device must be easy to make but
practically impossible to duplicate, even given the exactmanufacturing process that produced
it. Nevertheless for some types of PUFs, it is possible to obtain a good approximation of the
PUF, up to an error rate of 3 for delay-based PUFs [GCvDD], which in the case of an
HB-like protocol can incorporated in the LPN problem’s Bernoulli noise.
PUF-HB is very similar to HB+ and diﬀers in the use of the PUF to compute the prover’s
answer. As it is shown in Figure ., instead of computing a  x like in the HB+ protocol,
the prover computes PUF(a). In other words, the secret in PUF-HB consists of a single binary
vector y. ăe prover initiates a protocol instance by sending a nonce b to which the veriđer
replies with a challenge a. ăe prover’s answer is then computed by picking a bit   Ber()
and z = PUF(a)  b  y  . Having a function PUF() approximating the PUF, the veriđer
checks that the equality z = PUF(a) b  y holds. If aĕer the procedure is repeated r times,
the veriđer has accepted at least t rounds, the protocol succeeds.
Using the non-linearity of the PUF function, the authors of PUF-HB argued that the GRS
attack does not apply to their protocol. ăey however do not showwhether it can resist other
variants of the GRS attack and only proved that PUF-HB is resistant to active adversaries,
just like HB+. As it was already pointed at in [OOV] and[Seu], PUF-HB can easily be
shown to be vulnerable toman-in-the-middle attacks. ăat is, a man-in-the-middle adversary
who can modify messages going from the prover to the veriđer can change all b messages to
b  and check whether the authentication succeeds or not. When authentication succeeds,
the attacker learns that   y = 0 with probability 1   PFR. Otherwise, she deduces that
  y = 1, which holds with probability 1   PFA. Running this attack k times yields enough
equations to solve a linear system and recover y.
Having said that, we can even show that PUF-HB is not secure in the GRSmodel for most
PUFs. We only cover the case of delay-based PUFs but the attack generalizes to other types
of PUFs that are vulnerable to modeling attacks [RSS+]. (In fact, the PUFs considered in
the latter paper cover most proposed PUFs.) Delay-based PUFs can be modeled by a linear
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equation of the form.
PUF(a) =
8>><>>:
1 when
Pk
i=1( 1)aiyi + yk+1 > 0
b 2R f0; 1g when
Pk
i=1( 1)aiyi + yk+1 = 0
0 when
Pk
i=1( 1)aiyi + yk+1 < 0
We remark that the
ăeđrstHB-relatedprotocol that proved tobe immune in theGRSmodel isHBž [GRSb]
for which we dedicate the next Chapter.
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As we have seen in the previous chapter, numerous attempts to propose an alternative to
HB+ secure against GRS-like attacks have been made. It is was not until three years aĕer
the proposal of Juels and Weis, in , that Gilbert, Robshaw, and Seurin proposed R-
-HBž as the đrst HB-like protocol with a formal proof of security in the GRS model.
Moreover, they conjectured that R-HBž is secure against general man-in-the-middle
adversaries. However, the cost of such security is the size of the secret bits needed for the ran-
dom secret matrices that replaced the vectors of HB+. For this sake, a variant, which has less
memory requirements, called HBž, was also proposed in the same paper.
In this chapter, we đrst describe R-HBž and HBž and then present their security
properties. Aĕer that, we challenge the conjecture of Gilbert, Robshaw and Seurin about the
security of R-HBž and HBž against man-in-the-middle attacks. Concretely, we de-
vise a strategy that allows aman-in-the-middle adversary that is given the result of all protocol
instances to recover the secret shared between a prover and a veriđer. Depending on the pa-
rameter set considered, our strategy succeeds with the adversary provoking either 220 or 235
authentications. We further bound the minimal size required for R-HBž and HBž
to prevent our attack and show that it needs to exceed 5 000 bits in any case and 15 000 bits
if we take into account the necessity of having legitimate tags authenticated with probability
close to 1.
Moreover, we look at possible đxes to R-HBž and HBž, including lowering the
acceptance threshold or excluding the possibility of having false negatives. Unfortunately, we
demonstrate that these also vulnerable to variants of our attack.
ăeresults presented in this chapter arepart of a paperpublished atAsiaCrypt  [OOV].
4.1 Random-HBž and HBž
.. Description
In R-HBž, a prover and a veriđer are assumed to share two secret matricesX and Y
of dimension kx m and ky m respectively. ăese matrices are assumed to be randomly
picked from the set of matrices with binary components, hence the pređx R.
As shown in Figure ., R-HBž runs in one round as follows: At đrst, the prover
generates a ky-bit vector b and sends it to the veriđer. ăis latter then generates a random
kx-bit vector a that he sends back to the prover. Upon reception of a, the prover picks an
m-bit vector  following the binomial distribution with parameters (m; ), i.e., every bit of
 is set to  with probability , independently from the other bits. Aĕer that, he computes
z = a  X  b  Y  , and transmits it to the veriđer. At last, the veriđer compares the z
he receives with aX  bY and accepts the prover if they diﬀer in t positions at most, i.e., he
accepts if wt(aX  bY  z)  t.
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Prover Veriđer
Secret: X;Y Secret: X;Y
Choose b 2R f0; 1gky b        !
a          Choose a 2R f0; 1gkx
Choose   Binom(m; )
Compute z = aX  bY   z        !
Accept if
wt(aX  bY  z)  t
Figure 4.1:ăeR-HBž andHBž protocols. In R-HBž,X andY are randommatrices,
in HBž they are Toeplitz matrices. wt denotes the Hamming weight.
We remark that R-HBž can be seen as the compression ofm rounds of HB+ with
the same challenge pair (b; a) and diﬀerent secret vectors, represented by the columns of the
matricesX and Y . ăe size of secret is then increased from kx + ky for HB+ to (kx + ky)m
for R-HBž and the same bounds for the probabilities of false accepts and false rejects
can be derived by replacing r, the number of authentication rounds inHB+ bym, the number
of rows in the matricesX and Y
PFA = 2
 m
tX
i=0

m
i

; PFR =
kX
i=t+1

m
i

i(1  )m i:
WhileR-HBž possess strong security guarantees, as this will be detailled in the next
section, it needs a huge amount of memory to store all the secret bits of the secret matricesX
and Y . Such an ampliđcation is not acceptable when dealing with constrained devices such as
RFIDs or humans. To obtain a practical protocol, the authors of R-HBž proposed a
practical variant to R-HBž in which the random secret matricesX and Y have a spe-
cial structure: all values on the same diagonal are equal. ăesematrices are known as Toeplitz
matrices.
Deđnition . (Toeplitz Matrix)
An kmToeplitz matrixX is a matrix in which all values on the same diagonal are equal, i.e.,
it has the form:
A =
0BBBBBBBBB@
a1 a2 a3 : : : : : : am
am+1 a1 a2
. . . . . . ...
am+2 am+1
. . . . . . . . . ...
... . . . . . . . . . a2 a3
... . . . . . . am+1 a1 a2
am+k 1 : : : : : : am+2 am+1 a1
1CCCCCCCCCA
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Table 4.1: Practical parameter sets forHBžmatching -bit security against GRS adversaries. In the set
III, the Hamming weight of the error vector  generated by the prover is always smaller than
or equal t.
Parameter set kx ky m  t PFR PFA
I 80 512 1164 0:25 405 2 45 2 83
II 80 512 441 0:125 113 2 45 2 83
III 80 512 256 0:125 48 0 2 81
Such a matrix can be uniquely deĖned through a (k +m   1)-bit vector s that determines the
bits on the Ėrst row and the Ėrst column of the matrix. Hence, we denoteAs the Toeplitz matrix
deĖned by the vector s.
So, HBž is obtained by replacing the random matrices of Random-HBž X and Y , by two
Toeplitz matrices that we denoteXx and Yy . ăe main beneđt from this trick is that number
of secret bits needed forHBž becomes as low askx+ky+2m 2, compared to the (kx+ky)m
bits needed for R-HBž. Unfortunately, the price to pay for this optimization is that,
as it will be shown in the next section, the computational hypothesis on which the security of
HBž stands is not as well studied as the LPN problem is, and thus possibly weaker.
.. Proposed Parameter Sets
When deđning parameter values for HBž, ăe đrst thing to consider is the targeted false ac-
ceptance and rejection rates. As the former only depends onm and t, setting a negligible value
for PFA yields a relation involving those two parameters. Setting the rejection rate, a function
ofm, t, and , yields another equation in these three parameters.
ăe overall security of the scheme then depends on kX , kY and . However, the security
proof of R-HBž shows that kX and kY play two diﬀerent roles: only kY is related to
the diﬃculty of the underlying LPN problem, while kX needs only be k-bit long to achieve
k-bit security.
In the end, two parameter sets, matching -bit security against GRS-like attacks, corre-
sponding to the twomost popular values for  in the LPNproblem,1/4 and 1/8, were proposed
for HBž by Gilbert et al. [GRSb]. A third parameter set was proposed for a variant of the
protocol in which the prover never uses error vectors of Hamming weight greater than the
threshold t. ăese parameters are shown in Table ..
Please note that no parameter set was proposed for R-HBž as it was meant to be a
protocol of theoretical value only. However, throughout the analysis that follows in Sec .,
we use the parameter values intended for HBž in R-HBž to provide numerical exam-
ples.
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4.2 The Security of Random-HBž and HBž in the GRS Model
In this section, we give a sketch on the proof of security of R-HBž and HBž in the
GRSModel. We kindly refer the reader to the PhD thesis of Yannick Seurin [Seu, Chapter
] for a complete analysis.
.. ąeMHB Puzzle
To reduce the security of R-HBž to the LPN problem, Gilbert et al. introduced an
intermediate problem, in the form of a weakly-veriđable puzzle, whose hardness is equivalent
to the hardness the LPNproblem; this puzzle is called theMHBpuzzle. Hence, we introduce
the deđnition of weakly-veriđable puzzles, as they were deđned by Canetti et al. [CHS].
Deđnition . (Weakly-Veriđable Puzzle, [CHS])
A weakly-veriĖable system puzzle is a pair of algorithms (G;V) deĖned as follow:
 G, called the puzzle generator, is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that, on input
a security parameter 1k, generates a random “puzzle” p and some “check information”, i.e.,
(p; c) G(1k):
 V , called the puzzle veriĖer, is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that on input a
puzzle p, check-information c, and answer a, outputs a bit, i.e.,
f0; 1g  V(p; c; a):
A solĂer S for this puzzle is a polynomial-time algorithm, in k, that takes as input a puzzle p
generated by G and outputs an answer a. We deĖne the wining probability of such a solĂer as the
probability that the puzzle veriĖer V , on input p, the check information c, and a, outputs 1.
A system puzzle is said to be (1  )-hard if for any eﬃcient solĂer S , we have
8 k 2 N :
 Pr V(p; c; a) = 1  (p; c) G(1k)a S(p)

  
 = negl(k)
where the probability is taken over the random coins of G and S .
ăe LPN problem can be equivalently reformulated in terms as a puzzle, known as the HB
puzzle. ăis puzzle is deđned as a game inwhich the solver has access to a polynomially bound-
ednumber of samples (ai; zi), that are identical to the pairs computedby anLPNOracleOx; .
ăe goal of the solver if then to đnd one linear equation involving a random vector a, supplied
by the puzzle generator, and the secret vector x.
Deđnition . (ăeHBPuzzle)
Let  2]0; 1/2[ and let q : N! N be a polynomial function. ąeHBpuzzle is deĖned as follows:
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 ąe puzzle generatorG, which takes the security parameter k as input, Ėrst picks a random
k-bit vector x. It then generates q(k) random binary vectors a1; : : : ; aq(k) of length k and
q(k) bits 1; : : : ; q(k) following the Bernoulli distribution with parameter . Aěer that,
it computes, for i = 1 : : : q(k), zi = ai xi. At last, it generates a random k-bit vector
a and returns f(ai; zi)g1iq(k) and a that compose the puzzle. ąe check information is
the vector x while the answer of the puzzle, that the solĂer has to compute in order to win,
is a bit denoted z.
 ąe puzzle veriĖer, V , outputs 1 if and only if the equality a  x = z holds.
ăe security of the HB protocol in the passive settings can be expressed in terms of the HB
puzzle as it is shown hereaĕer.
Lemma . (LPNProblem,HBPuzzle [GRSb])
If the LPN problem is hard, then, for every polynomial function q : N ! N, the HB puzzle is
(1  1/2)-hard.
As it was already noted, R-HBž can be seen as the parallel repetition ofm instances
ofHB+withdiﬀerent secret vectors and the samepair. It becomes thennatural to consider the
extension of the HB puzzle tom parallel instances. For this, Gilbert et al. used a result from
the paper of Canetti et al. [CHS, Lemma ] relative to the hardness of a puzzle composed
ofm independent instances of a (1  )-hard puzzle. Essentially, they showed that the puzzle
composed ofm independent instances of the former puzzle is (1  m)-hard with respect to
solvers who have to solve all the m instances. ăe extension of the HB puzzle, named the
MHB puzzle, can be deđned as follows:
Deđnition . (ăeMHBPuzzle)
Let  2]0; 1/2[ and letm; q : N! N be two polynomial functions. ąeMHB puzzle is deĖned
as follows:
 ąe puzzle generatorG, which takes the security parameter k as input, Ėrst picks a random
(k m)-binary matrixX . It then generates q(k) random binary vectors a1; : : : ; aq(k)
of length k and q(k) binary vectors 1; : : : ; q(k) of length m that follow the Binomial
distribution with parametersm and . Aěer that, it computes, for i = 1 : : : q(k), zi =
ai X  i. At last, it generates a random k-bit vector a and returns f(ai; zi)g1iq(k)
and a that compose the puzzle. ąe check information is the matrixX while the answer of
the puzzle, that the solĂer has to compute in order to win, is anm-bit vector denoted z.
 ąe puzzle veriĖer, V , outputs 1 if and only if the equality a Xx = z holds.
ăeorem . (Hardness of theMHBPuzzle)
If theLPNproblem is hard, then theMHBpuzzlewith parameterm, that is polynomially bound-
ed in the security parameter, is (1  2 m)-hard for every polynomial function q().
Tomirror the diﬀerence betweenR-HBž andHBž, Gilbert et al. introduced a puz-
zle similar to theMHB one in which the randommatrixX of theMHB puzzle is replaced by
a random Toeplitz matrix. ăat puzzle is called the Toeplitz-MHB puzzle.
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Deđnition . (ăe Toeplitz-MHBPuzzle)
Let  2]0; 1/2[ and letm; q : N ! N be two polynomial functions. ąe Toeplitz-MHB puzzle
is deĖned as follows:
 ąe puzzle generatorG, which takes the security parameter k as input, Ėrst picks a random
(k+m 1)-bit vectorx that uniquely characterise the kmToeplitzmatrixXx. It then
generates q(k) random binary vectors a1; : : : ; aq(k) of length k and q(k) binary vectors
1; : : : ; q(k) of lengthm that follow the Binomial distribution with parametersm and
. Aěer that, it computes, for i = 1 : : : q(k), zi = ai  Xx  i. At last, it generates a
random k-bit vector a and returns f(ai; zi)g1iq(k) and a that compose the puzzle. ąe
check information is the matrixXx while the answer of the puzzle, that the solĂer has to
compute in order to win, is anm-bit vector denoted z.
 ąe puzzle veriĖer, V , outputs 1 if and only if the equality a Xx = z holds.
Unfortunately, no result about the equivalence between theMHBandToeplitz-MHBpuz-
zles is known so far. At the same time, no separation result between the two instances has been
demonstrated either. So, while the hardness of the MHB puzzle is tightly related to the one
of the LPN problem, the hardness of the Toeplitz-MHB puzzle is an open conjecture.
.. ąe Security Reduction
ăe proof of security of R-HBž presented by Gilbert et al. runs in two steps. ăe
đrst step is to prove that R-HBž is secure in theDETmodel, i.e., against active adver-
saries. ăis result is not surprising by itself, as it is an adaptation of the proof of Juels andWeis
concerning the security of HB+ in the DET model. As the reduction proves that any active
adversary against R-HBž winning with a non-negligible probability reduces to an ef-
đcient solver for the MHB puzzle, which hardness in its turn reduces to the LPN problem.
Unfortunately, the security reduction of HBž in the DET model relies on the conjectured
hardness of the Toeplitz-MHBpuzzle, which is not known to be equivalent to the LPNprob-
lem. Hence, the security of R-HBž in the GRS model is based on the assumption
that the LPN problem is hard while the security of HBž in the DET model is only based on
the conjectured hardness of the Toeplitz-MHB puzzle.
ăe second step of the proof is to reduce any GRS adversary against R-HBž to an
active adversary. ăe idea of the proof is to show that almost every time the adversary modi-
đes the amessage of the protocol, the veriđer refuses the authentication. ăe reason for that
is that, by doing this manipulation, the adversary is introducing errors in the triplet. For care-
fully chosenm and t, the resulting error vector computed by the veriđer will have, with over-
whelming probability, a Hamming weight greater than t. We remark that this result is also
applicable to HBž. In consequence, HBž is only proven to be secure in the DETmodel if the
Topelitz-MHB puzzle is hard. However, if it is secure in the DET model, then it is secure in
the GRS model.
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Prover Man in the middle Veriđer
Secret: X;Y Target triplet: (a;b; z) Secret: X;Y
Choose b 2R f0; 1gky b^=b
b        !
a^=aa          Choose a 2R f0; 1gkx
Choose   Binom(m; )
Compute z = a^X  bY   z^=zz        !
Accept if
wt(aX  b^Y  z^)  t
Figure 4.2:ăeMan-in-the-Middle Attack against R-HBž and HBž. ăe goal of the man-in-
the-middle is to learn the Hamming weight of the error vector introduced in the triplet
(a;b; z).
ăe full security analysis of R-HBž and HBž can be found in the original paper of
Gilbert et al. [GRSb], its full version from the Cryptology Eprint Archive [GRSc], or
the PhD thesis of Seurin [Seu] (in French).
4.3 The Insecurity of Random-HBž and HBž in the MIM Model
ăeprevious sectiondescribedhow the security of R-HBž canbe reduced to theLPN
problem when dealing with GRS adversaries, through theMHB puzzle. However, Gilbert et
al. could not extend that result to general man-in-the-middle adversaries. Instead, they pro-
posed an analysis in favor of the immunity of R-HBž to such attack scenarios. Con-
cretely, they studied the possible perturbation aman-in-the-middle adversary can perform on
one protocol instance (a; b; z). In a đrst time, they studied the information an adversary may
get by replacing the last message z by z   . As the outcome of this disturbed instance only
depends on theHamming weight of   , it is independent from the secret matrices. Hence,
the adversary does not learn any information from such an attack. ăe other case considered
by Gilbert et al. is when the adversary modiđes the three messages, i.e., the adversary replaces
the messages a by a  , b by b  , and z by z   . Due to the perfect balancing of the
function a 7! a  X , whenX is a random matrix, the error vector computed by the veriđer
at the end is  0 = X  Y   , which also follow a uniform distribution. ăe probability
that authentication succeeds is then bounded by PFA, which should be negligible for secure
parameters of R-HBž. We note that this reasoning can also be applied to HBž using
a earlier result due to Carter andWegman [CW] that proves that the mapping a 7! aX is
perfectly balanced whenX is a randomToeplitz matrix (in fact, Carter andWegman showed
that it is a family of universal hash functions). Aĕer suggesting that none of these two cases re-
veal any information to the adversary, they conjectured that R-HBž is secure against
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man-in-the-middle attacks.
ăe rest of this chapter is dedicated to showthat this conjecturedoesnothold and to analyze
possible variants of R-HBž. Concretely, we will propose a man-in-the-middle attack
against R-HBž. As it will detailled, this attack also applies to HBž since this latter is
only a simpliđcation of R-HBž to make it more practical. For the sake of clarity, we
present the attack in three steps.
.. Step : Computing the HammingWeight of the Error Vector
Algorithm Approximating w
Input: a;b; z, n
Output: P 1
 
c
n

, an approximation of w where w = wt(aX  bY  z)
Processing:
: Initialize c 0
: for i = 1 : : : n do
: During a protocol, set a^ = a a, b^ = b b and z^ = z  z
: if reader accepts then
: c c+ 1
: end if
: end for
ăe core idea of the attack is to perturbate the protocol messages (a; b; z) exchanged dur-
ing an instance by adding a special triplet: the adversary picks a triplet (a;b; z) obtained by
eavesdropping on a previous exchange between the prover and the veriđer. ăat is, once the
triplet (a;b; z) has been obtained, the adversary modiđes the communicationmessages of ev-
ery other protocol instance: When the prover sends his bmessage, it is replaced by b^ = bb.
Similarly, the adversary replaces the messages a and z by a^ = a  a and z^ = z  z. ăis
operation is depicted in Figure .. ăe goal of that perturbation is to “superpose” the error
vector thatwas embedded in z, denoted , on the diﬀerent error vector contained in the z that
is sent by the prover. Aĕer a number of repetitions, the adversary would be able to deduce the
Hammingweight of . ăe following computation shows that at the veriđer authenticates the
prover if wt(  )  t
aX  b^Y  z^ = aX  (b b)Y  (z  z)
= (a^X  bY  z) (aX  bY  z)
=   
Algorithm  is a procedure that can be used by the adversary to recover w, the Hamming
weight of . ăe justiđcation of the correctness of this algorithm is provided hereaĕer.
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By deđning ^ =    and w^ = wt(^), we can derive the probability p that the bit of ^ at
position i, denoted v^i is equal to 1:
p = Pr[^i = 1] =

 if i = 0
1   if i = 1:
Hence,m  w bits of ^ follow a Bernoulli distribution of parameter  and the other w bits
follow a Bernoulli distribution of parameter 1   . Due to the pairwise-independence of all
the bits of  and , the expected value and variance of w^ are respectively given by
 = (m  w) + w(1  ); 2 = m(1  ):
We let P be the function deđned as P ( w) = Pr[w^  t]. If n denotes the number of per-
turbed rounds and c the number of times the authentication succeeded in those n rounds,
then P ( w) tends to c/n when n tends to the inđnity. Using the central limit theorem to ap-
proximate P by the normal distribution function, we obtain
P ( w)  (u); u = t  

;
ăe random variable c/n thus follows a normal distribution with expected value P ( w) and
variance 1
n
P ( w)(1  P ( w)). Furthermore, letting P 0( w) = P ( w + 1)  P ( w) denote the
discrete derivative of P at the point w, we derive the following approximation
P 0( w) = P ( w + 1)  P ( w)
   1  2p
m(1  )
0(u)
=   1  2p
m(1  ) 
1p
2
e 
u2
2 :
In order to yield a good approximation of P ( w) by c/n, it is suﬃcient to take
n =
2
r2
R( w); R( w) = 2
P ( w)(1  P ( w))
(P 0( w))2
;
so that
Pr
h c
n
  P ( w) > rjP 0( w)j
i
= Pr
h c
n
  P ( w) <  rjP 0( w)j
i
= ( 
p
2)
=
1
2
erfc():
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In the previous equation, erfcdenotes the complementary error function, i.e., the complement
to  of the error function erf(), deđned as follows
erfc() = 1  erf()
= 1  2p

Z 
0
e t
2
dt
=
2p

Z +1

e t
2
dt:
We deduce that with  high enough, i.e. such that it gives an erfc() small enough, c/n
yields a fair estimate of P ( w)with precisionrP 0( w). Finally, the adversary can recover the
Hamming weight of the error vector introduced in z by computing
w = P 1
 c
n

=  1
ăis algorithm can be used in diﬀerent situations, by adjusting its internal parameters:
 With the prior assumption that w is an integer close to some value w0, we can call Al-
gorithm  and r = 1/2 to infer w = dP 1( c
n
)c with error probability erfc().
 If w 2 fw0   1; w0 + 1g, then we can choose r = 1 to infer w by the closest value to
P 1( c
n
). ăe error probability is 1
2
erfc().
 With the prior assumption that w 2 fw0   2; w0; w0 + 2g we can use r = 1 to
infer w = dP 1( c
n
)c. ăe error probability is 1
2
erfc() when w 2 fw0   2; w0 + 2g
and it is erfc() when w = w0. If w comes with an a priori distribution of ((1  
)2; 2(1   ); 2) over the support fw0   2; w0; w0 + 2g, the error probability is
(1
2
+ (1  ))erfc().
In all cases, Algorithm  can be interpreted as an oracle running with complexity n =
2
r2
R(w0) that can be used to compute w given a;b; z, and succeeding with an probability
of error smaller than erfc().
.. Step : Using theWeight Oracle to Obtain Linear Equations
Now that the adversary has an oracle to compute the Hamming weight of  inserted in a
triplet (a;b; z), we can use Algorithm  to recover, one by one, the values of the bits of .
For this, we use a very simple strategy: at đrst, we recover the Hamming weight of  with the
assumption that is close tow0 = bme, its mean value. ăen, we iterate on every bit position
i of z and Ĕip it to obtain zi. Aĕer that, submit the triplet (a;b; zi) to the weight oracle, with
the knowledge that theHammingweight of the error vector introduced in (a;b; zi) isw01.
If the weight measured by the oracle is w0   1, then we deduce that, by Ĕipping the bit at
position, we have removed an error from z. In the other case, i.e., when the returned value is
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Algorithm Getting linear equations forX and Y
Input: a;b; z and w0 the expected weight of  = aX  bY  z
Output: A system ofm linear equations aX  bY = c
Processing:
: Initializem-bit vector c z
: Call Algorithm  on input (a;b; z; n = 42R( w0)) to get w
: for i = 1 : : :m do
: Flip bit i of z to get z0
: Call Algorithm  on input (a;b; z0; n = 2R( w)) to get w0
: if w0 = w   1 then
: ci  ci  1
: end if
: end for
w0 + 1, then no error bit was introduced at position i. ăis way, the adversary can recover
all the error positions in z. In the end, she obtains a correct system ofm linear equations of
the form aX  bY = z  . As the complexity of Algorithm  is equal to its input n, when
w0 is the initial guess for the value of w, the Hamming weight of , the total complexity of
Algorithm  is
42R( w0) +m
2R( w):
Note that this operation can be repeated until the adversary gets enough equations to solve
a linear system and recover X and Y . Concretely, in order to recover the ` bits of the se-
cret key, ` linear equations are necessary. Hence, we need to iterate Algorithm  d`/me times
on independent (a;b) pairs. Recalling that Algorithm  outputs an erroneous equation with
probability erfc(), the expected number of errors in the equation system deđningX and Y
is then bounded by `  erfc(). In order to be solvable, the system of equations should con-
sist of linearly independent vectors (a;b). For this sake, each time the adversary gets a triplet
(a;b; z), she veriđes if the pair (a;b) is linearly dependent from the i previous ones and dis-
misses it if this is the case. Recalling that these vectors are of bit-sizekx andky respectively, the
probability that this event happens is 2i kx ky 1. We can then derive the number of sessions
on which the adversary has to eavesdrop to get enough equations for the linear system
C =
d`/meX
i=1
1
1  2i kx ky 1 < 2 +

`
m

:
.. Step : SolĂing the Linear System
Now that the adversary has obtained enough linear equations, it remains to solve the linear
system and compute the secret bits ofX and Y . For this aim, she can use classical algorithms
 . ž   ()  --- 
  
from linear algebra such as Gauss and Gauss-Jordan elimination, LU decomposition, or the
square root method which all run in time complexity (`3). To speed up this phase, other
modernmethods, asymptotically faster, can be used such as Strassen’s formula formatrixmul-
tiplication and inversion [Str], that runs in time complexity (`log2 7)  (`2:8) or the
more complex Coppersmith-Winograd algorithm [CW] which achieve the record com-
plexity of(`2:376). However, we note that this last method is only asymptotically faster as it
is outperformed by Strassen’s formula for our values of interest of `.
.. Asymptotic Complexity Analysis
ăe complexity of the attack is related to the complexity of Algorithm  (with a factor of
`C/m), which, in its turn, is related to the complexity ofAlgorithm (with a factor ofm+1).
ăus, the main component of the attack aﬀecting the overall complexity is the input n of
Algorithm .
Recalling that P ( w) 2 [0; 1], we have
n =
22
r2
 P ( w)(1  P ( w))
(P 0( w))2
=
22
r2
 P ( w)(1  P ( w))
 p
2m(1  )
1  2 e
u2
2
!2
2 

2eu
2

;
and the minimal value of n is reached when u = 0 which happens when
w0 = wopt =
t m
1  2 ;
and we obtain
P ( wopt) =
1
2
; P 0( wopt) =   1  2p
2m(1  ) ;
R( wopt) =
m
4

1
(1  2)2   1

= Ropt:
In order to obtain the minimal complexity, we have to start from a valid triplet (a;b; z)
obtained from a passive attack (or just by impersonating the veriđer to the prover) for which
w = wopt. As it is unlikely that the expected value of w0 is equal to wopt, we would like to
manipulate errors in z to reach an expected value of wopt. Unfortunately, due to the hardness
of the LPNproblem, we cannot remoĂe errors from z if w > wopt. However, if w  wopt then
we can inject errors in z so that the resulting vector has an expected weight of wopt. When
the triplet (a;b; z) is known to be valid, in the sense that a session with that transcript was
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accepted by the veriđer, and the false rejection rate of the protocol is negligible, we can use
the approximation w0  m. In such a case, we can derive
m  t m
1  2 =) t  2m(1  );
As the error probability of the attack should be less than 1, erfc() should be less than the
inverse of the number of secret bits `. Using the approximation( x)  '(x)/x when x is
large (so( x) is small), we can set  = pln ` for which we obtain
erfc() = 2( 
p
2)  2'(
p
2)

p
2
=
e 
2

p

<
1
`
:
ăus, from the expression of n given above, we distinguish three cases:
. t  2m(1  ): as we have w = wopt for which u = 0, the attack has an asymptotic
complexity of(` ln `).
. t = 2m(1  )  cpm(1  ) for c = plnm(1  ): the complexity is
multiplied by a ec2 factor. ăus, Algorithm  still runs in polynomial time.
. In the other cases, the complexity varies from sub-exponential to exponential but is
clearly not polynomial anymore.
Strategy for the case t  2m(1  ). From the hypothesis t  2m(1  ), we have that
wopt  w = m. ăus, the best strategy is to optimize the complexity of Algorithm  by
having a triplet (a;b; z) with an error vector of expected Hamming weight wopt.
Our strategy is to use a triplet (a;b; z) obtained from a passive attack, and introduce some
errors in it. ăat is, weĔip any b( wopt m)/(1 2)ebits of z to get  of expectedHamming
weight wopt. Aĕer that, we can use the attack described previously with optimal complexity.
Application to parameter vector II. As these parameters are in the case t  2m(1   ),
we can use Algorithm  in its optimum complexity to attack R-HBž and HBž. Aĕer
computing wopt = 77:167, P 0( wopt) = 0:0431, Ropt = 269:39 and the expected value of
w = m = 55, we have to Ĕip f = 29 bits to get an expected value close to wopt.
For R-HBž the number of bits to retrieve is ` = (kx+ ky)m = 261 072 for which
we can use  = 3:164. ăe total complexity is `2Ropt = 229:4. In the case of HBž the
number of secret bits is ` = kx+ ky +2m  2 = 1 472 for which we use  = 2:265 and end
up with complexity of `2Ropt = 221.
Strategy for t close to 2m(1  ). ăe case t < 2m(1  ) is trickier to address since the
expected value of w becomes greater thanwopt. To achieve the same complexity as the previous
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casewewould have to reduce theHammingweight of  which is infeasible in polynomial time
due to the hardness of the LPN problem.
However, if t is a only a little less than 2m(1   ) then the expected value of w is not
far from wopt. So, we can use Algorithm  without Ĕipping any bit of z and the complexity
is still polynomial. To further speed up the attack, we can remove errors from z in step  of
Algorithm  as they are recovered until we reach w = wopt which we can expect to happen at
iteration i =
l
w0  wopt
w0
m
.
Application to Parameter Set I. Although the asymptotic complexity of the attack is expo-
nential in ` when t < 2m(1   ), we can nevertheless apply the attack on parameter set I
proposed for HBž and R-HBž. We đrst compute w0 = m = 291, wopt = 228,
P 0( wopt) = 0:0135,R( w0) = 15 532 andRopt = 2742:6.
For R-HBž, the number of key bits is ` = (kx + ky)m = 689 088 and  =
3:308 is enough to guarantee that erfc()  1
689 088
. Hence, we obtain a total complexi-
ty of `2( w0  wopt
w0
R( w0) +
wopt
w0
Ropt) = 2
35:4. For HBž, we have ` = kx + ky + 2m  
2 = 2 918 secret bits to retrieve, so 2 = 2:401 is enough and we get a total complexity of
`2( w0  wopt
w0
R( w0) +
wopt
w0
Ropt) = 2
26:6.
.. Optimizing the Attack
Algorithm  Finding errors in jJ j-bit windows
Input: a;b; z, w = wt(aX  bY  z), a set J  f0; 1;   mg and wJ the number of
non-zero (aX  bY  z)j , j 2 J
Output: I  J containing the j with non-zero (aX  bY  z)j , j 2 J .
Processing:
: if wJ = 0 then
: I  ;
: else if wJ = jJ j then
: I  J
: else
: Choose J1  J such that jJ1j = djJ j/2e.
: Set  0 them-vector with  0j = 1 iﬀ j 2 J1
: Call Algorithm  on input (a;b; z   0; n = 42R( w)) to getw0.
: Call Algorithm  with (a;b; z; w; J1; wJ1 = ( w + jJ1j   w0)/2) to get I1
: Call Algorithm  with (a;b; z; w; J n J1; wJ   wJ1) to get I2
: I  I1 [ I2
: end if
ăis section is dedicated to optimize the attack we presented earlier in this chapter.
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Figure 4.3: Plot of the function C(k)/k. Note that the function has local minima at values which are
powers of 2.
Recall that our attack consists of twophases. At đrst, we recover theHammingweight of the
error vector and then use that result to compute all its bits. ăis second step is implemented by
Algorithm  by solving the following problem: given am-bit vector  of Hamming weightw
and an oraclemeasuringwhether each bit is 1 or 0 (Algorithm), what is theminimal number
of measurements to fully recover ?
Algorithm  solves this problem ineﬃciently by performing m measurements. Instead,
Erdős and Rényi showed in [oR] that the minimal number of measurements required to
fully recover  is upper-bounded by (m log2 9)/ log2m and proposed a method to achieve
this complexity. For our case, we propose Algorithm , which is an adaptation of the method
of Erdös and Rényi.
To determine the error positions in a k-bit window by measuring the weight, Algorithm 
uses a divide-and-conquer strategy: it splits the vector into two windows of the same length,
recovers the error positions of each of them and then applies this strategy recursively. As it
will be shown later, this yields a lower number of measurements comparing to measuring a
k-bit window bit by bit as Algorithm  does.
ăe number of invocations of Algorithm , Cw(k), to fully recover a k-bit window with
knownHamming weightw by Algorithm  is deđned by the recursive relation
Cw(k) = 1 +
minfw;dk/2egX
i=maxf0;w bk/2cg
 bk/2c
i
 dk/2e
w i
 
k
w
 (Ci(bk/2c) + Cw i(dk/2e)) ;
with initial values
C0(k) = 0; Ck(k) = 0 for all k 2 N?
We can also compute, C(k), the average number of invocations of Algorithm  that are
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Table 4.2:Complexity of measuring a -bit window applied to the parameter set I and II of HBž.
Parameter Set I Parameter Set II
k 16C(k)
k
Cost measurement 16C(k)
k
Cost measurement
  215:95 . 212:43
 . 215:96 . 212:49
 . 215:99 . 212:75
 . 216:11 . 213:90
needed by Algorithm  to recover the erroneous positions in a k-bit window s:
C(k) = 1 +
kX
w=0

k
w

Pr[wt(s) = w]  Cw(k)
= 1 +
kX
w=0

k
w

w(1  )k wCw(k)
Splitting the Error Vector. Algorithm  takes beneđt from Algorithm  and uses it to op-
timize the number of measurements needed to localize the introduced errors and outputm
linear equations. Algorithm  splits the error vector introduced in a triplet (a;b; z) tom/k
k-bit windows, and each one of these is recovered using Algorithm . Moreover, in order to
minimize the cost of measurement, i.e, the complexity of Algorithm , the weight of the er-
ror vector introduced in the target triplet is manipulated to tend towards the optimal value
wopt =
t m
1 2 . ăat is, once the algorithm learns k positions, if the expected weight of the
error vector, w0 is smaller than wopt, then it Ĕips at most wopt  w0 bits of z that are at correct
positions. In the opposite case, i.e., when w0 is greater than wopt, the algorithm Ĕips at most
w0   wopt bits of z that are at erroneous positions.
ăe number of calls to Algorithm  we need before reaching the optimal case w = wopt, is
then
i =
wopt   w0
k(m  w0)m when wopt  w0;
i =
w0   wopt
k  w0 m when wopt  w0:
Hence, the full complexity of Algorithm  is
N = 2

iR( w0) +
lm
k
  i
m
Ropt

C(k):
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Algorithm Optimizing Algorithm 
Input: a;b; z and w0 the expected value of  = aX  bY  z, k
Output: A linear equation aX  bY = c
Processing:
: Initializem-bit vector c z
: InitializeM  ;
: Call Algorithm  on input (a;b; z; n = 42R( w0)) to get w
: Deđne a set S of Ji = fik + 1; : : : ;min((i+ 1)k;m)g; i = 1 : : : dmk e
: repeat
: Choose J 2 S
: Call Algorithm  on input (a;b; z  J; n = 2R( w)) to get w0 = wt( ^ J)
: Call Algorithm  with (a;b; z; w; J; wJ = ( w + jJ j   w0)/2) to get I
: Set ci  ci  1 for all i 2 I
: M  M [ I
: Remove J from S
: if w > wopt then
: Flip min(jIj; w   wopt) bits zi for which i 2 I
: w  w  min(jIj; w   wopt)
: else if w < wopt then
: Flip min(jJ n Ij; wopt   w) bits zi for which i 2 J n I
: w  w +min(jJ n Ij; wopt   w)
: end if
: until S 6= ;
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.. Final Algorithm
ăe đnal attack is described in Algorithm . ăe idea is to get a vector with low expected
weight using Algorithm  and then đnd all the erroneous positions inserted by the tag to
obtain m linear equations and iterate this until we get enough equations to solve and đnd
the secrets X and Y . To get the lower complexity, we can Ĕip the last bits of z so that we
end up with an expected weight of wopt. We note that introducing errors in a full segment as
deđned by Step  of Algorithm  does not increase the needed number of measurements as
Cw(k) = Ck w(k).
Algorithm  Final attack on R-HBž and HBž
Input: k,w
Output: X , Y the secrets of the tag
Processing:
: Initialize S  ;
: for i = 1 : : : 2 +

`
m

do
: Call algorithm  on inputw to get a;b; z with an error vector of expectedweight w0 =
(m  w)w + w(1  w)
: if wopt > w0 then
: Flip the last ( wopt  m)/(1  2) bits of z
: Set w0  wopt
: end if
: Call Algorithm  on input (a;b; z; w0; k) to getm linear equations
: Insert linear equations in S
: end for
: Solve S
ăe full complexity in terms of intercepted authentications as
`
m

2

iR( w0) +
lm
k
  i
m
Ropt

C(k) + (2 +
`
m
)
1
P (w)
:
Application to parameter vector II Withwith input k = 8 andw = 300we obtainP (w) =
2 7, w0 = 273 and wopt = 228, i = 24, Ropt = 2742:6, R( w0) = 7 026:4. So the full
complexity of the attack is derived from  and ` as shown in Section ... ăis is 225 sessions
for HBž and 233:8 for R-HBž.
Application to parameter vector II In this case, we have k = 8,w = 0 and w0 = 55. We Ĕip
29 bits to obtain an error vector of expected weight wopt = 77, which yieldsRopt = 269:39
and i = 0. ăe complexity is 219:7 sessions for HBž and 228:1 for R-HBž.
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4.4 Thwarting the Attack: the Case of Small t
ăecase of lower t, the false acceptance rate will be very low but the false rejection rate ofHBž
becomes high (e.g. . for t = m) so that it would require more than one authentication in
average for the tag to authenticate itself. ăemain advantage of this approach is that the com-
plexity of Algorithm  becomes exponential. Here, we present a better strategy than calling
Algorithm  with an triplet (a;b; z) obtained by a simple passive attack.
Our goal is to call Algorithm with a w0 as low as possible. During the protocol, we can set
(a^; b^; z^) to (a; b; z  ) with  of weight w until the veriđer accepts z^. ăen, we launch our
attack with (a;b; z) = (a; b; z). A detailed description is showed in Algorithm .
Algorithm Getting (a; b; z) with lowHamming weight
Input: w
Output: (a; b; z) such that (aX  bY  z) has low weight.
Processing:
: Pick random vector  of Hamming weight w
: repeat
: During a protocol with messages (a; b; z), set z^ = z  
: until veriđer accepts
ăe probability that the veriđer accepts the session with transcript (a; b; z^) is P ( w). ăis
latter can be reformulated as
P ( w) =
tX
j=0
 
m  w
j

j(1  )m  w j 
t jX
i=0

w
i

 w i(1  )i
!
When the veriđer accepts, them  w positions not in the support of  are erroneous with
probability
 w =
Pt
j=0

j
 
m  w
j

j(1  )m  w j Pt ji=0   wi  w i(1  )i
(m  w)P ( w) :
Ontheother hand, the other positions of z^ in the support of  are non-zerowithprobability
w =
Pt
j=0
 
m  w
j

j(1  )m  w j Pt ji=0 i  wi  w i(1  )i
wP ( w)
:
ăus, because of the high false rejection rate, if the session with transcript (a; b; z^) gets
accepted, thenwe can expect that the error vector , introduced in the original triplet (a; b; z)
from the protocol, has weight w0 = (m  w) w + w(1  w).
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Table 4.3: Attack cost for the initial bit of the shared key for HBž applied to t = dmc
Parameter set Algorithm  Algorithms  + 
I 278 258:5
II 230 221
Application to Parameter Set II with t = 55 Assume that for the parameter set II we set
t = m  55. ăen, an accepted vector obtained by a passive attack will most likely have
weight
w0 = (m  w)0 + w(1  0)
 50
so 42R( w0) = 230 operations are suﬃcient to determine its correct weight.
CallingAlgorithm with w = 41, we get a triplet (a; b; z)with error vector  ofHamming
weight w0 = (m  w)41+ w(1 41)  33 in 1P ( w) = 220 authentications and can recover
the weight of  in another 42R(33) = 220 operations with Algorithm .
Table . shows the costs to determine the đrst bit of the secret key, i.e., calling Algorithm 
with a random vector obtained by a passive attack in comparison to calling Algorithm  đrst
and then Algorithm  with its output. Note, that recovering successive bits is always cheaper.
4.5 Thwarting the Attack: the Case of Vectors without False Rejections
To thwart the previous attacks without taking parameter sets with hugem or high false rejec-
tion rate, we could change the protocol so that the prover generates a vector  of constant or
bounded Hamming weight. In this section we will show that this leads to diﬀerent attacks.
Assume that the prover accepts a protocol instance (a; b; z), in which an error vector  was
introduced by the prover, if and only ifwt(aX bY Z) = t, then, asLmi=1 i = t mod 2,
we can write
mM
i=1
(aX  bY )i =
mM
i=1
(zi  i)
=
mM
i=1
zi  (t mod 2)
Using this equality, the adversary can Ĕip two bits of z, i.e., she generates a random vector 
ofHamming weight . In other words,  contains exactly two bits set to one, at position i and
j, while all the other bits are set to . When the veriđer accepts, the adversary deduces exactly
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one of the two bits of z that were Ĕipped is at an erroneous position, i.e, that i  j = 1. In
the other case, either the twobit positions are both erroneous or both correct, i.e., ij = 0.
Hence, through that manipulation, the adversary obtains
(aX  bY )> = z> 

1 if authentication succeeded
0 if authentication failed
ăe probability that the veriđer accepts z^ is equal to the probability that exactly one erro-
neous position was Ĕipped by the eﬀect of(nu), which is 
m w
1
 
w
1
 
m
2
 = 2w(m  w)
m(m  1) :
Generalization ăe above approach may be generalized to the case where the Hamming
weight of  is bounded in the original protocol, i.e. when the veriđer accepts if wt()  t
and the prover does not generate error vectors withHamming weight greater than t. ăis was
suggested by Gilbert et al. for parameter set III.
Again, the attacker can replace the message z by z^ = z   where  is anm-bit vector of
Hamming weight 2. In such scenario, authentication fails only whenwt() 2 ft  1; tg and
the attacker Ĕipped two non-erroneous positions. When this event occurs, the attacker learns
two error positions corresponding to the bits set to  in , i.e.,
(aX  bY )i = zi; i 6= 0:
ăe success probability of this attack is related to the probability of getting a triplet with an
error vector of Hamming weight equal to t  1 or t, and that the adversary picks a  that has
the eﬀect of Ĕipping two correct positions. It can be computed as
q =
Pt
i=0
 
m
t i

t i(1  )m t+i (
m t+i
2 )
(m2 )Pt
i=0
 
m
i

i(1  )m i
Application to parameter vector III For the parameter vector III, the attacker learns two bits
about the secret key every 1/q = 29:02  512 iterations. ăis is 16 times faster than an attack
by Algorithm  and needs only `  2/q = 226 to recover a R-HBž secret key (219 for
HBž).
4.6 Secure Parameters for Random-HBž and HBž
In this section, we investigate the lower bounds on the parameter sets for which our attack is
not eﬀective. Before that, we need to clarify the notion of bit security in HBž.
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Deđnition . (s-bit Secure Parameter Set for HBž)
For HBž, a parameter set (kx; ky;m; ; t) is said to achieve s-bit security if recoĂering one bit of
information about the secret matricesXx and Yy or making the veriĖer accept a session without
matching conĂersation requires an attack with complexity (in terms of protocol sessions) within
an order of magnitude of at least 2s and comparable time complexity.
Let us assume that Algorithm  succeeds with a total error weight of twhen the added error
vector has weightw0. We can thus expect that
t  (m  w)w0
m
+ w

1  w0
m

=) w0  m t  w
m  2 w;
since t < m/2 andw0 is a decreasing function in terms of w.
By using Algorithm  with input w we can get (a; b; z) such that  = aX  bY  z has
expected weightw0 in complexity 1/P ( w). Based on this triplet we can run Algorithm  twice,
once with r = 1/2 and then with r = 1, with complexity 32R(w0) and recover one bit
of information about the matrices with error probability bounded by 3
2
erfc(). For  = 1,
this probability is less than 1/4. Following our algorithms, the time complexity is “reasonably
comparable” (and even negligible) to the complexity in terms of protocol sessions. So we
conclude by saying that parametersm; ; t leading to the existence of w such that(
C1 =
1
P ( w)
+ 3R(w0)  2s
w0 = m
t  w
m 2 w
are insecure.
Computing the maximal w for which 1
P ( w)
is high, we have P ( w)  (u) so we expect to
have a very small negative u and we can use the approximationP ( w)   '(u)/u. Applying
this reasoning to a very low P (w0), we obtain
R(w0)  4RoptP (w0)eu20
  4Ropt'(u0)
u0
eu
2
0 ;
and we derive the complexity
C1   u
p
2e
u2
2   4Ropt
u0
p
2
e
u20
2 :
ăe exponential terms only match when u = u0, leading to w = w0 which translates into
w =
t
2
 m
m  w 
t
2
=) u0 = u 
t(1
2
+ ) mp
m(1  )
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As the equality eu
2
2 = e
u20
2 = 2s only holds when u2 = 2s ln 2, we can replace the value of u
from the previous expression to obtain
2s ln 2 = (2m   t(1 + 2))
2
m(1  (1  2)2) (.)
ăus, any parameter set involving (m; t; ) that satisđes this equation is insecure.
In the following, we use this equation to derive bounds on secure parameters for HBž, de-
pending on the case:
 ăeworst case complexity in our attack is obtainedwithminimal t, namely for t = m.
Note that with such a threshold, the honest prover gets rejected with probability 1/2.
In this case, Equation . simpliđes to
m =
2 ln 2
2

1
(1  2)2   1

 s
Hence, any (m; ) satisfying this equation is insecure. Using this result, we can derive
bounds for secure parameters for HBž
– For  = 1/8 and s = 80 we obtainm = 5521 and t = 690. We conclude that
any parameter with  = 1/8,m  5 521, and t = bme is insecure in the sense
that there exists an attack with complexity within the order of magnitude of 280.
– Similarly, with  = 1/4 and s = 80 we đnd thatm = 5323 and so t = 1331.
Hence, when  = 1/4 any parameter set withm  5 323 is insecure.
 General applications require the false rejection rate to be very low, i.e., in the order of
2 s/2. ăis constraint induces a new equation for the parameters
mX
i=t+1

m
i

i(1  )m i  2s/2:
Note that we can rewrite Equation (.) as
t =
1
1 + 2

2m   (1  2)
p
2ms ln 2

:
On their own, these two equations are not suﬃcient. Indeed, to satisfy both of tem, we
could set a threshold t small enough such that false rejects are negligible and suﬃciently
far from the expected valuem such that the attack does not apply. However, we have
also to take care of the most rudimental attack an adversary can perform: sending ran-
dom vectors z. For this reason, we require the false acceptance rate, PFA to be smaller
than 2 s, i.e.,
tX
i=0

m
i

 2m s
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Table 4.4: Summary of the complexity of our attacks.
Parameter Set kX kY m  t R-HBž HBž
I    .  234 225
II    .  228 220
III(w bounded)    .  226 219
Combining the last three equations yield a bound on the size of the parameters that
induce a secureHBžwith practical false acceptance and rejection rates. Unfortunately,
satisfying parameters are too large. ăat is, nom smaller than 15 000, for both values
of , satisđes the equations.
4.7 Perspectives
As it is depicted in Table ., the attack we presented in this chapter is devastating for all the
proposed parameter sets of HBž. On the other side, we could not propose an easy đx against
it.
Recently, new proposals for protocols whose security reduces to the LPNproblemhas been
published in a paper by Kiltz et al. [KPC+]. ăeir work essentially consists of two contri-
butions. ăe đrst one is about illustrating a two-round authentication protocol secure against
active adversaries. Yet, the protocol can be shown to be insecure in the MIM model. While
the proposed protocol has the advantage overHB+ of having fewermessages to exchange and
a tighter reduction gap, it requires the prover, i.e., the RFID tag, to perform additional com-
putations by checking the Hamming weight of the challenge. Still, the authors note that it is
possible to eliminate this step at the cost of adding to the secret key two n-bit vectors.
ăe second contribution of the paper is to design a MAC whose existential unforgeability
reduces to the LPN problem and use that MAC in a secure challenge-response protocol.
. 
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ăesimplest authenticationprotocols are challenge-response protocols inwhich the veriđer
starts by sending a challenge towhich the answer answers by computing a tag for the challenge
using a function, usually amessage authentication code, as it is shown in Figure ., or a digital
signature algorithm, of the received challenge and a secret key shared between the two parties.
Upon receptionof the response, the veriđer recomputes the expected answer and acknowledge
the veriđer if both values match.
It is commonly assumed that when dealing with constrained devices such as RFID tags, it
is preferable to use symmetric-key cryptographic primitives, i.e., MAC, over public-key prim-
itives such as digital signatures. When based on a MAC, such a challenge-response protocol
requires the underlyingMAC to be unforgeable under chosenmessage attacks to be secure. In
short, this model considers adversaries that have access to an oracle to which they can submit
adaptively chosen messages. ăeMAC is considered to be secure in a classical sense if no ad-
versary is able to produce a tag for a chosen value that was not submitted to the oracle, except
with a very small probability.
In this chapter, we study a proposal for aMACdestined to constrained environmentsmade
by Shamir [Sha] called SõUASH. ăe results of this analysis are the subject to a paper
published at EuroCrypt  [OV].
5.1 SQUASH
.. Description
ăe central idea of SõUASH is borrowed from one of the oldest and most studied public-
key cryptosystems: Rabin’s cryptosystem. Constructed around a public hard to factor mod-
ulusN , the Rabin encryption scheme is based on the trapdoor one-way function f(x) = x2
mod N . Besides its nice eﬃciency properties, this function exhibits a strong connection to
the factoring problem: it can be easily proven that inverting it leads to the immediate factor-
ization of the modulus N . For this reason, and the extensive eﬀorts made on factorization
algorithms, Rabin’s function is widely considered as a candidate one-way function.
Unfortunately, the implementation of such a function on an RFID tag with appropriate
sizes for the modulus is beyond the reach of low-cost RFID tags. Still, Adi Shamir presented
at the RFID Security Workshop , a MAC built around the Rabin function which sur-
prisingly enjoys a very compact implementation. Moreover, the presented scheme provided
some kind of provable security inherited from the Rabin function.
ăe đrst design of SõUASH was a randomized version of the Rabin cryptosystem similar
to an earlier proposal for smart-cards [Sha]. ăe idea of this randomized version is to get
rid of the modular reduction, which is the responsible of the expensiveness of implementing
exponentiation in Z?N , and replace it by a regular squaring over the Z. However, computing
square roots over the plain integers can be done eﬃciently. Hence, in order to prevent the
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Prover Shared Secret: K Veriđer
a         Choose a 2R f0; 1g
Compute t MACK(a) t       ! Output: CheckK(a; t)
Figure 5.1: Basic challenge-response authentication protocol based on aMAC.
inversion of the function, the output was randomized by adding a multiple of the modulus
N . In other words, the randomized Rabin function is to compute
f(x) = x2 + r N;
for a randomly chosen r of bit-length larger thanN ’s by  bits.
Note that a simple modular reduction removes the eﬀect of r. Hence, the recipient can
manipulate the output of the randomized Rabin function as he would do with the classical
Rabin function. Moreover, the following theorem establishes the security of the scheme.
ăeorem .
Let k 2 N denote a security parameter and `() and () two polynomial functions that deĖne
the bit-size ofN and r, respectively. If (`(k)) upper-bounds the probability that an adversary
inĂerts the Rabin function, then no polynomial-time adversary inĂerts the randomized Rabin
function with probability greater than (`(k)) + 2 (k).
Even if the randomized Rabin function was designed for smart-cards which, at the time of
its publication, were suﬀering from the same computational restrictions RFID tags are en-
countering, implementing this function on RFID tags leads to another drawback. ăe fact
that, contrarily to smart-cards which communicated through a physical channel, RFID tags
communicates over wireless channels, restricts them in the amount of data they can trans-
mit. Considering this, the large amount of bits a tag has to transmit in the randomized Rabin
function is undesirable.
To counter that issue, the SõUASHproposalwas to release only a small window in themid-
dle of the `-bit result of the original Rabin squaring. As it is depicted in Figure ., SõUASH
is composed of three steps. At đrst, it applies a mixing function that takes as input a message
and a secret key. Given a public hard-to-factor modulusN , it converts the output of the mix-
ing function to an element ofZ?N and then squares the output of themixing functionmodulo
N . In the end, it outputs a window of consecutive bits, consisting of bits that in between po-
sitions a and b, with b > a. Mathematically, SõUASH is described by the following formula.
T =
 
2b
 
F 2(K;m) mod N

mod 2a
We note that veriđcation is done in the same way: the veriđer recomputes the MAC value
from the given message and the key. He then checks that it corresponds to the one supplied
by the sender.
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Figure 5.2:ăeăree steps of SõUASH. First it mixes the received challenge with the internal secret
key, then computes the Rabin encryption of the result. At last, it outputs speciđc bits from
the encryption.
.. Implementation Trick and Shamir’s Challenge
ăe đrst observation is that SõUASH, as a MAC in which both participants share a secret
key and the veriđer only needs to “recompute” the operations performed by the sender, does
not need the invertibility feature of the Rabin function. ăerefore, universal moduli with
unknown factorization can be used. In particular, Shamir suggested the use of integers of the
form N = 2`   1, known as Mersenne numbers. Again, the modular reduction with such
moduli can be well approximated by a simple bit shiĕ. We note that numbers of the form
N = a`   1, known as Cunningham numbers, can as well be used. Shamir even mentioned
the possible use of more general numbers of the formN = a  bc  d for small a; b; c; d.
Besides having a simple modular reduction, the trick behind reducing the cost implemen-
tation of SõUASH resolves around a central observation: Since the MAC is not revealing
the whole output from the Rabin function, there is no need in computing it entirely. Instead,
Shamir proposed to compute an approximation of the đnal window by starting the convolu-
tion in “the middle”. Concretely, instead of computing the convolution from the least signif-
icant bit and keep the most signiđcant bits that are to be released, it starts at a bit of higher
position. However, the eventual carry that propagate from least signiđcant bits can lead to
wrong computations of the output. To address this issue, Shamir proposed to start the ap-
proximation a few bits before the đrst one to be outputted. Although the đrst bits of the con-
volution may be wrongly computed, having some “guard bits” to “absorb” the carry helps in
decreasing the probability of a wrong approximation as it is suﬃcient that a single bit position
in the guard bits does not produce a carry for the window to be correctly computed.
In parallel to the theoretical SõUASH, Shamir proposed a practical implementationwith a
more aggressive optimization that he called SõUASH-. Although the initial proposal for
SõUASH was to use a universal modulus such as the Mersenne numbers C365 = 21237   1
and C385 = 21277  1, whose factorizations are still unknown, it was noted that knowing the
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full factorization of the modulus seems to not help the adversary in reconstructing the full
output of the mixing function. ăerefore, the suggestion was to use a very small modulus,
N = 2128   1, which factorization can be easily computed as
2128 1 = 351725764165 537274 1776 70041767 280 421 310 721:
For the mixing function, his proposal was to use the non-linear feedback shiĕ register of
the stream cipher GRAIN- [HJMM]. Concretely, Shamir proposed to initialize the
-bit register with the -bit key in its least signiđcant half and with the key XORed with
the -bit message in its most signiđcant one. ăe register is then to be clocked  times,
twice more than in GRAIN-, and subsequently squared modulo 2128   1. Finally, a -
bit window, consisting of bits between positions  and , inclusive in both ends, is to be
released as the output. In order to correctly perform the window approximation,  bits, the
ones ranging from positions  to , are to be computed as guard bits.
5.2 SQUASH-0 and SQUASH-1
For the rest of this chapter, we denote byK ,M ,R, and T the key, message, MAC, and trun-
cation function of SõUASH respectively. ăe function SõUASH will simply consist of the
following:
R = T
0@ ` 1X
i=0
2i  fi(K;M)
!2
mod N
1A ;
where the fi’s are Boolean functions and the truncation function T is deđned by
T (x) =

x mod 2b
2a

: (.)
By expanding the square, we obtain:
R = T
  
` 1X
i=0
` 1X
i0=0
2i+i
0  fi(K;M)fi0(K;M)
!
mod N
!
(.)
ăe version of SõUASHpresented in , whichwe call SõUASH-, uses amixing func-
tion f expanding (using a linear feedback shiĕ register) theXORof the key and the challenge.
Due to a private commentbyVaudenay about an attack against SõUASHwithout truncation,
it was updated, in the proceedings version [Sha], to use a non-linear function.
Since the mixing function outputs `-bit integers to be fed to the Rabin function, we can
represent every bit position i, for i 2 J0; `K, by linear functionsfi(K;M) = gi(K)Li(M).
. Ŀ-  Ŀ-
      
In order to algebraically manipulate SõUASH, we need to map the bitwise XOR operation
to operations over the integers. For this, we have two possibilities. ăe đrst option is to use
the relation
a b = a+ b  2ab;
which maps the XOR to addition and multiplication. ăe second option would be to deđne
the notation a^ = ( 1)a, b^ = ( 1)b and the map the XOR operation using the relation
a b = 1  a^b^
2
:
ăis last representation presents the nice property that only one operation between the
operands is actually performed, leading to a simpler overall representation. For this reason, we
will use it in the rest of this chapter. Hence, by setting ki = ( 1)gi(K) andmi = ( 1)Li(M),
we apply the mapping to Equation (.) and we obtain the following equation which is the
starting point of our analysis
R = T
 
1
4
X
i;i0
2i+i
0
mimi0kiki0   2
`   1
2
X
i
2imiki +
(2`   1)2
4
mod N
!
(.)
Interestingly, whenN is aMersenne number, i.e.,N = 2`  1, this last equation simpliđes to
R = T
 
1
4
X
i;i0
2i+i
0
mimi0kiki0 mod (2`   1)
!
(.)
In the sequel, we đrst present the attack by Vaudenay, i.e., without truncation, and apply it
to any mixing function of form g(K) L(C). We then improve on the attack by letting the
adversary choose the messages in its attack. At last, we show how to apply this last attack to
the case inwhich awindowof consecutive bits is returned, i.e., against the original SõUASH-
. In order to give evidence about the eﬃciency of each of the attacks we present, we provide,
in each case, a numerical applicationwithmoduli of size  bits in the case of no truncation
and  bits in the case of SõUASH-.
We note that our analysis translates into an attack against Rabin-SAEP case with “known
random coins” in which the adversary can request many encryptions of the same plaintext
with diﬀerent randomness and learn, along with the ciphertexts, the random bits used by the
algorithm. We stress that this type of attacks are irrelevant for public-key encryption schemes,
i.e., the security of Rabin-SAEP is not concerned by our analysis.
5.3 Known Message Attack on SQUASH-0 without Window Truncation
In a đrst step, we omit the truncation function, i.e., we set the function T to be the identity
function. A đrst attack consists of collecting enough equations of the form of Equation (.)
and solving them using standard algebraic techniques such as linearization [KS].
 .  Ŀ’  
  
Simple linearization consists in expressing every quadratic term kiki0 as a new unknown to
obtain a system of linear equations. Although we get a system with 1/2`(` + 1) unknowns,
we only need 1/2r(r + 1) equations. Combining these latter with the equations induced by
the gi’s, we can recover the r secret bits. Using standard Gaussian elimination techniques,
solving the system requires to perform O(r6) multiplications, each one of them would be
computed with complexity O(`2). Hence, the overall time complexity is O(`2r6) while the
data complexity to store all the equations would beO(`r2) bits.
We get unknowns and a solving algorithm of complexity O(`2r6) (as for O(r6) multipli-
cations with complexityO(`2)) aĕer collection ofO(`r2) bits (as forO(r2) samples ofO(`)
bits). Since kiki0 = 1 which is unexpectedly small, we can also consider algorithms based
on lattice reduction usingO(`) samples only. ăe attack works even if theLi’s are not linear.
Interestingly, wenote thatwhenN is aMersennenumber thenN = 2` 1 soEquation (.)
simpliđes by getting rid of r unknowns. ăerefore, we have r(r 1)
2
unknowns instead of r(r+1)
2
and the number of equations needed for the attack decrease accordingly. However, for ` resp.
r in the order of magnitude of 210 resp. 26, complexities are still very high.
5.4 Chosen Message Attack on SQUASH-0 without Window Truncation
When forced to random messages, we can only solve Equation (.) by collecting enough
equations and deriving from them equations with only one unknown term through lineariza-
tion. On the other hand, when the adversary is allowed to choose arbitrary values for the
messages, he could try to produce equations with only one unknown term. However, there
are two restrictions in choosing the messages. First, themi’s can only take values in f−1; 1g
and then one can only obtain sparse equations but through combinations of several equations.
Second, themi’s can not be chosen independently because they result from some expansion.
Obviously, when r is very small against `, there is no way to ensure that a preimage exists of
an arbitrary `-bit expanded value exists. ăerefore, one can only select expanded messages
with properties accessible from random pickings in the r-bit message space. However, in the
particular case when the expansion is linear, we can construct vectors of expanded values with
the structure of a linear subspace.
From now on, we consider an adversary who submits 2d, for a đxed value of d, messages
to the MAC oracle (Note that if d is logarithmic in the size of the modulus, then the attack
still runs in polynomial time). Furthermore, let fM1; : : : ;Mdg denote d random distinct
messages andU be the `dmatrix whose i-th row corresponds toL(Mi). Finally, we denote
byUi the i-th column ofU .
Wemake the adversary compute all linear combinaison of theMi’s and submit them to the
MAC oracle. In other words, for every d-bit vectors x, the adversary submits messages of the
.     Ŀ-  
      
form
M(x) =
M
j
xjMj
to the MAC oracle and denote R(x), the response obtained for the latter. Once all those
responses are obtained, they are combined using an Hadamard-Walsh transform.
Deđnition . (Hadamard-Walsh Transform)
Let d be a positive integer and ' : Zd ! R be a function over the real numbers. Given a d-bit
vector V , we deĖne the function '^, the Hadamard-Walsh (or multidimensional discrete Fourier)
transform of ', with respect to V as
'^(V ) =
X
x2Zd
( 1)xV '(x):
In a particular case, we remark that '^(0) =
P
x2Zd '(x).
Note that due to the linearity of theLi’s, we can single out every bit of the linear combinai-
son of theM(x)’s in the following way
Mi(x) = ( 1)Li(M(x)) = ( 1)
L
j xjLi(Mj) = ( 1)xUi
Table 5.1: Basic properties for computing R^(V ).
'(x) '^(V )
 2d  1V=0
( 1)xiUi 2d  1Ui=V
( 1)xi(UiUj) 2d  1UiUj=V
ăe linearity of theLi’s can be further exploited to derive the properties listed in Table ..
Fromthose properties, we can compute, fromEquation (.), theWalsh-Hadamard transform
of the functionR
R^(V ) =
1
4
X
i;i0
2i+i
0
 X
x
( 1)x(UiUi0V )
!
kiki0
  2
`   1
2
X
i
2i
 X
x
( 1)x(UiV )
!
ki (.)
+
(2`   1)2
4
X
x
( 1)xV (mod N):
 .  Ŀ’  
  
WhenN is a Mersenne number, i.e.,N = 2`   1, then the last two terms of Equation .
vanish so it simpliđes to
R^(V ) =
1
4
X
i;i0
2i+i
0
 X
x
( 1)x(UiUi0V )
!
kiki0 (mod 2`   1) (.)
At this point, the best attack strategy would be to saturate the polynomial R^ so that the coef-
đcients of all the monomials but one equal 0. So, we have two options for the monomial to
keep, either one of degree one, i.e., with unknown ki, or a quadratic one, i.e., with unknown
kikj . Note that, due to Equation (.), this approach does not hold when N is a Mersenne
number. Hence, we need to take a speciđc treatment for that case.
.. ąeNon-Mersenne Case
In the general case, we have two options: ăe đrst is to manipulate Equation (.) such that
the coeﬃcients of all the quadraticmonomials and all themonomials of degree onebut one are
. ăe other optionwould be to eliminate all themonomials expect one quadraticmonomial.
Once we simplify Equation (.) to any of the two forms, we obtain one linear equation in
the key. Later, we present a tradeoﬀ between the two approaches.
Eliminating the kikj Monomials. ăe đrst strategy is to select messages that eliminate all
the quadratic monomials kikj and keep only one monomial of degree one. In light of the
results listed in Table ., this can be done by taking pairwise diﬀerent Ui’s and set one of
them to be the vector containing only 0’s. With respect to the messagesM1; : : : ;Md, this is
equivalent to the conjonction of the two hypotheses
 8j 2 J1; dK;9I 2 J0; `  1K : LI(Mj) = 0
 8i; i0 2 J0; `  1K; 8j 2 J1; dK : Li(Mj) = Li0(Mj) =) i = i0
Clearly, we can đnd these vectors by using an incremental algorithm to select Cj ’s in the
hyperplane deđned by LI(C) = 0. If we generate d random vectors in the hyperplane, un-
der heuristic assumptions, the probability that the condition is fulđlled is roughly e `22 d 1
which is constant for d = 2dlog2 `e and equal to e 1/2.
We can use Equation (.), thanks to the hypotheses we obtain
R^(0) = 2d 2
X
i
22ik2i   2d+I 1(2`   1)kI +
2d(2`   1)2
4
(mod N)
but since k2i = 1 for all i we obtain
R^(0) = 2d 1(2`   1)

2
3
2`   1
3
  2IkI

(mod N) (.)
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      
We can thus deduce kI when N is not a Mersenne number. ăis means that recovering the
key requires O(r`2) chosen challenges and complexity O(r`3). Clearly, we can trade data
complexity against time complexity.
Eliminating theMonomials of Degree One. Another approach is to choose the challenges
in a way that all the coeﬃcients, except one of degree two, become . For this, we take values
for V that are diﬀerent from the zero vector and all theUi’s. Furthermore, if we construct the
challenges in a way such that for everyUi, there exists a uniqueUj such thatUj = UiV . In
this scenario, Equation (.) simpliđes to
R^(V ) = 2I+J 1+dkIkJ (mod N) (.)
so we can deduce the value of kIkJ .
ăe advantage of this method over the đrst one is that from the same set of challenges we
can derive many equations of the form kIkJ = b (which are indeed linear equations) for all I
and J such that V = UI UJ satisđes the above conditions. With randomMi’s, the expect-
ed number of such equations is roughly 1
2
`2e `
22 d 1 so for d  2 log2 ` we obtain enough
equations to recover all bits ofK usingO(`2) chosen challenges and complexityO(`3 log `).
Generalization We can further generalize this attack by taking all values V which are either
 or equal to some UI or to some UI  UJ but without requiring unicity of I or fI; Jg.
In general, we obtain an equation which may involve several kI or kIkJ as Equation (.)
simpliđes to
R^(V ) =
X
fI;Jg:UIUJ=V
2I+J 1+dkIkJ
 
X
I:UI=V
(2`   1)2I+d 1kI (.)
+ (2`   1)22d 21V=0 (mod N):
Provided that the number of monomials is not too large, the only correct1 assignment of
the monomials leading to an expression matching the R^(V ) value can be isolated.
Using d = log2
r(r+1)
2
we obtain only one unknown per equation on average so we can
recover all key bits with complexityO(`r2 log r) usingO(r2) chosen challenges. We can still
slightly improve those asymptotic đgures.
Let `m be the complexity of getting thematching1 assignments in one equation (i.e.m is
the complexity in terms of moduloN additions). ăe complexity of the Fourier transform is
O(`d2d), so the complexity of the algorithm becomesO(`(d+m)2d). ăe average number
of unknowns per equation is r22 d 1. By using an exhaustive search strategy to solve the
equation we obtain log2m  r22 d 1. With d = 2 log2 r   log2 log2 log r   1 we have
 .  Ŀ’  
  
m = log r andwe đnally obtain a complexity ofO(`r2 log r/ log log r)withO(r2/ log log r)
chosen challenges.
We could view the equation as a knapsack problem and use solving algorithms better than
exhaustive search. For instance, we can split the equation in two halves and use a claw search
algorithm. ăe eﬀect of this strategy leads us to log2m  12r22 d 1 and we reach the same
asymptotic complexity.
.. ąeMersenne Case
When N is a Mersenne number, the expression of R is only composed of quadratic terms.
Following the same reasoning as in the general case, our strategy is to nullify all the coeﬃcients
of the monomials but one. Speciđcally, this translates into choosing the set fM1; : : : ;Mdg
in a way that, with respect to the Ui’s, every value appears exactly twice. In other words, we
require that
8I 2 J1; `  1K;9!J 2 J1; `  1K : I 6= J ^ UI = UJ :
Under this assumption, we can derive from Equation (.)
R^(0) = 2I+J+d 1kIkJ mod N: (.)
Hence, the same analysis developed for the case of saturating all the monomials of degree
one applies.
Generalization. ăe main drawback of the latter method is that for the 2d messages, the
adversary can get only one equation for the key. In the following, we follow on the general
strategy presented in Section and integrate the results we obtained with the simpliđcations
that usingMersenne numbers imply. Concretely, if we combine Equations (.) and (.), we
obtain
R^(V ) =
` 1X
n=0
2n
X
fI;Jg:UIUJ=V;
I+J 1+d=n mod `
kIkJ (mod N): (.)
So, if the set of fI; Jg’s sparsely spreads on the (UI UJ ; (I + J   1+ d) mod `) pairs, the
knapsack is nearly super-increasing, i.e., that is, each element of the set is greater than the sum
of all the numbers before it. So, we can directly read all kIkJ bits in the table of all R^(V )’s.
With d = 2 log2 r  log2 `  1we roughly have ` unknowns per equation and we can expect
this phenomenon. So, we obtain a complexity ofO(r2 log r)withO(r2/`) chosen challenges.
For instance, withN = 21 277 1 and r = 128we can take d = 3 so that  chosen challenges
are enough to recover all bits. With r = `we can take d = 10 so that 1 024 chosen challenges
are enough.
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.. Numerical Application
SõUASH with no truncation is trivially broken if we can factor the modulusN so it should
be at least of 1 024 bits. As an example, for r = ` = 1024 we can take d = 14 so roughly
2d  16 000 chosen challenges. We obtain at most `(`+1)
2
2 d  32 unknowns per equation
on average. We can then use a claw search algorithm that works with 216 numbers in memory
and 216 iterations to recover 32 bits of the key for each equation.
5.5 Handling Window Truncation
In what follows, we letS denote the output from the Rabin function. We further recall Equa-
tion (.) that describes window truncation in SõUASH
T (x) =

x mod 2b
2a

:
It is clear that when S is available to adversary, then the analysis from previous sections can
be applied. Hence, we assume that the adversary only sees the đnal output SõUASH, i.e., he
can query a MAC oracle for getting the MAC of chosen message.
Releasing a small part from the output of the Rabin functionmakes its inversion seemingly
harder: it is not clear how, even by knowing the factorization, an adversary can reconstruct the
missing bits. Consequently, this version of SõUASHwas proposedwith a very smallmodulus
whose factorization could be easily computed (Recall that the concrete proposal of SõUASH
was to useN = 2128   1).
.. Handling the Truncation of the Combinaison of Many Integers
Comparedwith the previous situation, we cannomore combine theMACvalues of theM(x)
but only their extractions T (M(x)). Unfortunately, the extraction of a combination of such
integers does not coincide with the combination of the extractions because carriesmay propa-
gate. However, whenwe sum a relatively small number of integers the overlap remains limited
so that we can list all possible values. Indeed, for any e1; : : : ; eq 2 ZN we have
ei mod 2b = 2aT (ei) + i;
for an integer i 2 J0; 2a   1K. Summing over all the ei’s yields 
qX
i=1
ei mod N
!
mod 2b =
 
qX
i=1
ei   N
!
mod 2b
=
 
2a
qX
i=1
T (ei) +
qX
i=1
i   N
!
mod 2b a;
 .  Ŀ’  
  
for an integer  2 J0; q   1K. If we let  = T (Pqi=1 i) 2 J0; q   1K, we đnally obtain
T
 
qX
i=1
ei mod N
!
=
qX
i=1
T (ei) + T ( N) +  (mod 2b a) (.)
Although we do not know the value of  and  when the complete ei’s values are not re-
vealed, it is still possible from Equation (.) to recover these values. In fact, since there
are only q2 possible pairs while the right-hand side, like the đrst term of the leĕ-hand side,
can take 2b a diﬀerent values. By construction, we are ensured that the correct pair (; ) is
unique. ăe other ones can be considered to be random. So, as long as 2 2b a  q2, we can
build a table of all possible values of T ( N) +  to single out the correct assignment for 
and  with probability 1/2.
We note that the result above holds when we consider the alternate sum of the ei’s. In other
words, we can show that, for v1; : : : ; vq 2 f 1; 1g such that
Pq
i=0 vi = 0, we have
T
 
qX
i=1
viei mod N
!
=
qX
i=1
(viT (ei)) + T ( N) +  (mod 2b a) (.)
where  2 J 1  q/2; q/2K and  2 J 1  q/2; 1 + q/2K.
ăeMersenne Case. We further notice that whenN is a Mersenne number, we readily have
N  1 (mod 2b). Hence, we have the simpliđcation 
qX
i=1
ei mod 2`   1
!
mod 2b =
 
qX
i=1
ei   
!
mod 2b
for an integer  2 J0; q   1K. ăen, we can write
T
 
qX
i=1
ei mod 2`   1
!
=
qX
i=1
T (ei) + T () +  (mod 2b a) (.)
ăe nice property of this expression is that if q  2a then we always have T () = 0. In
this case, the right-hand side of the equation can only take q values. In the other case, T ()
is an integer of q   2a bits. It can be integrated in the  in T ( N) +  in other cases: all
T ( N) +  values are numbers in the J0; 2d + j2d 1
2a
kK range. Consequently, assuming
that q  2a, Equation (.) further simpliđes to
T
 
qX
i=1
ei mod 2`   1
!
=
qX
i=1
T (ei) +  (mod 2b a) (.)
ăis result can also be generalized to the case of a combinaison of addition and subtraction
of truncated values. Starting fromEquation (.), we note that if q < 2a then the expression
T ( N) simpliđes to either0, when is positive or equal to0, or2b a 1, when is negative.
Hence, the sum T ( N) +  ranges in the interval  2 J q/2; q/2K instead of J q; qK for
the general case.
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.. Adapting the Attack on SQUASH-
Equations (.) and (.) provide us with a mean to link the bits from the combinaison
of some integers and their truncation. Hence, we can almost readily adapt the analysis of
Section . with q = 2d.
Let us đrst consider the đrst attack of Section .., namely the one in which the adversary
sums over all the R(x)’s. We now apply the previous attack (đrst method) with n = 2d
and the list of all d-bit vectors x and set ei = S(x) corresponding to the challengeM(x).
Recall that, under the appropriate assumptions on themessages submitted to theMACoracle,
Equation (.) describes the relation between the I-th key bit and the sumof the outputs from
the Rabin function. Adapting the notation, this equation rewrites as
S^I(0) = 2
d 1(2`   1)

2
3
2`   1
3
  2IkI

(mod N)
On the other hand, we have
T

S^I(0) mod N

= T
 X
x2Zd
R(x) mod N
!
=
 X
x2Zd
T (R(x)) + T ( N) + 
!
mod 2b a
=

R^(0) + T ( N) + 

mod 2b a:
Hence,
T

2d 1(2`   1)

2
3
2`   1
3
  2IkI

mod N

=

R^(0) + T ( N) + 

mod 2b a:
Here, the pair (; ) can take up 22d values which can be đltered by the r-bit value of the
leĕ-hand side (recall that r = b   a). Hence, the probability that there exists  and  such
thatT (S^I(0))matches the right-hand side of the equation is atmost 22d r, so for 2d+1 < r
it is likely that we can deduce kI . ăe complexity of the attack in terms of queries remains
unchangedwhereas the computational complexity is augmented by the cost of building a table
of values for T ( N) + .
ăe second method of Section .. in which the adversary saturates the monomials of de-
gree one can also be adapted as follows. Keeping the same assumptions on theMi’s and the
vector V , Equation (.) rewrites as
S^(V ) = 2I+J 1+dkIkJ (mod N):
Again, we can use Equation (.) to yield
T (2I+J 1+dkIkJ) =

R^(V ) + T ( N) + 

mod 2b a
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ăus, as long as 2d + 1 < r, we can deduce the value of kIkJ . Again, the complexity
of the attack is the same as before in number of queries and slightly overheaded in time for
computing the table of values of T ( N) + .
ăeMersenne case. In the case whereN is a Mersenne number, we need to make a speciđc
treatment. Updating the notations of Equation (.) under the same assumptions yields
S^I;J(0) = 2
I+J+d 1kIkJ mod 2`   1:
Combining this last expression with Equation (.), we obtain
T (S^I;J(0)) =

R^(0) + 

mod 2b a
for some in the J0; 2d   1K range. Let S^+I;J(0) and S^ I;J(0)denote the value of S^I;J(0)when
kIkJ is equal to+1 and 1 respectively. Note that T (S^ I;J(0)) + T (S^+I;J(0)) = 2b a   1,
in other words T (S^ I;J(0)) and T (S^+I;J(0)) have all their bits inverted. Furthermore,
T (S^+I;J(0)) = T
 
2(I+J+d 1) mod `

=

2((I+J+d 1) mod `) a if (I + J + d) mod ` 2 Ja+ 1; bK
0 otherwise:
ăis is enough to deduce kIkJ for (I; J) pairs such that there is no  for which T (S^+I;J(0))
matches the right-hand side. ăus we can recover kIkJ .
.. Generalization
As we proceeded in Section ., we can generalize the attack to take any combinaison of the
MAC responses. In general, for all V there exists  and  such that
T
0@0@ X
fI;Jg:UIUJ=V
2I+J 1+dkIkJ
 
X
I:UI=V
(2`   1)2I+d 1kI + (2`   1)22d 21V=0
!
mod N
!
=

R^(V ) + T ( N) + 

mod 2b a
with (
 2 J0; 2dK;  2 J0; 2d   1K if V = 0
 2 J 1  2d 1; 2d 1K;  2 J 2d 1 + 1; 2d 1   1K if V 6= 0
Our attack strategy can now be summarized as follows.
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. Take a value for d. Make a table of all T ( N) +  values. ăis table has less than
22d terms, and exactly 2d + 1 terms in the Mersenne case, and can be compressed by
dropping the d least signiđcant bits corresponding to the part. In theMersenne case,
it can be compressed to nothing as numbers of formT ( N)+ are all in the intervalJ 2d 1; 2d 1Kmodulo 2b a.
. Pickd challenges at randomandquery all the2d combinationsC(x). Get the responses
R(x).
. Compute the discrete Fourier transform R^ inO(`d2d).
. For each V , try all1 assignments of occurring unknowns in S^(V ) and keep all those
such that T (S^(V ) mod N)  R^(V )matches an entry in the table of T ( N) + .
Again, this attack uses O(2d) chosen challenges and a complexity of O(`(d + 2s2 d)2d)
where s is the number of unknowns, i.e. s = r(r+1)
2
resp. s = r(r 1)
2
in the Mersenne case.
ăe remaining question is whether all wrong assignments are discarded.
For a given equation, each of the 2s2 d wrong assignments is discarded with probability
22d (b a) resp. 2d (b a). ăus, if b   a > 2d + s2 d resp. b   a > d + s2 d they can all
be đltered out. ăe minimum of the right-hand side is 2 log2 s + 2 log2 e ln 22 resp. log2 s +
log2(e ln 2) and reached by d = log2 s+ log2 ln 22 resp. d = log2 s+ log2 ln 2. By taking this
respective value for dwe haveO(r2) chosen challenges and a complexity ofO(`r2 log r), and
the conditionbecomes b a > 4 log2 r+2 log2 e ln 22  2 resp. b a > 2 log2 r+log2(2e ln 2).
If b  a > 4 log2 r   2 resp. b  a > 2 log2 r this condition is always satisđed.
ăeMersenne case. Finally, the Mersenne case can simplify further using Equation (.).
We take d = 2 log2 r   log2 `   1 and run the attack with O(r2/`) chosen challenges and
complexityO(r2 log r). Assuming that all unknowns kIkJ sparsely spread on (UIUJ ; (I+
J 1+d) mod `) pairs thenT (R^(V ) mod N) yields b a d useful bits with roughly one
kIkJ per bit and ends with d garbage bits coming from T ( N) + . So, we can directly
read the bits through the window and it works assuming that b a > d, which reads b a >
2 log2 r   log2 `  1.
Application toSõUASH-withLinearMapping Wenowuse the recommendedparam-
eters by Shamir: ` = 128,N = 2128   1, a = 48, b = 80 and plug them into SõUASH-.
Although Shamir suggested to use a -bit secret key with non-linear mixing, we assume here
that the mixing is of the form f = g  L with linearL but that g expands to r = 128 secret
bits (possibly non-linearly). We have s = 8128 unknowns of form kiki0 . With d = 10 we
obtain 1 024 vectors V so we can expect to đnd  unknowns in each equation. Equations are
of form
T (S^(V ) mod N) =

R^(V ) + T ( N) + 

mod 2b a
where (T ( N)+) mod 2b a is in the range [ 29; 29]which gives a set of atmost 210+1.
Filtering the 28   1 wrong assignments on the  unknowns we can expect 2 13 false accep-
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tances in addition to the right one. Simple consistency checks can discardwrong assignments,
if any, and recover all ki’s. Clearly, all computations are pretty simple and we only used 210
chosen challenges.
Using the đnal trick in the Mersenne case we use d = 6 and thus 64 chosen challenges to
get 64 equations which yield 26 bits each.
WithN = 21 277   1 and the worst case ` = r, i.e., the mixing function is not expanding
the key, the attack works for b  a  21 and we can take d = 19. We request for 219 chosen
challenges. We obtain 219 equations with roughly 1:6 unknowns per equation.
By using the đnal trick we take d = 10. ăe T ( N) +  part wastes 10 bits from the
window and we can expect to have a single unknown per remaining bit so that we can simply
read it through the window. Provided that the window has at least 32 bits we expect to read
22 bits in each of the 1 024 equations so we can recover all bits.
5.6 Extending to Non-linear Mappings
In case themappingL is a (non-linear) permutation, we can adapt our attack strategy by choos-
ing the challenges as follow
 pick d challengesC1; : : : ; Cd.
 compute the chosen challenges byC?(x) = L 1
L
j xjL(Cj)

.
By using,
c?i (x) = ( 1)Li(C
?(x)) = ( 1)
L
j xjLi(Cj) = ( 1)xUi
Equation (.) remains unchanged so that we can still apply all the attacks described through
Sections . and .. More generally, we can extend these attacks to any mixing function of
form f(K;C) = g(K)  L(C) as long as we can đnd vector spaces of dimension d in the
range ofL.
5.7 Conclusion
Oneargument formotivating theSõUASHalgorithmconsistedof playing the “blamegame”:
if anyone could break SõUASH, then the Rabin cryptosystem is the one which should be
blamed instead of the SõUASH design. Clearly, our attack demonstrates that this argument
is not correct. ăere are instances of the SõUASH algorithm which can be broken although
we still have no clue how to factor integers. Indeed, our method translates into a “known
random coins attack” against Rabin-SAEP which leads to a plaintext recovery. Known ran-
dom coins attacks are not relevant for public-key cryptosystems although they are in the way
SõUASH is using it.
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So, although the “blame game” argument is not valid, the security of SõUASH is still an
open problem.
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ăis chapter mainly serves as a motivation for the upcoming ones: We exhibit privacy at-
tacks on several RFID protocols. Namely, we show that ProbIP [CS], MARP [KYK],
Auth [TSL], YA-TRAP+ [LBdM], O-TRAP [LBdM], and RIPP-FS [CPMS] all
fail to protect the privacy of the tag’s holders.
ăe adversaries we consider in this chapter are assumed to not be able to tamper with tags.
In other words, we consider adversaries who are able to interact with readers and tags and
have control over the communication link. Since RFID tags do communicate through an
unprotected wireless channel, it is appropriate to assume such abilities for an attacker.
Before that, we introduce a simple ad-hoc privacy model that will be employed to show the
privacy shortcomings of the protocols mentioned above.
ăis chapter includes results that were earlier published in the proceedings of two confer-
ences, the đrst one in ISPEC  [OPa] and the second one in ACNS  [OPb].
6.1 An ad-hoc Privacy Model
Wewill later deal with the problemof building a globalmodel capturing the notion of privacy.
For now, we will consider a simple model, in some ways equivalent to the one of Juels and
Weis [JW], with some diﬀerences essentially lying in the constraints put on the adversary.
Although it is not its goal, we will use that model to capture the basic notions of untrace-
ability and anonymity of RFID tags.
Similarly to Juels andWeis, we capture thenotionof privacy as the inability for any adversary
to infer the identity of a tag chosen from a pair she has chosen. Concretely, aĕer interacting
with the RFID system, the adversary is asked to select two RFID tags and receives one of
them. Her goal is then to discover the identity of the received tag. For that, she is still allowed
to interact with the system and the target tag. In the end, we consider that the adversary has
defeated the privacy of the scheme if her guess for the correct identity of the tag is true with a
probability signiđcantly greater than the one of when she outputs a random guess.
We stress again that we neither aim to propose this deđnition as a privacy model nor claim
novelty of our deđnition. Instead, we will use this model exclusively in this chapter and the
following one for the analysis of the privacy and security issues of recent RFID protocols. In
fact, the model deđned herein can be seen as an alternative deđnition of the model of Juels-
Weis [JW] with some diﬀerences, e. g., in the constraints put on the adversary (see the dis-
cussion in Section ..) in a style that is more in line with the model of Bellare, Pointcheval,
andRogaway [BPR] for password-based authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. ăe
reason for borrowing the formalism of AKE protocols is mainly due to the close relationship
these latter enjoywithRFIDprotocols. Indeed, the goal of both primitives is for a party to au-
thenticate himself to another one with whom it shares some partially secret bits. Examples of
such shared data include a public key, a password, or an encryption key. Moreover, AKE pro-
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tocols oĕen run in an asymmetric scenario: the veriđer of the protocol may be a resourceful
server while the prover is a client with limited capabilities. In such a case, it is oĕen assumed
that the prover, i. e., the tag in RFID systems, is corruptible while the most powerful entity
is resilient to corruption. In other words, an adversary may be able to obtain the secret held
by the weaker party by tampering. We further follow on a common assumption and limit the
model to one RFID reader that has an inner up to date copy of the database.
We deđne an RFID scheme as a polynomial-time two party authentication protocol be-
tween a tagTID and a readerR. While we assume each tagTID to hold a secretKID, the database
that the reader accesses contains all the tags’ secrets, i.e., it is a table of the form (IDj; Kj).
Aĕer running a protocol instance, the reader outputs either Accept(IDj) if it authenticates a
tag whose ID is listed in the database , or Reject otherwise. Conversely, in the case of mutu-
al authentication, i. e., when the reader is also required to authenticate itself, the partner tag
outputs Accept(Rj) in case of success and Reject otherwise. Hereaĕer, we formally deđne our
notions of partnership and session completion.
Deđnition . (Partnership & Session Completion)
We say that a reader instance Rj and a tag instance Ti are partners if, and only if, both have
output Accept(Ti) and Accept(Rj) respectively, signifying the completion of the protocol session.
An adversaryA is amalicious entity, modeled as a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm,
who controls all the communications between readers and tags and interacts with them as
deđned by the protocol. Concretely, the adversary interface with the RFID system through
the following oracles.
 Execute(R; T ; i) query. ăis oracle models passive attacks, i.e., the ability for an ad-
versary to eavesdrop on a protocol instance. As such, it triggers a full protocol instance
with identiđer i between the readerR and the tag T and returns its transcript to the
adversary.
 Send(U1; U2; i;m) query. ăis query models active attacks by allowing the adversary
A to impersonate a reader U1 2 Readers (resp. a tag U1 2 Tags) in some protocol
session i and send a messagem of its choice to an instance of a tagU2 2 Tags (resp. a
reader U2 2 Readers). ăis query subsumes the TI and RI queries
as well as challenge and response messages in the Juels-Weis model.
 Corrupt(T ; K) query. ăis query allows the adversaryA to learn the stored secretK 0
of the tag T 2 Tags, and which further sets the stored secret to K . It captures the
notion of forward security or forward privacy and the extent of the damage caused by
the compromise of the tag’s stored secret. ăis is the analog of the SK query of
the Juels-Weis model.
 TestUPriv(U; i)query.ăis query is the only query that does not correspond to any ofA’s
abilities or any real-world event. ăis query allows to deđne the indistinguishability-
based notion of untraceable privacy (UPriv). If the party has accepted and is being asked
a Test query, then depending on a randomly chosen bit b 2 f0; 1g,A is given Tb from
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the set fT0; T1g. Informally,A succeeds if it can guess the bit b. In order for the notion
to be meaningful, we restrict the adversary to perform Test queries on sessions that ter-
minated correctly without any party being corrupted. Such a session is said to be fresh
and its formal deđnition is given hereaĕer.
Deđnition . (Freshness)
A party instance is Ěesh at the end of execution if, and only if,
. it has output Accept with or without a partner instance,
. both the instance and its partner instance (if such a partner exists) have not been sent a
Corrupt query.
Deđnition . (Untraceable Privacy (UPriv))
Untraceable privacy (UPriv) is deĖned using the game G played between a malicious adversaryA
and a collection of reader and tag instances. A runs the game G whose setting is as follows.
. Phase  (Learning): A is able to send any Execute, Send, and Corrupt queries at will.
. Phase  (Challenge):
. At some point duringG,Awill choose a Ěesh session onwhich to be tested and send a
Test query corresponding to the test session. Note that the test session chosen must be
Ěesh in the sense of DeĖnition .. Depending on a randomly chosen bit b 2 f0; 1g,
A is given a tag Tb Ěom the set fT0; T1g.
. A continues making any Execute, Send, and Corrupt queries at will, subjected to the
restrictions that the deĖnition of Ěeshness described in DeĖnition . is not violated.
Phase  (Guess): Eventually, A terminates the game simulation and outputs a bit b0,
which is its guess of the value of b.
ąe success ofA in winning G and thus breaking the notion of UPriv is quantiĖed in terms ofA’s
advantage in distinguishing whetherA receivedT0 orT1, i.e. it correctly guesses b. ąis is denoted
by AdvUPrivA (k) where k is the security parameter.
ăe LBdMmodel [LBdM] similarly allows the corruption of tags. Nevertheless, proofs
of security are set in Canetti’s universal composability (UC) framework [Can].
Vaudenay’s model [Vau, Vau] is stronger than both the Juels-Weis and Le-Burmester-
deMedeirosmodels in terms of the adversary’s corruption ability. Inmore detail, it is stronger
than the Juels-Weis model in the sense that it allows corruption even of the two tags used in
the challenge phase. It is stronger than the Le-Burmester-deMedeiros model in the sense that
it considers all its privacy notions even for corrupted tags, in contrast to the Le-Burmester-de
Medeiros model that only considers corruption for its forward privacy notion.
Our choice to describe our tracing attacks in later sections with reference to a deđnedmod-
el is for more uniformity between similar attacks on diﬀerent RFID protocols, and for better
clarity to illustrate how an adversary can circumvent the protocols using precise types of in-
teractions that she exploits, as captured by her oracle queries. ăis will facilitate the task of a
designer when an attempt is made to redesign an attacked protocol.
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Tag System
State: KID Database: f: : : ; (ID;KID); : : : g
For          
(a1; b1) : : : ; (aP ; bP ) 2R f0; 1gk+` s.t.
8i 2 J1; P K : Hwt(K#ai  bi) = `2
a1;b1;:::;a`;b`        ! Find (ID;KID) s.t.
KID satisđes all the equations
Figure 6.1:ăe ProIP protocol
6.2 ProbIP
.. ProbIP and the SAT Problem
At RFIDSec ’, Castellucia and Soos [CS] proposed an RFID protocol (ProbIP) that al-
lows tag identiđcation by legitimate readers. Its security is based on the SAT problem. A SAT
instance is deđned by a propositional logic formula written in conjonctive normal form, i. e.,
the AND of several literals, which are, in their turn, written in disjonctive normal form,i. e.,
as the combinaison of OR and NOT of boolean variables. An example of a SAT instance is
given below.
(x1 _ x2 _ :x5) ^ (:x2 _ x3 _ x4) ^ (:x1 _ :x3 _ x4):
Now, given a SAT instance, the associated decisional SAT problem is to determine whether
there exists an assignment for the boolean variables such that the formula evaluates to True.
ăe converse computational problem is to đnd this solution, if it exists. A similar problem,
the `/2-in-` SAT problem, is to determine whether there exists, from L variables, a truth as-
signment to those variables so that each clause has exactly `/2 true literals.
ăis problem is famous for being the đrst one to be proven to lie in the class of complexity
NP-Complete in the seminal paper of Cook [Coo]. However, NP-hardness treats the
complexity of solving any instance of a decisional problem. In other words, it only considers
the worst-case instances of a problem. ăus, when constructing a cryptographic primitive
it is crucial to ensure that the instances of theNP-Complete problem that are generated are
indeed “hard” to solve. Several cryptosystems based onNP-Complete problemswere broken
just because the generated instances were in fact “easy” to solve. For concrete examples, we
refer the interested reader to [Sha] and [Vau].
As it is depicted in Figure ., the core idea of ProbIP is to make the tag generate instances
of the `/2-in-` SAT problem. For that, each tag is given a k-bit secret key K and the reader
is given access to the list of all secrets. ăe protocol starts by a H message from the
reader that initiates a protocol instance. To compute its answer, the tag generates a pair of
vectors (a; b) such that a is a k-bit vector whose Hamming weight is equal to ` and b is an
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`-bit vector. Besides this, we letK#a denote the `-bit vector which contains the bits ofKID
in positions corresponding to the positions of all the elements of a equal to . We further
restrict the Hamming weight of the `-bit vectorK#a  b to be equal to `/2, i.e., it has exactly
`/2bits equal to . For a complete authentication round, the tag repeats this operationP times.
In other words, it generates P pairs, (a1; b1); : : : ; (aP ; bP ) that satisfy the above conditions.
Hence, the output of one authentication session for the tag is an (under-deđned) linear system
of equations of the form.8>>>><>>>>:
PL
i=1(Ka1i  b1i ) = L2PL
i=1(Ka2i  b2i ) = L2
: : : : : :PL
i=1(KaPi  bPi ) = L2
To recover the identity of the tag, the reader goes through its list of secrets and tests which
one of them satisfy all the equations. In the end, the tag whose secret solves all equation is
accepted as the partner tag. We note that this operation is more eﬃcient if instead of testing
all equations at once for every key, each equation could act as a đlter: the reader đrst keeps all
keys that satisfy the đrst equation, then tests them on the second one and so on. Indeed, the
whole complexity decreases from Pn/2 to s.
Depending on the parameter set, it may be that a key diﬀerent from the one held by a tag
satisđes all the equations and be recognized as the partner tag. ăis event is commonly known
to as a false positive. To compute the probability of false positives occurring, one has to look
at the number of equations for which a random but đxed key can be a solution versus the total
number of equations. When the RFID system consists ofn tags, Castellucia and Soos showed
that this probability is given by
PFA = n
  
k
`/2
 
k `/2
`/2
 
2k
`
 !P
From this probability, we can derive the number of equations P that a tag has to provide
the reader to authenticate itself. However, for a security point of view, there is still an upper-
bound for P above which the `/2-in-` SAT problem becomes easier to solve. Nevertheless,
having a to small P may induce a high false acceptance rate, which harms the correctness of
the whole scheme. Hence, it is crucial to đnd a balance between security and eﬃciency. In
order to measure the increasing diﬃculty of the problem when P changes and determine pa-
rameter sets, the authors of ProbIP proposed to use a SAT solver, calledMinisat, to tentatively
solve a `/2-in-` SAT problemwithP equations. Unfortunately, no concrete parameter set was
suggested.
ăe security of the scheme was analyzed under the Juels-Weis model. As the adversary se-
lects two tags and is given one of them, chosen randomly, she has to guess the real identity
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of the latter with a non-negligible probability, i.e., signiđcantly larger than 1 (see Chapter 
for a complete description of the Juels-Weis model). For that, the adversary needs to interact
with the target tag and will ultimately need to decide from which secret was an `/2-in-` SAT
instance generated. Since this problem reduces to the decisional `/2-in-` SAT problem, any
successful attack on ProbIP leads to an eﬃcient solver of the `/2-in-` SAT problem.
.. Violation of Anonymous Privacy
Before submitting the two tags to the challenger, the Juels-Weis model allows the adversary
to interact with all the tags. Namely, the adversary can query the two target ones as many
times as she wishes. ăis is even more easy to carry out when the tag does not authenticate its
partner as it is the case in ProbIP. In the following, we show that these interactions lead to the
recovery of the tag’s secret, thus violating both its security and privacy.
In short, an adversary could just query the tag until she ends up with enough equations. At
this point, it becomes useless to hand the system to a SAT solver since a Gaussian elimination
type algorithmwould be able to recover the key in polynomial time. More formally, the attack
runs as follow. We consider an RFID system with two RFID tags, T0 and T1. We make the
adversary send  messages to each of the two tags via Send queries to the tag until she
gets ` equations. Since each request generatesP equations, an adversary would need to query
the tag n/P times. Aĕer that, she obtains the following system in which vji denotes a boolean
variable that is set to 1 if the i-th bit ofK is present in the j-th equation8>>>><>>>>:
PL
i=1 v
1
i (K[i] b1i ) = L2PL
i=1 v
2
i (K[i] b2i ) = L2
: : :PL
i=1 v
`
i (K[i] b`i) = L2
(.)
As for any boolean v we can write v + v = 1, we replace anyK[i] by the value 1  K[i].
ăere are as many as 3n possible equations as the coeﬃcients of each variableK[i] take three
values: 0; 1; 1.
ăis way, the adversary gets a linear system ofn equations andn variables that can be solved
using standard methods such as the Gaussian elimination method. In the case where the n
equations are not linearly independant, the adversary can still obtain more equations from
the tag by sending Hmessages until she gets enough equations.
.. Future Development
ăe weakness of this authentication protocol comes from the fact that at each round the ad-
versary gets some information from the same key. So a quick way to counter the attack would
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be to include a key-updating mechanism similar to OSK [OSK] at the end of the protocol
using a one-way function.
Another approach, recently taken by Kiltz et al. [KPC+] was to randomize the tag’s re-
sponse by having some of the equations erroneous with some probability . A discussion of
this scheme can be read in Chapter .
6.3 MARP
.. Description
Starting from the observation that RFID tags do not support expensive computations that are
quasi-mandatory to achieve security and privacy, Kim et al. [KYK] considered the use of a
third party acting between the reader and the tags, a mobile agent for RFID privacy abbrevi-
atedMARP hereaĕer. In practice, the role of theMARP can be played by a PDA or a mobile
phone. ăe idea of Kim et al. was to bind a tag to aMARP so that it is the latter who authen-
ticates to the reader on behalf of the tag. For that, the scheme they proposed is composed of
three sub-protocols. At đrst, each tag is given a PIN that can be used to unlock it. A copy of
that PIN is also stored in the database. ăe đrst sub-protocol, called the initial setup phase,
is used to transfer that PIN authentication capabilities of a tag to a designatedMARP: at the
end of the protocol, the MARP learns a secret, associated to the tag’s PIN, that allows it to
acts on behalf of the latter. Concretely, this operation is supposed to represent a transfer of
ownership. ăis operation typically happens when an item is bought in a store and the client’s
MARP registers the PIN of the tag attached to the product.
Once the secret information of the tag is stored in theMARP, the tag is put into sleepmode.
ăis is called the privacy preserving phase as it allows the MARP to act on behalf of the tag.
It is also the most typical mode of the proposed scheme as data communication occurs only
between aMARPand the reader. Anothermode, called authenticationmode, is also proposed
for when the reader wants to ensure that a MARP is eﬀectively paired with a tag as it claims.
AsMARPs only learn the hash of the tags’ keys, the protocol consists of the reader sending an
encrypted challenge to theMARP.ăe latter decrypts it and forwards it to the tagwho hashes
its XOR with the key. Finally, that hash value is sent back to MARP who encrypts it and
forwards it to the reader. A mathematical description of the scheme is depicted in Figure ..
To avoid confusion with the next protocol, we shall name this protocol MARP-.
Another protocol, which we refer to as MARP-, and does not feature all those diﬀerent
modes was also proposed by the authors of MARP-. Instead, it allows to have a double au-
thentication of MARP and a tag at once. ăe đrst is authenticated using its key pair and the
information it has received from the tag during the initialization phase while the second uses
its PIN.ăe detailled steps of this protocol are depicted in Figure ..
It is worth mentioning that in both protocols MARP- and MARP- all communication
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Reader (IDg) MARP Tag
Key Pair: (skg; pkg) Key pair: (skm; pkm) Secrets: ID; PINID;KID
Initialization Phase
PINID   ! Store PINID
hPIN  h(PINID) hPIN   ! xID = PINID  ID
Store ID; h(KID)
xID;xK     xK = PINID  h(KID)
Privacy Preserving Phase
PickRr
  Signskg(IDgjjRr)
IDg ;Rr;    ! Check Signature
PickRm
c1  Encpkg(RrjjRm)
a1;c1     a1  Signskm(c1)
Check Signature
RecoverRm
r  Signskg(Rm)
cr  Encpkm(r) cr   ! Check Signature
e Eh(KID)(ID)
c2  Eskm(IDjje)
Check signature a2;c2     a2  Signskm(c2)
Recover ID
Authentication Phase
PickR
e Encpkm(R) e   ! Decrypt e R   ! at = h(RKID)
Recover PINID
e2     e2  Encpkg(at) at    
Figure 6.2:ăeMARP- protocol, comprising  phases: setup, privacy protection, and authentication.
channels, except the one between the reader and the server, are assumed to be insecure. ăat
is, anymalicious entity can access all those channels during all phases andmanipulate the data
transmitted over them.
.. Cryptanalysis of MARP-
Tracing. Note thata2 is đxedper tag, being a functionof a particular tagTt’s unique identiđer
IDt and its secret keyKID. As the channel between the reader and theMARP is not conđden-
tial, an adversary via Execute queries (i.e. eavesdropping) can easily track the movement of
Tt by checking for matches of a2 with previously captured values, as the encryption scheme
is deterministic. Alternatively, the adversary can replay an old R from MARP to the tag via
Send queries, and check if the response at matches the old value of at corresponding to the
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Reader (IDg) MARP Tag
Key Pair: (skg; pkg) Key pair: (skm; pkm) Secrets: PINID;KID
MARPAuthentication
PickRr
  Signskg(IDgjjRr)
IDg ;Rr;    ! Check Signature
PickRm
c1  Encpkg(RrjjRm)
a1;c1     a1  Signskm(c1)
Check Signature
RecoverRm
r  Signskg(Rm)
cr  Encpkm(r) cr   ! Check Signature
e Eh(KID)(ID)
c2  Eskm(IDjje)
Check signature a2;c2     a2  Signskm(c2)
Recover ID
Tag Authentication
PickRs
hr = h(KID)Rs hr   ! PickRd
hd = h(Rd  h(PINID))
hP = h(PINID)Rs Rd;hd;hP     ! RecoverRs
a3     a3)     a3 = h(KID Rs)
Check that a3 matches
Figure 6.3:ăeMARP- protocol, comprising  phases: MARPauthentication and tag authentication.
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replayedR.
We remark that these attacks have less requirements than the ones performed by Juels and
Weis [JW] on some other older RFID protocols that require Corrupt queries.
Violating the anonymous privacy. Note that the initial setup messages allow to compute
z = [PINID  IDt] [PINID  h(KID)]
= IDt  h(KID):
ăen the adversary simply issues Execute queries to be able to compute z, and then issues a
Send query to replace the message R from MARP to the tag with R0 = 0, and so the tag
responds with at = h(KID). ăis allows to compute
z  at = [IDt  h(KID)] h(KID)
= IDt;
and so reveals a potential unique identiđer of the tag, which can be cross-checked against the
possible list of identiđers for a match.
.. Tracing MARP-
MARP- also allows tracing. By eavesdropping both messages via Execute queries between
the reader and MARP and between the MARP and the tag, an adversary gets h(KID)  Rs
and h(PINID)Rs. By XOR-ing these two values, the adversary gets h(PINID)h(KID)which
does not depend on the session parameters and can be used to trace a tag.
ăis scheme is also vulnerable to replay attacks since the response of the tag only depends
on the parameters sent byMARP. So if an adversary sends twice the samemessage as via Send
queries, she will get the same response a3 which can also be used for tracing.
6.4 Auth2
.. Description
Tan et al. [TSL] addressed the problem of relying on a permanent link to a database server
that keep all the tags’ secrets for authentication. As in practice there are a dozen of reasons
for this connection to be interrupted, they motivated the need of readers that can act with-
out that permanent link. ăe naïve solution which consists of simply uploading the whole
database into the readers is not a reasonable approach, not only for the amount of time and
data communication that it induces, but also because it is unsafe to have all the tags’ secret put
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ReaderRi Tag TID
Secret: L = f: : : ; `ID = f(rijjtID); : : : g Secret: tID
nt     Pick nt
Pick ni
ni;ri   ! h1 = Truncm(f(rijjtID))
Check 9`ID 2 L : Truncm(`ID) = h1 h1;h2     h2 = h(f(rj jjti)jjnijjnt) IDi.
Compute ID = h2  h(`IDjjnijjnt).
Figure 6.4:ăeAuth protocol.
into a device that an adversary may control. Instead, Tan et al. proposed to give each reader
the output of a function of each tag’s secret and a secret unique to that reader. Concretely,
given each tag’s secret tID, that is also listed in the database, and every reader identiđer ri, the
manager computes a list L including all f(ri; tID). Given that the function f is one-way, no
malicious entity is able to recover any of the tags’ secrets from L. On the other hand, cor-
rectness of the scheme would require that no collision on the output of f occurs. Hence, the
function f needs at least to be collision-resistant.
Wenowconcentrate on theđrst variant of the secondprotocol proposedbyTan et al., which
we call Auth. As Figure . shows, the tag đrst starts by sending a randomnoncent to which
the reader replies with a nonce nj and its unique identiđer ri. Upon receiving this answer,
the tag computes h1 = Truncm(h(f(ri; tID))) and h2 = h(f(rijjtID)jjntjjnj). Here Truncm
denotes the function that truncates its input to itsm least signiđcant bits while f and h are
two collision-resistant hash function.
.. Cryptanalysis of Auth
In their security analysis, the authors of Auth considered two notions of tracing: deđnite
and indeđnite. Deđnite tracing occurs when an adversary is able to keep track of one precise
tag while indeđnite tracing is the ability of tracing a members of a group without distinction
between them. ăat is, the adversary is not able to tell more than the fact that the tag under
her watch belongs to a certain group she has encountered before. ăe authors did not claim
that Auth was secure against indeđnite tracing attacks. Instead, they argued for its security
against deđnite tracing attacks as even if the value h1 is đxed per tag, truncating it tom bits
leads to many collisions for diﬀerent tags. Since the output from each tag is not unique, an
attacker should not be able to distinguish which tag is outputting this value.
Nevertheless, we show that the Auth protocol allows to trace a single tag using the infor-
mation obtained from two diﬀerent readers. ăe attack runs as follow.
. Learning: ăe attacker eavesdrops several protocol sessions involving a tag T0 and 
readersR1; : : : ;R via Execute queries. At the end of this phase, the attacker obtains
 pairs of the form (ri; h(f(rijjt0))m).
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. Challenge: Some time later, when the adversary wishes to track the tag T0, she starts
a session with the challenge tag Tb 2 fT0; T1g replaying r1 by issuing a Send query
and comparing the response from the tag for a match on the đrst part of the message
with h(f(r1jjt0))m. ăen, she starts another session replaying r2 via a Send query and
checks the response from the tag for a match on the đrst message component with
h(f(r2jjt0))m. She continues to do that operation for all  pairs she learned in the
đrst phase.
Now, if two tags have a probability, induced by the birthday paradox, of having the same
h1 equal to 2 m/2 then the probability that T1 has its responses to the challenges sent
equal to those of T0 is upper-bounded by 2 m/2. Hence, one can choose  so that the
probability is negligible. In this case, it becomes highly likely that this is the same tag
whose session she had initially eavesdropped, i.e. Tb = T0. So, the adversary outputs
b^ = 0. In the other case, the adversary deduces that Tb = T1 and outputs b^ = 1.
Note that the attacker always wins when Tb = T0 but fails when Tb = T1 and all queries
match. From this, we can derive the advantage of the adversary
Adv = Pr[b^ = b]  1/2
= 1/2 Pr[b^ = bjb = 1] + 1/2 Pr[b^ = bjb = 0]  1/2
= 1/2 Pr[b^ = bjb = 1]
= 1/2(1  Pr[b^ = :bjb = 1])
 1/2(1  2 m/2):
Since it has a non-negligible advantage, the adversary we described earlier is signiđcant.
6.5 YA-TRAP, YA-TRAP+ and O-TRAP
In this section, we study a series of optimistic authentication protocols that were proposed
for RFID tags: Ya-TRAP, designed by Tsudik [Tsu], and their follow-up YA-TRAP+ and
O-TRAP, due to Burmester et al. [LBdM]. ăe term optimistic refer to two diﬀerent be-
haviors readers follow depending onwhether the system is under attack or not. When noma-
licious entity interferes with the system, a very optimized procedure, compared to standard
protocols from the literature, is performed. However, when the protocol deviates from the
ideal case, a special procedure is launched from the reader. Although this last procedure usu-
ally has a higher cost than typical veriđcation algorithms for RFIDs, one hopes that a system
does not get under attack most of the time in practice. If this is the case, then deploying two
approaches, one of them being optimistic, can be beneđcial for the scalability of the system.
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Reader Tag
Secret hash table: Public: tmax
f: : : ; (tj ;HMACKID(tj)); : : : g Secret: KID; tID
tj   ! if tj 2 Jti + 1; tmaxK
hj  HMACKID(tj)
tID  tj
else
check 9ID s.t. (tID; hj) 2 L: hj     hj  PRNGi(tj).
Figure 6.5:ăeYA-TRAP protocol.
.. YA-TRAP
ăesteps ofYA-TRAPare given in Figure ., whereHMAC refers to theHMACconstruction
of a MAC from a has function [BCK] and PRNG is a pseudo-random number generator.
Each tag is initialized with an initial timestamp t0 and a max value for it, denoted tmax, as
well as a unique secret valueKID. Regarding their computational capabilities, tags are assumed
to have PRNG implemented, and we denote by PRNGjID the j-th element outputted from the
sequence of TID’s PRNG.
YA-TRAP is a simple challenge-response protocol in which the reader starts by issuing a
timestamp tj for the challenge. ăe tag’s response consists of computing the function HMAC
with its secret key KID and the received timestamp tj if this latter is in the interval limited
by the current timestamp tc and its maximum value tmax. However, when the last condition
is not fulđlled, the tag instead answers with PRNGID(tj). For veriđcation, the reader is given
a hash table, computed by the database server which holds all the tags’ keys, consisting of
the outputs of the HMAC of each tag’s secret and their corresponding timestamp. In order to
recover the tag’s identity, the reader searches that list for a pair matching (tj; hj) and returns
the corresponding tag.
We note that this approach is optimistic in the sense that the reader is able to recover the
identity of the partner tag when the tag did not update its timestamp value. In other words,
this procedure only works when the system is not under attack. We consider two scenarios
for desynchronization attacks. In the đrst one, the tag gets desynchronized to a value tID that
is smaller than or equal tmax. To recover the identity of that tag, the reader can try increasing
values for the challenge timestamp and forward the tag’s answers to the database. Having
knowledge of all secrets, the database is able to recover the tag’s identity providing that the
reader supplies it with the correct tID. Clearly, if the reader sends all possible values for tID
then the database will be able to recognize the partner tag. However, when tID is equal to
tmax, the tag always outputs a random answer independent from its internal key and is thus
permanently unable to authenticate itself. In other words, an adversary could mount a denial
of service attack by sending the tag in the future, i.e., sending tmax. Tsudik acknowledged that
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securing against this type of attacks requires to put more computation on the tag and was not
a primary goal of YA-TRAP. Finally, note that for an RFID system composed of n tags, the
complexity in the optimistic case for the reader and database side is O(n) to construct the
hash table and thenO(1) to recover the partner tag whereas in the other case the complexity
for recovering one tag isO(tmaxn).
Two operatingmodes were proposed for YA-TRAP, real-time and batch. ăe diﬀerence be-
tween the two being that while in the former mode, the reader instantaneously authenticates
a tag, in batch mode the reader only collects responses for multiple sessions and later com-
municates with the database server for identiđcation. For applications that do not require an
immediate response, such as inventory control, batch mode presents the advantage of being
easier to deploy since the readers are not required tomaintain a persistent link to the database.
However, when immediate feedback is required, such as library check-outs, retail outlets, or
contactless credit cards, real-time mode should be used.
ăe main goal of YA-TRAP’s design was to achieve untraceable privacy (UPriv) with ad-
versaries assumed to be able to corrupt tags. Albeit Tsudik explicitly stated that resistance to
denial of service attacks was not among the features of YA-TRAP,we show that such an attack
still allows an adversary to track any chosen tag.
Tracing tags in real time. In the YA-TRAP speciđcation, it was suggested that the top value
tmax of a tag’s timestamp does not need to be unique but could instead be shared by a batch of
tags.
Consider a scenario where tags have diﬀerent tmax, operating in real-time mode. Indeed,
acknowledging the fact that tags are produced by diﬀerent manufacturers for diverse applica-
tions, it seems inevitable that some tags will have a diﬀerent tmax. ăis leads us to an adversary
who can trace a tag, hence breaking the UPriv notion of privacy, as follows. For simplicity,
assume two tags T0 and T1 with respective tmax0 and tmax1 , where tmax0 < tmax1 .
. Learning: Issue a Send query with tj = tmax0 to a tag T 2 fT0; T1g. Since tmax0 is
much into the future than current ti value, a response hj = HMACKID(tj) is expected,
irrespective of which tag it is. Furthermore, the tag will update its local time counter
as ti = tmax0 . ăis action serves to send the tag into the future by marking it for future
tracing.
. Challenge: Some time later, when it is desired to trace the tag, issue a Sendquerywith tj
for tmax0 < tj < tmax1 . If T = T0, it will respond hj = PRNGji and will not successfully
pass the validation check by the reader. If T = T1, it will respond hj = HMACKID(tj)
and will successfully pass the validation check. ăus by observing the reader-tag inter-
action via Execute queries, an adversary can distinguish between T0 and T1 and win the
privacy game.
Juels andWeis [JW] gave two tracing attacks on YA-TRAP that are valid in their privacy
model, thus showing YA-TRAP does notmeet their deđnition of strong privacy. ăeirmodel
arguably assume that the adversary is able to interact with each tag on its own before having
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to recover the identity of one of them. ăis feature clearly reĔects real-world capabilities of
attackers in the context of RFID tags. Moreover, it turns out to bemandatory for the attack of
Juels andWeis to work. In contrary, we do not make this assumption and simply assume that
the adversary interacts with all tags similarly. ăat is, our attack applies to a more constrained
setting for the adversary by forcing a common tmax for all tags.
YA-TRAP was designed to speciđcally output a random response even if the tag does not
want to be validated by the reader, such that an adversary is unable to distinguish between
that random response and a proper response. Yet, by observing the output of the reader-tag
interaction, i.e. seeing if the tag passes the validation or not, still allows the distinguishing.
In this sense, using the YA-TRAP approach of generating random responses by itself is not
suﬃcient to prevent tracing.
To reiterate, our attack can be prevented if the adversary is unable to observe the output
of the reader-tag interaction, i.e. it does not know if the tag successfully passes the reader’s
validation check. ăis inability in fact corresponds to the narrow adversary model deđned
in Vaudenay’s privacy model [Vau]. One example setting that đts this narrow model is the
batchmode suggested forYA-TRAP.Nevertheless, the batchmode is not relevant for applica-
tions where immediate feedback is required and is only meaningful when tags are assumed to
be honest since they are not authenticated on the spot but later. Clearly, this last assumption
is hard to justify.
Cloning. First note that due to computational restrictions, it must be that tmax  t0 is a poly-
nomial function in the security parameter of the scheme. Hence, we can have an adversary
enumerating all those timestamps and querying a particular tag with all of them. In the end,
the adversary obtains a list of pairs of the form (tj; hj) that she can use to produce a clone to
the earlier tag. ăe forged tag only needs to have that list and to answer to the hj that cor-
responds to the tj it receives. Clearly, this tag gets authenticated so the YA-TRAP protocol
does not protect against cloning attacks.
.. YA-TRAP+
To address availability of all RFID tags, which is the main conceptual limit of YA-TRAP,
Burmester et al. [LBdM] proposed an extension to the latter protocol called YA-TRAP+.
ăe diﬀerence between the two version essentially lies in the absence of the max timestamp
tmax. Moreover, the reader is assumed to have access to the tags’ secrets KID (instead of the
outputs of a function of these secrets). For authentication, the reader issues a timestamp t
and a random value rt, just like in YA-TRAP. ăe response from the tag then depends on
the comparison of the received timestamp with the one he received during the session before.
If the timestamp it receives is greater than the stored one then the tag answers with h1 =
HKi(00jjtjjrt) and updates its internal timestamp tID to the received one. In the other case,
the tag computes h1 = HKID(01jjrijjrt), for a randomly chosen ri, but does not update tID.
 .     
  
Reader Tag
Database: f: : : ; (ID;KID); : : : g Secret: KID; tID
Pick rt
tj ;rt   ! Pick rID
if (t > tID)
h1 = HKi(00jjtjjrt)
tID  t (without optional part)
else
check 9(tj ;KID) 2 L s.t. rID;h1     h1 = HKi(01jjrIDjjrt)
h1 = HKID(00jjtjjrt)_
h1 = HKID(01jjrIDjjrt)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Optional Part
h2 = HKID(10jjrIDjjt) h2   ! if (t > tID ^ h2 = HKID(10jjrIDjjt))
tID  t
Figure 6.6:ăeYA-TRAP+ protocol.
To avoid distinguishing attacks by the number of values that the tag returns, it is set such that
it sends ri and h1 in both cases, although it is useless in the đrst one. Veriđcation from the
reader is straightforward since it has all the tags’ secrets.
To đx the vulnerability to DoS attacks which aﬀects YA-TRAP, it was proposed to add
an optional phase to YA-TRAP+ which implements reader authentication. In this variant,
the reader issues a third message h2 = HKID(10jjrijjt). When a tag receives that message, it
decides whether it matches with the answer it expects. In case of a match, the tag updates its
tID to t, providing that t > tID. ăe whole protocol is shown in Figure ..
It turns out that the tracing attack againstYA-TRAP is simplerwhen applied toYA-TRAP+
if its optional second pass is implemented. ăe attack runs as follows.
. Learning: An adversary đrst issues Send queries to the tag T0 with some rt and a value t
that is predictablymuch larger than the tag’s tID.ăe adversary then obtains the response
ri; h1 = HK(00jjtjjrt). Aĕer that, she sends a random message h2 which, with very
high probability will make T0 not authenticate its partner as the reader. Consequently,
T0 does not update its internal time counter tID to t.
. Challenge: We let the adversary đrst issue a Send query to the challenge tag Tb with the
samert and t. If the challenge tag isT0, itwill return the responser0i; h1 = HK(00jjtjjrt)
forwhichh1 is the same as the one answered in the đrst phase. Otherwise, the adversary
knows Tb = T1. ăis allows to track the tag and win the privacy game.
Note that YA-TRAP+ was speciđcally designed to resist the kind of tracing attack that we
mounted on its predecessor YA-TRAP. Yet, this result shows that the optional second pass of
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Reader Tag
Database: f: : : ; (rID;KID); : : : g Secret: KID
Pick rt rt   !
check 9(rID;KID) in DB s.t. rID;h     h = HKID(rt; rID)
h = HKID(rt; rID) _ h = HKID(rt; rID) rID  HKID(rID)
rID  HKID(rID)
Figure 6.7:ăeO-TRAP protocol.
YA-TRAP+,whichwasmeant to provide additional security to resist denial of service attacks,
makes the protocol vulnerable to tracing attacks.
.. O-TRAP
Beside proposing YA-TRAP+, Burmester et al. proposed another authentication protocol
for RFID tags called O-TRAP. In its spirit, this protocol is similar to OSK [OSK]. To
authenticate itself, the tag computes a keyed function HKID of a challenge sent by reader rt
and a self chosen nonce rID, i.e., it computes h = HKID(rt; rID), and sends both the output of
H and its nonce to the reader. Having knowledge of the keys, the reader goes through all those
keys to đnd the one for which the output ofH matches. ăe steps of O-TRAP are shown in
Figure ..
. Learning: An adversary can issue a Send query to the tag T0 with random values rt
repeatedly, causing the tag to update its rID each time such that it is way into the future
compared to its synchronization with the reader.
. Challenge: ăe adversary observes the future interaction between a tag Tb 2 fT0; T1g
and a reader via Execute queries to see if the reader accepts the tag as valid. If not, then
the adversary knows this was the tag that it marked during the learning phase, i.e. Tb =
T0. Else, Tb = T1.
Note that this kind of attack has been independently applied by Juels andWeis [JW] to
a couple of other older RFID protocols. Yet what is interesting, as has been demonstrated
here, is that more recent provably secure protocols like YA-TRAP+ and O-TRAP still allow
for tracing. In this particular case, the privacy leakage of the protocols come from the poor
formulation of privacy in the LBdM model as it permits to prove that protocols that allow
tracing attacks are private.
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Reader Tag
Database: Shared secret:
{: : : ; (ID;KjID;HMACKjID(tj)); : : : } Ki;KID; tID
K0j ;t
0
j        !
t = t0j   tj
if (t > 0 ^Ht(K 0j) = Kj)
tj = t
0
j ,
Kj = K
0
j ,
KTi = Ht(KTi),
hj = HMACKTi (t
0
j).
else
hj = PRNG
j
i .
hj         
check 9Ti; hj : hTi;KjTi ; hji 2 L.
Figure 6.8:ăeRIPP-FS protocol.
6.6 RIPP-FS
RIPP-FS was proposed by Conti et al. [CPMS] as an improvement to the YA-TRAP type
protocols that features resilience to denial of service attacks and forward privacy. ăis last
notion deals with the privacy of sessions that precedes the leakage of the tag’s secrets to an
attacker. Albeit tag authentication works in a similar way to YA-TRAP, RIPP-FS includes an
additional key that is shared between all the tags and the reader and is used to authenticate
the latter. Concretely, that key is derived from a hash chain seeded by a valuew and is deđned
as follow.(
K` = w
Ki = H(Ki+1) = H
` 1(w); i = 0; : : : ; `  1
To perform reader authentication, every tag is given K0. For time period i, it is the key
Ki that will be sent by the reader as the đrst message for authentication along with a period
counter ti. Having the key of the last period, the tag checks thatKi 1 = H(Ki) (if one time
period separates the current authentication from the last one. In general, the tag checks that
Ki+ti tID = H(Ki) ). ăe rest of the protocol follows YA-TRAP: the tag updates its inter-
nal period counter tID to ti if the former value is greater than the later. ăe tag also updates
Ki+ti tID toKi and returns HMACKID(ti) to the reader which is able to recoverKID and hence
deducing the identity of the partner tag. As in the YA-TRAP protocol, when the received
timestamp is smaller than the stored one, the tag does not perform any of the updates men-
tioned before and rather answerswith PRNGID(i). ăe steps of RIPP-FS are given in Figure ..
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In a similar way to YA-TRAP, it is possible to trace anRFID tag implementing the RIPP-FS
protocol in the following way.
. Learning:
a) õuery Send to the reader to initiate two protocol sessions, obtaining (Kj; tj) and
(Kj+1; tj+1), where tj+1 > tj , andKj = H(Kj+1).
b) Make a Send query to a tag T0 with the value (Kj+1; tj+1). Since this is a valid
message generated from the reader, a response hj = HMACKID0 (ti+1) is expected.
More importantly, the tag will update its time interval counter as tID0 = ti+1, as
well as the other secretsKi = Ki+1 andKID0 = H ti tID(KID0).
. Challenge: Some time later, when an adversary decides to trace a tag, she issues a Send
query with (Ki; ti) to the challenge tag Tb, and passes the response to the reader. If
Tb = T0, then the target tag’s response will have been hj+1 = PRNGID(i) and will
not successfully pass the validation check by the reader. However, when Tb = T1,
the response hj+1 = HMACKIDb (ti) will successfully pass the validation check. ăus
by passively observing the reader-tag interaction via Execute queries, an adversary can
distinguish between T0 and T1 and win the privacy game.
6.7 A Backward and Forward Untraceable Protocol
At ICICS ’, Lim and Kwon [LK] proposed an RFID protocol that oﬀers untraceable
privacy (UPriv) bothbefore and aĕer corruptionof a tag. ăis is indeed amajor feat, since other
RFID schemes in literature are only able to treat backward untraceability, i.e. a corrupted tag
cannot be linked to any past completed sessions.
ăe initialization phase is as follows:
. ăe reader chooses a random secretKi for each tag Ti, and evaluatesm  1 evolutions
ofK0i = Ki, i.e. Kji = g(K
j 1
i ) for 1  j  m   1, where g is a pseudorandom
function. It then computes tji = extl2(K
j
i ) for 0  j  m   1, where l2 is some
appropriate bit length, extl(x) is an extraction function returning l bits of x.
. ăe reader also chooses a random ui for each tag Ti and computes a key chain fwji gn 1j=0
of length n, such that wni = ui and wji = h(w
j+1
i ) for 0  j  n   1, where h is a
pseudorandom function.
. ăe tag stores hwi;T ; Kii wherewi;T = w0i and initializes a failure counter ci = 0.
. ăe reader creates two tables L1; L2 for Ti in its database, where L2 is empty and L1
has entries of the form hsi; ftjigm 1j=0 ; ui; ni; wi;T ; wi;Si where ni = n and wi;S = w1i
thuswi;T = h(wi;S).
Aĕer initialization, a normal protocol session is illustrated as in Figure ., where f is a
pseudorandom function. For further discussions on this protocol, the interested reader is
referred to [LK].
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ReaderR Tag Ti
Database: f: : : ; (Ki; tablesL1; L2); : : : g Secret: wi;T ; ci;Ki
pick r1
r1   !
ti  extl2(Ki)
pick r2
ti;r2;1     1  extl1(f(Ki; r1jjr2)).
check 9tji : (tji = ti) ^ (tji 2 ftki gm 1k=0 )^
hKi; ftki gm 1k=0 ; ui; ni; wi;T ; wi;Si 2 (L1 [ L2)
calculateK 0i = g(Ki)j ; 01 = extl2(f(K 0i; r1jjr2))
and check that 01 = 1
calculate 2 = f(K 0i; r2jjr1) wi;S 2   ! wi;S = f(Ki; r2jjr1) 2.
for k = 0 : : :m  j   1 calculate: t^ki = tj+k+1i ; check h(wi;S) = wi;T .
for k = m  j : : :m  1 calculate: If yes:
K^i = g(K
0
i); t^
k
i = extl2(g(K^i)
k m+j); ci = 0;wi;T = wi;S ;
update K^i; ftki gm 1k=0 inL2 Ki = g(Ki  (wi;T jjr1jjr2)).
calculateKi = g(Ki  (wi;S jjr1jjr2)); else
tji = extl2(g(Ki)
j) for j = 0 : : :m  1; ci = ci + 1;
ni = ni   1; wi;T = wi;S ; wi;S = h(ui)ni if ci < m
update hKi; ftki gm 1k=0 , ni,wi;T ; wi;Si inL1 updateKi = g(Ki).
Figure 6.9:ăe backward and forward untraceable RFID protocol.
Tracing the Tag. For the purpose of understanding our attack, it suﬃces to review the gist
of the Lim-Kwon protocol. ăe tag updates its stored secretKi in two possible ways. If the
reader is successfully authenticated, it would update asKi = g(Ki  (wi;T jjr1jjr2)). Else,
the tag would update as Ki = g(Ki); up tom times of unsuccessful authentications, aĕer
which the tag stops updating its Ki. ăis eventual non-updating allows the reader to catch
up.
Our attack nevertheless works using the basic pattern of desynchronization that we applied
in Section .. Recall that the idea of the attack is to intentionally desynchronize the tag from
the reader by sending the tag into the future.
. Learning: An adversary sendsm number of queries rj1 for 1  j  m to the tag T0,
and records the tag’s response tj for 1  j  m. Since the adversary is impersonating
the reader, thus each time it will not pass the check by the tag, and so each time the tag
would update its stored secret asKi = g(Ki), fromwhich ti will be derived in the next
session.
. Challenge: õuery rm1 to the tag Tb 2 fT0; T1g, and obtain its response t.
. Guess: Check if t = tm. If so, then the adversary knows this was the tag it queried
during the learning phase i.e. Tb = T0. Else, it knows that Tb = T1.
Lim and Kwon remarked that once a tag is successfully authenticated by a reader, then the
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tag’s stored secretKi would be freshly randomized so that tracing of any kind is prevented.
Yet, our adversary can repeat the above step of the Learning phase by sending m arbitrary
queries rj1 for 1  j  m to the tag again to desynchronize it and the same tracing attack
applies.
In order to solve the DoS problem, the authors included a feature into the design of the
protocol that unfortunately allowed our attack causing the tag to be traceable even without
corruption, although the goal for their protocol wasmuch stronger i.e. backward and forward
untraceability even with corruption.
Violating the Forward Untraceability. Another goal of the protocol is to achieve forward
untraceability, i.e. even if a tag is corrupted thus leaking its stored secret Ki, it should be
impossible for the adversary to trace the tag in future sessions. Nevertheless, we describe an
attack in the context of the example application provided byLimandKwonof a tag embedded
in a purchased item. Initially, the seller’s reader R1 has legitimate access to the tag. At the
point of purchase, ownership of this access should transfer to the buyer’s readerR2. ăe attack
canbemounted either by the seller’s reader or by anoutsider adversary having access toCorrupt
queries.
. An outsider adversary issues a Corrupt query to the tag Tb, obtaining its stored secret
Ki. Alternatively, the seller’s readerR1 knows the stored secretKi andwi;T .
. At the point of purchase, the buyer’s readerR2 interacts with the tag in a protocol ses-
sion, thus updating Ki. During this time, the adversary eavesdrops the values r1; r2
communicated in the session.
. Right aĕer the interaction between the tag and the buyer’s readerR2, the adversary ini-
tiates a protocol session with the tag. Since she knows the previousKi, and also the lat-
est values of r1; r2, the adversary can recompute the latestKi = g(Ki(wi;T jjr1jjr2))
and thus produces a message the passes the tag’s veriđcation procedure. ăis way, the
adversary can trace the tag in all future sessions and block other readers, including the
buyer’s,from authenticating the tag.
ăis result contradicts the protocol’s claim that its ownership transfer is perfect. While Lim
andKwonargued that the protocol achieves forwarduntraceability under the assumption that
the adversary cannot eavesdrop on all future legitimate interactions involving the tag and the
reader; the above attack works without violating that assumption. Lim and Kwon also gave a
provable security model for forward untraceability in its Appendix. However, their protocol
was not formally proven in thatmodel, and only a sketch of the proofwas provided in [LK].
6.8 O-FRAP and O-FRAKE
At AsiaCCS ’, Le et al. [LBdM] presented a universally composable (UC) [Can] pri-
vacymodel for RFIDprotocols, and proposedO-FRAP andO-FRAKE.ăese two protocols
 .     
  
ReaderRj Tag Ti
Database: f: : : ; (ri;Ki); : : : g Secret: ri;Ki
pick r r   !
ri;v2     v1jjv2jjv3jjv4jjv5 = F (Ki; rjjri)
check 9(ri; ;Ki) in DB Set ri  v1.
calculate v01jjv02jjv03jjv04 = F (Ki; rjjri)
check v02 = v2
output Accept(Ti)
update (ri;Ki) = (v01; v04) in DB
v03   ! If (v3 = v03)
Output Accept(Rj).
SetKi  v4
Figure 6.10:ăeO-FRAP protocol.
Reader Tag
Database: f: : : ; (ri;Ki; SKi); : : : g Secret: ri;Ki; SKi
pick r r   !
ri;v2     v1jjv2jjv3jjv4jjv5 = F (Ki; rjjri)
check 9(ri; ;Ki; SKi) in DB Set ri  v1.
calculate v01jjv02jjv03jjv04jjv05 = F (Ki; rjjri)
check v02 = v2
output Accept(Ti; SKi)
update (ri;Ki; SKi) = (v01; v04; v05) in DB
v03   ! If (v3 = v03)
Output Accept(Rj ; SKi).
Set hKi; SKii  hv4; v5i.
Figure 6.11:ăeO-FRAKE protocol.
are shown in Figures . and ., respectively, in which F denotes a pseudorandom func-
tion.
.. Tracing O-FRAP
O-FRAP is formally proven to be a secure untraceable RFID protocol in the LBdM mod-
el where corruption of tags is allowed, in the sense that the only information revealed to an
adversary is if a party is a tag or a reader. Yet we show here how its untraceable privacy can
be violated by presenting a tracing attack that is valid even in a weaker privacy model where
corruption possibility is not granted to the adversary.
ăe attack works as follows:
. Learning:ăeadversary sends an arbitrary r value to the tagT0, but does not complete
. -  -
      
the protocol. ăis causes the tag to update its ri, while itsKi remains unchanged, thus
marking the tag for future tracing.
. Challenge: To trace the tag in future, the adversary observes the interaction between
the reader and the tag Tb.
. Guess: If the reader does not output Accept, then the adversary knows that this tag was
indeed the tag that it marked in step (), i.e. Tb = T0. Otherwises, he deduces that
Tb = T1.
.. Violating the Forward Privacy of O-FRAP
In the Le-Burmester-de Medeiros model, corruption is not allowed before a protocol session
is initiated, and it is assumed that upon corruption of a party, either a tag or a reader, then
the corrupted party’s current incomplete session oﬀers no privacy. It is claimed that privacy is
maintained for all previously completed sessions involving the corrupted party.
To motivate our case, we consider the deđnition of subsession completion in the LBdM
model. A subsession is a party’s view of its current protocol session, e.g. during an O-FRAP
protocol session, both the reader and the tag have their own separate views of that session,
so-called their subsession. To quote from [LBdM], “Upon successful completion of a sub-
session, each party accepts its corresponding partner as authenticated.” ăus, at the point
where a party outputs Accept, its subsession is already considered completed.
Referring to theO-FRAP description in Figure ., the reader’s subsession is completed at
the point when it outputs Accept, i.e. before it updates its entry inL and before it sends v03 to
the tag. Meanwhile, the tag’s subsession is completed at the point that it outputs Accept, i.e.
before it updates itsKi. In the context of the Le-Burmester-deMedeirosmodel, corruption of
a party at this point should not violate the privacy of the party corresponding to its completed
subsession. ăis is the problem with the O-FRAP proof that we are exploiting. Indeed, we
show how this can be circumvented.
. ăe adversary đrst eavesdrops on an O-FRAP session and records hr; ri; v2i.
. ăen, it corrupts a tag T 0i at the point aĕer the tag outputs Accept. It thus obtainsK 0i
corresponding to a previoulsy completed subsession, and not the updatedK 0i = v4.
. ăe adversary calculates v1jjv2jjv3jjv4 = F (K 0i; rjjri). It can then check the comput-
ed v2 with its recorded v2 for a match, thereby associating the tag T 0i to the particular
completed subsession corresponding to its recorded hr; ri; v2i.
Our attack here requires a stronger adversary than the other attacks we have presented in ear-
lier sections of this chapter. Yet, assuming corruption capabilities is taken into account by
the Le-Burmester-deMedeirosmodel in whichO-FRAP’s privacy was proven, and shows that
O-FRAP does not achieve its goal of forward untraceable privacy.
 .     
  
.. Breaking the Forward Secrecy of O-FRAKE
ăe above attack can be extended to break the forward secrecy of the O-FRAKE protocol,
which is an extension of O-FRAP that furthermore establishes a shared secret session key
between the tag and reader.
. ăe adversary đrst eavesdrops an O-FRAKE session and records hr; ri; v2i.
. It then corrupts a tag T 0i at the point aĕer the tag outputs Accept. It thus obtains a pair
hK 0i; SK 0ii corresponding to a previously completed subsession, and not the updated
hK 0i; SK 0ii = hv4; v5i.
. ăe adversary calculates v1jjv2jjv3jjv4jjv5 = F (K 0i; rjjri). It can then check the com-
puted v2 with its recorded v2 for a match, thereby associating the tag T 0i to the partic-
ular completed subsession corresponding to its recorded hr; ri; v2i; and further it also
knows that the established session key for that associated session is SK 0i .
6.9 Conclusion
Although we have used a very limited privacy model, we have been able to show that several
RFID protocols that allegedly addressed privacy were vulnerable to rather simple attacks. We
identify the main cause behind these failure to be the lack of formal analysis. Indeed, most
presentedprotocolswere only supported by informal arguments that cannot take into account
all the possible attacks an adversary can perform. ăerefore, we stress the need of studying the
extend of privacy an RFID protocol oﬀers by providing a formal proof of security.
Moreover, we have shown that the choice of themodel is crucial as it can be that a protocol is
proven private according to amodel with a correct reduction and Still be vulnerable to privacy
attacks not covered by the model. As it was demonstrated with the O-FRAP and O-FRAKE
protocols, this applies to the LBdMmodel.
. 
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Before moving on to Vaudenay’ privacy model, we review other privacy models that were
proposed. We proceed chronologically and present Avoine et al.’s model [ADO] (ADO),
the Juel-Weismodel[JW, JW] and its extension due toDamgård andOstergaard [DP]
(We refer to the Juels-Weis model and its extension as the eJW model.) and đnally the zero-
knowledge based model of Deng et al. [DLYZ]. ăese models will be formally compared
to our model in the next chapter.
As a contribution, we show that the privacy experiment of Juels and Weis simpliđes when
one takes correctness and soundness into consideration.
7.1 The ADO Model
To the best of our knowledge, the đrst formal treatment for studying the privacy of RFID
systems is due toAvoine, Dysli, andOechslin [ADO]who used an ad-hocmodel to analyze
Molnar andWagner’s scheme [MW]. It was subsequently improved by Avoine in his PhD
thesis [Avo]. We refer to this model by ADO.
In short, this model is based on the notion of indistinguishability: A scheme is supposed
to preserve privacy if an adversary choosing a target tag and getting either that tag or another
one, with both events happening with probability 1/2, cannot tell which tag she received with
a better chance than guessing, i.e., deducing the tag’s identity with probability 1/2. To perform
the attack, the adversary is given the secret state of anotherRFID tag and is allowed to interact
with the target tag before it is submitted to the challenger.
7.2 The Extended-Juels-Weis Model
ăeADOmodel was generalized by Juels andWeis [JW, JW]who elaborated onADO’s
privacy game to attain a notion that is closer to classical indistinguishability games for encryp-
tion schemes. ăat is, contrarily to the ADOmodel, the adversary gets to choose both target
tags and receives one of them in return. ăe adversary is also able to corrupt any tag except
the two targets and has control over the communication channel. Note that the corruption
model of Juels andWeis allows the adversary to set a new key for the corrupted tag.
Juels andWeis model RFID systems as a set of tags interacting with a single reader is set up
by an algorithm denoted Gen that outputs n secrets, each one for a tag, and gives the reader
the n secrets. ăe reader can, contrarily to tags, maintain multiple sessions in parallel. For
this, the reader binds every running protocol session to a unique session identiđer sid that is
put in a table containing all the messages belonging to the session.
Attackers are assumed to have complete control over all communications between parties.
ăey interact with the RFID system through several interfaces.
 .    
  
 ăeRI interface allows to trigger protocol sessions andmake the reader out-
put the session identiđer sid and the đrstmessage for the session. (ăe Juels-Weismodel
assumes that it is always the reader that initiates the communication.)
 ăeTI interface serves to bind a tag to a session. As such, it needs to receive an
sid. Once sid has been set for the reader or a tag, the adversarymay sendmessages of the
form (sid;m) to which the party answers with a message computed using the previous
messages related to sid, sid, its secret, i.e., the tag’s key or the reader’s list of keys, and
its internal randomness. Note that when a tag receives a TI, it aborts the current
session and deletes all internal data, except for the key K , even if this happens while
the tag is in a middle of another protocol session. At some point, the reader performs
a veriđcation step by computing a function over its entire internal state, including all
running sessions and any internal keymaterial to output an “accept” or a “reject” for the
session sid and close it. ăat is, the adversary is always assumed to be able to determine
whether a protocol instance is succeeded or failed.
 Tag corruption and initialization are done through an interface denoted SK. Up-
on reception of a SKmessagewith parameterK 0, a tag answers withK , its current
secret, and replaces it byK 0. ăe tag does not update its secret if the parameter is not
speciđed. A tag that has received a SK message is said to be corrupted.
Deđnition . (Privacy in the Juels-WeisModel)
Let k be a security parameter andA be a polynomial time algorithm that takes as input four pa-
rametersn, s, r, tand follows the following privacy experiment.
System Setup
: for i = 1 to n do
: Ki  Gen(1k)
: end for
: Init reader with (K1; : : : ; Kn)
: Set each tag’s Ti secret by SK(Ki)
Phase : Learning
: Interact with the system without exceeding r RI calls, t TI calls, and s com-
putation steps. Leave at least two tags uncorrupted.
Phase : Challenge
: Select two uncorrupted tags and denote them T ?0 , T ?1 .
: Pick b 2R f0; 1g and giveA access to T ?b . T ?:b becomes unreachable.
: Interact with the system without exceeding r RI calls, t TI calls, and s com-
putation steps and sending SK to T ?b .
: Output b0
Winning condition: b = b0
A scheme is said to be (n; r; s; t)-private if every polynomial-time adversaryA playing the privacy
.  -- 
      
experiment is such thatPr[A(1k) wins]  12
 = negl(k)
ăis deđnition was also extended to cover the case of forward-privacy, i.e., when the ad-
versary learns about the key of the target tag. ăis eventuality was included in the privacy
experiment by adding a step before the eighth one in which the attacker issues a SKmes-
sage on T ?b .
However, two key concepts were not discussed by Juels and Weis: correctness and sound-
ness. ăat is, an RFID scheme is useless if a tag having an undisturbed session with the reader
does not get authenticated or if an attacker can come up with a way to impersonate a tag to
the reader. (In fact, designing a private RFID protocol without both requirements is easy: It
suﬃces to make the tag output random bits.) ăis issue was adressed by Damgård and Peder-
sen [DP] who introduced two notions of correctness and soundness. In short, correctness
ensures that whenever a tag and a reader share a protocol session, the tag gets authenticated
whereas soundness requires that no polynomial-time adversary who can corrupt all the sys-
tem’s tags but one can make the reader accept a tag T for a protocol session in which T was
not involved.
Damgård and Pedersen also gave further clariđcations on the structure of the protocols that
are considered in the model. As the Juels-Weis model does not seem to support asymmetric
keys (that choice was probably made because public-key cryptography is believed to be too
expensive for simple devices as RFID tags), Damgård and Pedersen ređned the deđnition of
symmetric-key based protocol by giving to each tag, instead of a keyKi, an access to a random
oracle	Ki . On its side, the reader is given the list of all these keys and hence has access to all
the oracles	Ki . Moreover, Damgård and Pedersen showed that security for an RFID system
mandates that the reader accesses 	Ki to authenticate a tag Ti. Notice that proceeding in
this way implies a linear complexity for the reader in the number of the system’s RFID tag.
Consequently, corrupting a tagTi ismodeled by granting access to the oracle	Ki . We further
note that privacy in the sense of Juels-Weis can only be obtained for systems in which the
keys are independent, i.e., when the Gen algorithm is stateless and does not receive any hidden
parameter.
Albeit the description given above can be used to describe most protocols based on con-
ventional cryptography, it may be that there are more eﬃcient ways for the reader to verify a
protocol session. ăis is especially the case for correlated tags’ secrets where the complexity
can be reduced to a logarithmic factor [MW] at the cost of a weaker model of privacy in
which the adversarymay not be allowed to corrupt every tag from the system. Despite its lim-
itations, the weaker model has its beneđts in practical settings. So, it was taken into account
by Damgård and Pedersen who introduced a đĕh parameter for the adversary in the privacy
experiment that deđnes the maximal numbers of tags the adversary can corrupt in order to
retain privacy.
 .    
  
Simple Privacy for the eJWModel Juels and Weis argued that the attacker’s ability to cor-
rupt any tag except the two targets induces the requirements that the scheme should not use
strongly correlated secrets for the tags. In the following, we incorporate Damgård and Ped-
ersen’s requirements of correctness and soundness to yield a simpler but equivalent privacy
experiment for the eJWmodel.
Deđnition . (Simple Privacy for the eJWmodel)
Let the simple privacy experiment denote the privacy experiment of the Juels-Weismodel in which
the adversary is never allowed to sendSKmessages. ąis experimentwrites as
System Setup
: for i = 1 to n do
: Ki  Gen(1k)
: end for
: Init reader with (K1; : : : ; Kn)
: Set each tag’s Ti secret by SK(Ki)
Phase : Learning
: Interact with the systemwithout exceeding rRI calls, tTI calls, s computation
steps, and without issuing SK messages.
Phase : Challenge
: Select two tags and denote them T ?0 , T ?1 .
: Pick b 2R f0; 1g and giveA access to T ?b . T ?:b becomes unreachable.
: Interact with the systemwithout exceeding rRI calls, tTI calls, s computation
steps, and without issuing SK messages.
: Output b0
Winning condition: b = b0
We say that a scheme is (n; r; s; t)-simple private if every polynomial-time adversaryA playing
the simple privacy experiment is such thatPr[A(1k) wins]  12
 = negl(k):
ăeorem .
If anRFID scheme is correct, simple private, and uses independent keys, then the scheme is private.
Proof. We assume, without loss of generality, that once the adversary corrupts a tag, she does
not query it anymore. Instead, she uses her access to the oracle	 to simulate her interactions
with corrupted tags. To simulate the đnal outcome of a protocol session, i.e., the last message
from the reader, the adversary checks with the list of oracles she obtained from her SK
queries. Correctness ensures that if the reader authenticates a corrupted tag, the adversary’s
simulation does the same.
If aĕer trying with all these queries, the adversary is still unable to đnd the session partner,
she forwards the request to the reader. Clearly, the latter will not identify a corrupted tag so
simulation is perfect.
.  -- 
      
At last, using the fact that keys are independent, we can assert that the protocol messages
produced by the uncorrupted tags are unrelated to the states obtained by corruption. ăere-
fore, the success probability of the adversary is not aﬀected by the simulation. ăe resulted
game corresponds to the simple privacy experiment.
7.3 Zero-Knowledge Privacy
ăe formulation of zero-knowledge privacy [DLYZ], abbreviated zk-privacy, is derived
from the literature on zero-knowledge [GMR, GMR] with the idea of linking privacy
and zero-knowledge. ăe link between these two notions is done by noticing the fact that
privacy requires an adversary interacting with a random tag not to learn anything else than
what she could have deduced herself is reminiscent of the fact that a veriđer should not learn
anything from interacting with the prover in zero-knowledge interactive proofs (with the dif-
ference that in RFID protocols the malicious attacker is not one of the scheme’s entities).
Consequently, the privacy deđnition follows the simulation paradigm: An adversary is con-
sidered not to have learnt anything from interacting with a tag if every outputs it makes can be
produced by another polynomial-time algorithm, called simulator, that does not have access
to that tag.
Adversaries in zk-privacy are placed in the center of the RFID system and have complete
control over communication channels, except for the one between the reader and its database
server. To interact with the system, the adversary has access to a set of four interfaces denoted
IR, to create a protocol instance, ST, to send a message to a tag, SR, to
send a message to a reader, and C, for corruption (which reveals the content of the
tag’s permanent and volatile memory to the adversary). ZK-Privacy assumes that protocol
sessions end with amessage from the reader telling whether the session succeeded or failed. It
is therefore unnecessary to deđne an interface for the outcome of a protocol.
ăe privacy experiment is composed of two phases. Aĕer the creation of the reader and
a number of tags by a procedure denoted Setup, the adversary A interacts with the system
through the oracles mentionned above. At the end of this phase, she outputs her state and a
set C composed of so-called clean tags. Clean tags are uncorrupted tags that are currently at
the status ofwaiting for the đrst-roundmessage from the reader to start a new session. A target
tag, denoted Tg , is then randomly chosen from the set C. In a second stage, the adversary can
still interact with all the tags that are not in C and additionally has blind access to Tg , i.e., it
cannot corrupt it.
Simulators are also composed of twophases. ăeđrst phase of the attack for the simulator is
identical to the attack of the adversary described above. However, when it gets the randomly
chosen target tag, and aĕer interacting with the tags not in C, the simulator outputs a sim-
ulated view, denoted sview. Note that the simulator does not have access to Tg . ZK-privacy
 .    
  
requires sview to include all oracle answers to the queries made by the simulator. A protocol
is said to be zk-private if for every adversary there exists a simulator such that the view of the
former is computationally indistinguishable from the sview computed by the latter. Exten-
sions to forward-zk-privacy and backward-zk-privacy were also deđned. Hereaĕer, we give
a deđnition of zk-privacy but we refer the reader to the original papers for a more complete
deđnition, especially for the other properties of completeness and soundness.
Deđnition . (ZK-Privacy)
AnRFID protocol satisĖes zk-privacy, if for any polynomial-time adversaryA = (A1;A2) there
exists a polynomial-time simulatorS = (S1;S2) such that for all suﬃciently large k, the outputs
Ěom the following games are indistinguishable. (C is a set of clean RFID tags.)
Real game:
: Run Setup(1k)! (param;R; T ).
: ExecuteA1(param;R; T )! (C; st)
: pick Tg 2R C
: RunA2(R; T   C; Tg; st)
: Output (g; viewA)
Simulated game:
: Run Setup(1k)! (param;R; T ).
: Execute S1(param;R; T )! (C; st)
: pick Tg 2R C
: Run S2(R; T   C; st)! sview
: Output (g; sview)
Note that sviewmust contain all oracle answers to the queries made by S .
It is worth mentioning that zk-privacy’s notion of privacy is stronger than the one of the
eJWmodel: Any zk-private protocol is private in the sense of [JW].
In the next chapter, we study the relationship between zk-privacy and our privacy models.
Loosely speaking, we exploit the fact that zk-privacy’s simulators only need to deal with the
removal of one target tag and ensure that privacy is still preserved. However, casesmay be that
an adversary needs two tags to defeat privacy. We show that in these settings zk-privacy fails to
detect any information leakage. At the same time, we show that our model successfully deals
with those situations.
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ăis Chapter is dedicated to present and compare the model proposed by Vaudenay at Asi-
aCrypt  [Vau]. ăe model we describe in here diﬀers in some details from the one
published in [Vau] in that we do clarify some vague notions used by Vaudenay such as dis-
tributions and how RFID tags are selected.
Aĕer that, we show implications and separation results with the eJW [JW, DP] and
ZK-privacy [DLYZ] models mentioned in the previous chapter. Finally, we present Her-
mans et al.’s adaptation of the model [HPVP], discuss its semantics and its point of diver-
gence with Vaudenay’s model.
8.1 Description
Contrarily to the models we presented in Chapter , Vaudenay’s model does not đx any par-
ticular experiment to capture the notion of privacy. Instead, privacy in Vaudenay’s sense is
achieved if the adversary is unable to learn any information, written as a boolean statement,
from interactingwith the RFID system. Of course, an attacker could still learn unrelated facts
such as the number of RFID tags that compose the system or how many protocol instances
were triggered. However, it seems that nothing can prevent a curious entity who has control
over all communication channels from extracting such information. For this reason, Vaude-
nay’s model treats privacy loss in RFID systems as the leakage of information that comes from
the wireless link, i.e., the protocol messages. ăis means that tag tampering is not considered
by itself a privacy loss in Vaudenay’s model: ăe fact that an attacker succeeds in extracting
the secret contained in an RFID tag is not a privacy leakage. Nevertheless, that piece of in-
formation can still lead to be a privacy loss if the secret proves to be useful for deducing an
information about past sessions (In this context, we commonly name the notion Forward pri-
vacy) or future ones (a protocol preventing such attacks is said to be backward private, or
Strong private in Vaudenay’s model).
ăemodel also takes into account the possibility of getting the result of protocol instances
by the adversary that was introduced by the Juels-Weis model. It also considers the possibility
of an adversary inserting illegitimate tags into the system. An illegitimate tag behaves exactly
like a legitimate one except that it does not have a corresponding entry in the database server.
In other words, an illegitimate tag never gets authenticated. From a practical point of view,
onemay see these illegitimate tags asRFID tags that follow the sameprotocol specs but belong
to a diﬀerent RFID system. It is not hard to see that the use of such tags always compromises
privacy: If a malicious entity gets holds of a tag, she can easily tell whether it belongs to a
system or not by looking at the outcome of a protocol session on the system’s reader. Clearly,
this privacy leakage is independent from the cryptography used in the tag. It is therefore not
considered as a privacy loss in Vaudenay’s model.
To capture its notion of privacy, Vaudenay proposed the notion of blinder. Basically, if the
adversary is unable to use the protocol messages to compute its statement, then those proto-
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col messages could be changed to ones that are produced by an entity who, like the adversary,
does not know the tags’ secrets and that change would go unnoticed to the adversary. Pro-
ducing those messages is delegated to an entity called the blinder. Still, the blinder has to be
aware of the actions of the adversary. In particular, it has knowledge of all the tags’ identi-
đers and the internal state of the corrupted ones (this only applies when considering strong
or destructive privacy). As a stateful algorithm, the blinder is allowed to gradually take into
account the history of the adversary’s actions to compute its protocol messages. In the end, an
RFID systempreserves privacy if for every adversary against privacy, there exists a blinder that
runs in polynomial time and for which replacing the protocol messages by the one computed
by this blinder does not aﬀect the adversary’s đnal statement. Alternatively, we can consider
a stronger, more restrictive, notion of privacy by requiring the blinder to be universal, inde-
pendent from the adversary. As we shall see later, all the blinders that were constructed by
Vaudenay [Vau] were in fact universal.
8.2 Deånition of the Model
.. RFID System
Like most models for RFID, Vaudenay considers an RFID system to be composed of a reader
permanently connected to a database server and a number of RFID tags that communicate
with the reader through a wireless link. As the link between the reader and the database is
assumed tobe secure, Vaudenay takes the simpliđcationofmerging the reader and thedatabase
server into one entity.
InVaudenay’smodel, every tag is bound to a uniquepublicly known identiđer ID and is given
a secret state SID. ăe reader has a key pair (pk; sk) (this key pair will be useful for protocols
that use public-key cryptography) and the database consists of entries of the form (ID; KID),
where ID refers to a tag identiđer andKID is the key corresponding to its state.
Deđnition . (RFID System)
An RFID system is composed of the following three algorithms
 SetupReader(1k) ! (sk; pk):ąis Ėrst probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm is used
to initialize the reader. As such, it takes as input a security parameter k and outputs a
pair of secret/public key (sk; pk) for the reader (if no public-key cryptography is used in
the RFID scheme then pk is set to?).
 SetupTagpk(ID)! (KID; SID):ąis probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm creates a tag
with unique identiĖer ID. ąe state SID is stored inside the tag while an entry (ID; KID) is
inserted in the server’s database DB when the created tag is legitimate.
 A two-party game run between a reader and a tag ID, in which each one of them follows
an interactive polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm, comes to complete the deĖnition.
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Apart Ěom a random tape, the algorithm for the tag takes as input the state SID while the
algorithm for the reader takes as input the database DB, and the reader’s secret key sk. In
the end, the reader ends up with a tape Output, set to? if the instance failed Ěom its per-
spective. A protocol execution with ID is called succeeded if it has a matching conĂersation
with the reader with output ID.
Simple RFID Protocols ăe deđnition of an RFID system given above is very general and
does not take into account the particularity of RFID tags. Due to their constraints, most of
theRFIDschemesproposed in the literature are elementary challenge-responseprotocols: the
reader sends a challenge to which the tag replies with the output of some (oĕen randomized)
function of its state and the received challenge. Some of these protocols may also include a
challenge from the tag. ăis is particularly the case when reader authentication is performed.
In order to identify its partner, the reader sends a query to the database. ăe database server
processes the query by applying a predicate	, that depends on the secret key and the protocol
transcript, on every entry and outputs the only pair (ID; KID) that satisđes the predicate. ăe
eventual future messages in the session from the reader may depend on this database entry.
In the event that more than one entry satisđes the predicate, the database acts as if she could
not identify the correct tag (Note that in the case of correct RFID schemes, this happens with
negligible probability). Such schemes are named simple RFID schemes.
Deđnition . (Simple RFID Scheme)
An RFID scheme is said to be simple if the following conditions are fulĖlled:
 Protocol messages do not depend on sk. ąey may depend on some entry (ID; KID) if the
latter has already been identiĖed as the partner tag for the session.
 ąe reader sends a query to the database with its secret key sk and the (possibly partial)
transcript p obtained Ěom a protocol session .
 ąere exists a predicate, i.e., a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that outputs a sin-
gle bit,	 that takes as input sk, p, and a database entry (ID; KID) such that the response
Ěom the database is computed by returning the set of database entries, denoted E, that
satisĖes the predicate (this implies that the predicate is tested on every database entry). ąe
reader then uniformly chooses one entry ĚomE and returns it. If no such entry is found,
then it returns?.
 Once a tag ID has been identiĖed in the database, its corresponding secret in the database,
KID, may be updated to a new value. When it takes place, this procedure is carried out
by an algorithm Update that is given as input sk, ID, KID, and the full transcript of the
protocol instance  . ąis algorithm outputs a newKID and the database entry (ID; KID) is
updated.
Note that this deđnition slightly diﬀers from the one given by Vaudenay in that the original
deđnition assumed the existence of an arbitrary eﬃcient sampling algorithm to choose the
đnal tag ID fromE whereas we đx the distribution to be uniform.
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.. Adversarial Capabilities
We follow on Vaudenay’s deđnitions and consider powerful adversaries who have complete
control over the communication channel: ăe adversary sits at the center of the RFID system
and has all messages transiting through her. ăerefore, she has the ability to insert, delete, and
modify messages. She can also provoke authentication sessions and relay, insert, and delete
messages. She additionally is given the ability to order the creation of legitimate RFID tags
and can request the creation of illegitimate ones. ăe diﬀerence between the two type of tags
being that only legitimate tags have a corresponding entry in the system’s database.
Furthermore, adversaries have the ability to have one or more RFID tags in their vicinity to
watch over them. RFID tags that are under control of the adversary are called drawn and the
others are said to be free. For a tag that has been drawn, all its interactions become controlled
by the adversary: ăis latter has access to all its communications, can trigger protocol instances
with the reader and sendmessages to the tag. Notonly can an adversary choose todraw speciđc
tags, but she can select them randomly following a speciđed probability distribution. For
instance, the adversary may be able to draw one tag over two, one with probability 1/3 and the
other with probability 2/3 without knowing a priori which tag she has obtained. At any time,
an adversary may decide to release a drawn tag and the latter becomes free. Apart from the
drawn tags, the DT oracle returns a bit for each one of them telling whether each tag
is legitimate or not. ăe reason for introducing these bits is to prevent the kind of attacks that
were described in Section .. concerning legitimate and illegitimate tags.
Drawn tags can also be tampered with: an adversary can “open” a tag and retrieve its inter-
nal state. While the leakage of the internal state through tag corruption is not under question,
whether the adversary can also extract the contents of its volatile memory, i.e., the random
variables it was using right before it was opened is debatable. Even if the contents of the tem-
porary memory fade away when not connected to a power source, recent attacks have shown
that it is still possible to “freeze” the volatile memory and extract bits from it [HSH+].
However, this issue is not a threat if we only consider two-message protocols and assume that
the parties securely delete the contents of their volatile memory right aĕer the protocol ter-
minates.
More formally, we give the following deđnition for an adversary, adaptated fromVaudenay’s
original work.
Deđnition . (Adversary against an RFID System)
An adversary against an RFID system is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which takes
a public key pk as input and interacts with the system through the following nine interfaces.
 CTb(ID): create a tagwithunique identiĖer ID. Depending on the bit b submitted
by the adversary, the tag may be legitimate, when b = 1, or illegitimate, when b = 0.
Aěer calling upon SetupTagpk(ID) ! (KID; SID) for both type of tags, the pair (ID; KID)
is inserted into the database if the adversary queried for a legitimate tag.
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 DT(Samp) ! ((vtag1; b1); : : : ; (vtagn; bn)): select a set of tags according to a
distribution speciĖed by a polynomial-time sampling algorithm Samp. During the period
in which a tag is drawn, the adversary has complete control over its interactions. Along
vtag, a bit b, set to  whenever the drawn tag is legitimate and to  when it is illegitimate,
is returned. When a tag is drawn, it is designated by a unique virtual Ěesh identiĖer vtag.
Drawing a tag that was already drawn makes the oracle output?.
Additionally, this interface keeps a private table T that keeps track of the real identiĖer of
each drawn tag, i.e., it is such that T (vtag) is the real identiĖer of the virtual tag vtag.
 F(vtag): release the RFID tag with virutal identiĖer vtag and makes it unreachable
for the adversary. Yet, the adversray can still choose to later draw it again.
 L ! : make the reader launch a new protocol instance . Without loss of gen-
erality, this oracle can be assumed to be deterministic. For easier notations, we denote by
Output() the tape that the reader obtains aěer the completion of the instance .
 SR(m;)! m0: send a messagem to a protocol instance  for the reader.
 ST(m; vtag) ! m0: send a message m for the drawn tag vtag and receives the
answerm0.
 E(vtag) ! (; ): executes a complete protocol instance between the reader and
the drawn tag vtag. It returns the transcript of the protocol denoted  , the list of successive
protocol messages.
 R()! x: returns the result of the completed protocol instance. Namely, it yields
0 when Output =? and 1 otherwise.
 C(vtag) ! S: returns the current state S of the tag T (vtag). It does not return
the content of the temporary memory of the tag.
Deđnition . diﬀers from Vaudenay’s with respecct to the introduction of the algorithm
Samp in DT queries. Vaudenay uses a vague term of “distribution” for the input of
DTwhichmay use exponential length. For example, this happens when the adversary
wants to draw all tags in a random order at the same time. As it will be made more explicit in
thenext chapter, such a restriction is necessary for the eﬃciency of theRFIDsystem, especially
for the security proofs to hold. ăat is, as soon as wewant to reduce the security of the scheme
to a computational assumption, the environment has to be executable in a polynomial number
of steps. ăat can not be guaranteed unless samplings can be performed in polynomial time.
Depending on the type of RFID tags, adversaries may not be able to query all the interfaces
deđned above. Several classes of adversaries deal with those disparities.
Deđnition . (Adversarial Classes)
Depending on the restrictions on accessing the interfaces listed in DeĖnition , we categorize ad-
versaries in several classes.
 Strong. ąis is the class of adversaries that has absolute access and no restriction.
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 Destructive. It refers to the class of adversaries for who tampering with a tag results in its
destruction. In a more formal sense, a Destructive adversary is not allowed to issue any
query with vtag aěer requesting C(vtag).
 Forward. Aěer a Forward adversary corrupts a tag, she is only allowed to corrupt other
tags or terminate.
 Weak. ąis class captures the set of adversaries who cannot corrupt any tag.
Orthogonal to this classiĖcation, we also consider the case in which adversaries do not have
access to the R oracle. Such adversaries are referred to as Narrow and for every class listed
aboĂe, we consider a Narrow counterpart.
 Narrow-Strong.ąis class denotes the set of Strong adversaries who do not access R.
 Narrow-Destructive.ąis includes allDestructive adversarieswho cannot accessR.
 Narrow-Forward. ąis is equivalent to Narrow[ Forward.
 Narrow-Weak. ąis is the class of the weakest adversaries who can neither corrupt tags
nor access R.
Regarding the relationbetween those adversarial classes, it is clear that for every non-narrow
classP wehaveNarrow P  P . It alsoholds thatWeak  Forward  Destructive  Strong
and Narrow-Weak  Narrow-Forward  Narrow-Destructive  Narrow-Strong.
.. Matching ConĂersation
Before deđning the necessary properties of an RFID scheme, we formalize the event that a
tag and a reader have an undisturbed protocol instance. ăis notion will prove to be useful to
deđne correctness and security for RFID systems.
Deđnition . (Matching Conversation)
We say that a protocol instance  had a matching conĂersation with the tag ID if they exchanged
well interleaved and faithfully (but maybe with some time delay) messages until  is completed.
.. Correctness
Basically, correctness formalizes the fact that whenever the reader and a tag ID participate
in an undisturbed protocol session, the reader authenticates the tag, that is, it ends up with
Output = ID, except with a small negligible probability. ăe diﬀerence between our deđni-
tion and vaudenay’s deđnition of correctness is that we take into account all possible actions
that may have happened in the past for the system. ăat is, we require that a legitimate tag
remains successful in authenticating itself and an illegitimate one gets rejected regardless of
the past events that occurred in the RFID system. ăe deđnition we propose is in fact close
to the deđnition of adaptive completeness from the ZK-Privacy model [DLYZ].
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Deđnition . (Correctness of an RFID Scheme)
LetA be a Strong adversary interacting with the RFID system in which she creates n RFID tags
and produces no output. We also assume without loss of generality that A Ěees all tags before
terminating.
An RFID scheme is said to be correct if for every suchA and every eﬃcient sampling algorithm
Samp on the set of the system’s tags, we have
Pr
2664 b = 1 ^ Output() = T (vtag)_
b = 0 ^ Output() =?

(pk; sk) SetupReader(1k)
ExecuteA(pk)
(vtag; b) DT(Samp)
(; ) E(vtag)
3775 = 1 negl(k)
We also propose a weaker notion of correctness in which only tags that have not completed
more than t consecutive unsuccessful instances get authenticated by the reader. ăat is, we
propose the following deđnition.
Deđnition . (Weak Correctness for Simple RFID Schemes)
A simple RFID system is said to be weakly-correct if
 ąere exists an eﬃciently computable predicate	0 such that if a tag ID and the reader have
a matching conĂersation in a session  and the tag ID has previously completed t successive
sessions without the reader authenticating it, we have
jPr[	0(ID; t)! 1]  Pr[Output() = ID]j = negl(k)
 For every Strong adversaryA that produces no output but Ěees all the tags before termi-
nating, and every eﬃcient sampling algorithm Samp on the set of the system’s tags, we have
Pr
2664
(b = 1 ^	0(T (vtag); t)
^Output() = T (vtag))
_
(b = 0 ^ Output() =?)

(pk; sk) SetupReader(1k)
A(pk)
(vtag; b) DT(Samp)
(; ) E(vtag)
3775 = 1 negl(k)
For simple schemes, this deđnition of weak-correctness means that the output of	0 is com-
putationally indistinguishable from the output of 	 with matching sessions and known tag
identiđers. Clearly, this deđnition is less restrictive thanVaudenay’s whomandated perfect in-
distinguishability between the two predicates, i.e., the original deđnition states thar the two
predicates have to be equivalent. Since the deđnition of correctness leaves a negligible prob-
ability that the reader authenticates another tag in place of the one it is running the instance
with, reĔecting this probability in the	0 predicate is reasonable.
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.. Security
Security is the equivalent of soundness in the eJW model. It formalizes the fact that no ad-
versary should be able to make the reader accept a protocol session in which the adversary
has been actively involved in the sense that sge did not only relay messages. In summary, an
RFID scheme is said to be secure if no Strong adversary is able to make a reader protocol in-
stance recognize an uncorrupted tag ID except with negligible probability and that is even if
the adversary corrupts all the other tags, unless  and the tag have a matching conversation.
Deđnition . (Security of an RFID System)
We say that anRFID scheme is secure if for every Strong adversary, the probability that the reader
ends with a tape Output = ID for a session  that has no matching conĂersation with the tag ID is
negligible in the RFID scheme’s security parameter.
Simple RFID schemes enjoy an interesting property: their security reduces to an adversary
playingwith a system consisting of a single tag IDt and having access to an oracle implementing
	(sk; ; ; ) towhich she can submit triplets of the form (ID; KID; )with the restriction ID 6=
IDt. In the following, we give the formal proof that this simpliđcation holds for our class of
simple and weakly-correct RFID systems.
Deđnition . (Security of Simple andWeakly-Correct RFID Systems)
For simple RFID schemes that are weakly-correct, we consider the following simpliĖed security
game for adversaries who are given access to an oracleO	 who checks the predicate	(sk; ; ; ).
: (sk; pk) SetupReader(1k)
: CT1(ID)
: vtag  DT(ID)
:   L
: RunAO	 interacting with L, SR, and ST. AO	 is not allowed
to specify ID in its queries toO	.
: b R()
: Output  if  has no matching conĂersation with ID and R() = 1.
ąe scheme is said to be simply secure if the winning probability of any adversary playing the
simple security experiment is negligible in the security parameter.
Lemma .
For simple and weakly-correct RFID schemes, simple security implies security.
Proof. We use the game proof methodology to reduce an adversary against the security of
the scheme to an adversary playing the simple security game. We denote by Si the event that
A wins the experiment described by game i.
Game . ăis denotes the original security game played by a đxed Strong adversary A. We
let S0 be the event thatA succeeds. Recall thatA has access to all interfaces. We
.    
      
assume, w.l.o.g., thatA stops as soon as it wins the security game, i.e., one protocol
session  identiđes a tag ID without the two having a matching conversation.
Game . We relax A’s winning condition by declaring that is suﬃcient that one instance 
with transcript  satisđes 	 on an input (ID; KID) for which ID had no matching
conversation with . We further stop the adversary as soon as it wins the game
under this condition. Note that the adversary wins the original security game if this
tag has been selected from the setE . ăerefore, we đnd that
Pr[S1]  Pr[S0]
Game . We add a new condition for A to win by requiring it to correctly guess the target
tag IDwhen created and the target instance  when launched. IfS3 is the event that
the adversary wins this game and n, t are the number of tags created and sessions
launched respectively, we have
Pr[S2]  1
nt
Pr[S1]
Game . In this game, we simulate all A’s drawings. ăat is we construct an algorithm A1
such that, each time a tag is created,A1 draws it, and subsequently simulates allA’s
DT and F queries. Clearly, the views ofA in both games are perfectly
indistinguishable so the winning probability remains unaﬀected. In other words,
Pr[S3]  Pr[S2] = 0
Game . We now simulate the creation of all tags except the target one. ăat is, we process
all CT queries with a parameter diﬀerent from ID in the following way. A
calls SetupTagpk() to generate the tag state and the key for the database. If the query
concerns a legitimate tag, A inserts the entry into a list of legitimate tags Tags1.
SinceAhas knowledge of all states of the tags, she can simulate all STqueries
related to any tag, except ID that is forwarded to the ST interface (Recall that
A draws tags herself so she knows the real ID of every tag). ăe simulation is thus
perfect, i.e.,
We also need to show that Output, and thus R, can be simulated. To deter-
mine the outcome of a protocol session,A tests queriesO	 on every entry except
(ID; KID) to determine which entry satisđes	. As for (ID; KID),A assumes that	
would answer 0 if the instance does not have matching conversation with that tag.
Otherwise, it assumes it to be 1. ăerefore, when the predicate testedwith (ID; KID)
would have yielded 0, A perfectly simulates Output (the rest of the protocol mes-
sages do not depend onKID if ID has not been identiđed). If the predicate would
have answered 1 with (ID; KID) and without matching conversation, it should al-
ready have been the target session and this is addressed with another selection in
Game . So, simulation is perfect and we đnd that
Pr[S4] = Pr[S3]
 . ’  
  
Note that the adversary submits its SR query if its simulated output is
ID so that the database entry can be correctly updated.
Finally, we notice that Game  is described by the simple security experiment. We therefore
conclude that simple security for simple and weakly-correct RFID schemes implies security.
.. Privacy
ăe intuition behind the privacy deđnition in the Vaudenay model is that any signiđcant ad-
versary against privacy should output a statement deduced Ěom the interactions between the
tags and the system. ăis was formalized using the classical simulation paradigm: any adver-
sary making eﬀective use of the protocol messages should have its success probability aﬀected
if she were to interact with an intermediate between the RFID system and the adversary that
simulates the protocol messages. ăis intermediate system is called a blinder. As privacy only
concerns the wireless link, blinders are not required to simulate tag creation and corruption
queries.
ăerefore, the đrst step in deđning Vaudenay’s notion of privacy is to deđne blinders.
Deđnition . (Blinder)
A blinderB for an adversaryA is a stateful polynomial-time algorithmwhich sees the samemes-
sages asA and simulates the L, SR, ST, and R oracles toA. ąe
blinder does not have access to the reader’s tape and is given neither the reader’s secret key sk nor
access to the database.
A blinded adversaryAB is an adversary who does not produce any L, SR,
ST, R oracles query but relies onB to obtain answers for those queries.
ăe second deđnition formalizes the privacy game and the fact that privacy means that no
adversary deduces any information from the protocol messages.
Deđnition . (Privacy)
We consider adversaries who start with an attack phase consisting of oracle queries and some com-
putations then pursuing an analysis phase with no oracle query. In between phases, the adversary
receives the hidden table T of theDT oracle then outputs a bit b, or equivalently a boolean
statement that evaluates to 1 or 0. ąe adversary wins if the output is 1.
We say that the RFID scheme is P private if for any simulatable adversaryA which belongs to
class P there exists a blinderB for which we have
Pr[A(pk)! 1]  Pr[AB(pk)! 1]j = negl(k):
.    
      
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Figure 8.1: Implications, separations and Equivalences in Vaudenay’s Privacy notions. ăe implications
fromweaker to stronger privacy notions assumeweak-correctness and security for theRFID
scheme.
8.3 Equivalences and Impossibilities of some Privacy Classes
In this section, we present Vaudenay’s results in the equivalence between the diﬀerent levels
of privacy. A special attention is also given to the relation between Forward and key exchange
protocols’ notion of perfect-forward secrecy as well as to the impossibility result of Strong
privacy. Figure . summarizes these results.
.. FromNarrow Privacy to Privacy
ăe đrst result we present is related to the relation between Narrow-Weak and Weak priva-
cy, and between Narrow-Forward and Forward privacy. Basically, Vaudenay showed that if
an RFID authentication protocol that is strongly correct, secure, and achieves Narrow-Weak
privacy, resp. Narrow-Forward privacy, is Weak private, resp. Forward private.
Lemma .
Assumea correct and secureRFIDprotocol. If that protocol isNarrow-Weakprivate, resp. Narrow-
Forward private, then it is Weak private, resp. Forward private.
ăe argument holding behind the proof of this theorem is that since the adversary knows
whether a drawn tag is legitimate, she must be able to predict the outcome of a protocol ses-
sion executedwith a legitimate tag. On theother hand, security guarantees that no illegitimate
tag gets authenticated by the reader, except with negligible probability. (Recall that an illegiti-
mate tag is created by calling SetupTag so an adversary could just obtain a state by running this
algorithm and simulating a tag with that state to the reader.) ăerefore, the R interface
can be always simulated to the adversary by looking at whether a drawn tag is legitimate, in
which case it replies with 1, and with 0 otherwise. Again, correctness ensures that the simula-
tion in case of success is perfect while using an hybrid argument in conjonction with security
guarantees that the simulation in case of failure of one protocol instance is computationally
indistinguishable from R’s answers.
Interestingly, this result does not apply to Destructive and Strong adversaries. ăat is be-
cause through tag tampering, these type of adversaries get the ability to simulate a potentially
legitimate tag that passes authentication. However, from the blinder point of view, no mes-
sage was forwarded from a tag to a reader. In some sense, the blinder would need to be able
 . ’  
  
to deduce the ID of any identiđed tag. Unfortunately, this is not realizable if the protocol
guarantees Destructive privacy. For instance, the protocol described in Section .. and de-
picted in Figure . is correct, secure and proven to beNarrow-Strong private while not being
Destructive private.
.. ąe Impossibility of Strong Privacy
ăemost severe drawback of Vaudenay’s privacymodel is probably its impossibility of achiev-
ing Strong privacy. For a better understanding of the solution we propose later, we detail the
proof of this result here.
ăe source of the impossibility result comes from the incompatibility of Narrow-Strong
and Destructive privacy. At a đrst glance, Destructive privacy may seem to be equivalent to
Forward privacy if the state of tags are (at least computationally) independent, i.e., the proba-
bility of guessing a tag state is unchanged if the algorithm is given another tag state. However,
Vaudenay’s deđnitions are made such that a corruption gives a Destructive adversary the abil-
ity to compute protocol messages that lead to a successful outcome for the reader (despite the
fact that in Destructive privacy a tag does not exist aĕer corruption). For a scheme that meets
this level of privacy, there should exist a blinder that successfully predict the outcome of that
session. However, it turns out that constructing a blinder that can deduce the hidden actions
of the adversary is not an easy task. (Up to date, there is no known instance of a Destructive
private protocol.) Nevertheless, the existence of such a blinder for a protocol implies the ex-
istence of a signiđcant Narrow-Strong adversary. ăerefore, achieving both Destructive and
Narrow-Strong privacy at once is impossible.
More explicitly, let us consider a Destructive adversary A against an RFID scheme who
creates one legitimate tag and corrupts it. ăen it picks a random state and launches a protocol
instance with the reader simulating either the legitimate tag or using the random state. In the
end, the adversary outputs true if the reader accepts the instance. ăe following algorithm,
written for the case of a two message protocol, describesA’s behavior.
: CT1(ID0)
: vtag  DT(ID0)
: S0  C(vtag)
: (S1; ) SetupTagpk(ID1)
: Choose b 2R f0; 1g
:   L
: a SR(; )
: Compute c, the answer of a tag with state
Sb receiving challenge a and send it back
to the reader.
: b0  R()
: Output b b0
On one hand, because of correctness, the R interface always answers with 1when the
adversary simulates the legitimate tag. In other words,
Pr[A ! 1jb = 0] = 1:
. Ŀ      
      
On the other hand, when the adversary simulates a tag with random state, then, due to
security, the R interface outputs 1 with a negligible probability. Hence,
Pr[A ! 1jb = 1] = 1  negl(k):
Combining both probabilities, we deduce that
Pr[A ! 1] = 1  negl(k):
Since the protocol oﬀers Destructive privacy, there must exist a blinderB for the adversary
A such that j Pr[A ! 1]   Pr[AB ! 1]j is negligible. As it sees all the actions ofA, this
blinder gets a tag ID, ID0 alongwith its stateS0, that is revealed byA’s corruption query and is
asked to simulate twooracle queries, namely one SRquery and oneRquery.
Hence, the blinder can be seen as a two-stage algorithm đrst simulating a message from the
reader thenwaiting for an answer from a tag aĕerwhich it computes the result of the protocol.
In the following, we are interested in the simulation of the R query. By correctly
predicting the outcome of the protocol, the blinder acts as a distinguisher between a tag with
known state and a random one who never uses the secret key of the reader. ăis means that
for a Destructive private scheme, it must be possible to identify tags whose states are known a
priori. However, this allows to construct a Narrow-Strong adversaryA0 that uses that blinder
to identify an anonymous tag communicatingwith the reader. ăis adversaryworks as follows.
: CT(ID0)
: vtag0  DT(ID0)
: S0  C(vtag0)
: F(vtag0)
: CT(ID1)
: vtag1  DT(ID1)
: S1  C(vtag1)
: F(vtag1)
: vtag  DT(Pr[T (vtag) =
ID0] = Pr[T (vtag) = ID1] = 12)
: Run B on input pk, ID0, S0 and get
SR message a for vtag.
: c SendTag(vtag; a)
: FeedB with c and get its output b.
: Get T and output T (vtag) = ID:b.
Clearly, we have that
Pr[A0 ! 1] = Pr[AB ! 1] = 1  negl:
However, predicting which tag has been drawn is impossible for any blinder who does not
have access to the protocol messages. So, for every blinderB0, it must be that
Pr[A0B0 ! 1] = 1
2
:
ăerefore, no Destructive private scheme is Narrow-Strong private. Since Strong privacy im-
plies both notions together, it is impossible to achieve.
 . ’  
  
Tag System
State: SID SID = KID Database: f: : : ; (ID;KID); : : : g
a          Choose a 2R f0; 1g/2
Choose b 2R f0; 1g/2
c = FKID(a; b)
b;c        ! Check that 9(ID;KID) 2 DB : FKID(a; b) = c
Output: ID or? if not found
Figure 8.2: A correct, secure, and Weak private RFID authentication protocol based on a pseudo-
random function.
8.4 Case Studies
ăis section is dedicated to presentVaudenay’s RFIDprotocols thatwere included in [Vau].
Notice that all the proposed protocols consist of two messages, a challenge sent by the reader
and an answer computed by the tag.
.. AWeak-Private Protocol Ěom a PRF
ăe đrst example given by Vaudenay concerns the achievability of Weak privacy by using a
PRF. In the sequel, we let and  be two polynomials functions overN and we assume a PRF
F : f0; 1gk  f0; 1g(k) ! f0; 1g(k). ăe protocol, depicted in Figure ., is described
hereaĕer.
 Setup. Since the scheme does not use public-key cryptography, this algorithm is void
and is never used.
 SetupTag. To create a tag ID, pick a random k-bit keyKID and set SID = KID. When
the tag is legitimate, the entry (ID; KID) is put in the database.
 Authentication. Tag authentication is performed by a challenge-response protocol
which works as follow
– First, the reader picks a /2-bit string a and sends it to the tag.
– ăe latter also picks a random /2-bit string b and computes c = FSID(akb). ăe
tag’s answer consists of b and c.
– Finally, the reader looks in its database for a pair (ID; KID) that satisđes the equal-
ity c = FSID(akb) and outputs the corresponding ID. If no entry satisđes this
equality then the protocol ends in failure and the reader outputs 0.
We note that this protocol has been proposed by Feldhofer et al. [FDW] with the PRF
being instantiated by a block cipher.
ăeorem .
If F is a PRF, the aboĂe RFID scheme is correct, secure, andWeak private.
.  
      
Tag System
State: SID SID = KID Database: f: : : ; (ID;KID); : : : g
a          Choose a 2R f0; 1g
Compute c = G(SIDka) c        ! Check that 9(ID;KID) 2 DB; i 2 J1; tK :
Update SID  H(SID) G(H i(KID)ka) = c
If entry found, updateKID  H i(KID)
Output: ID or? if not found
Figure 8.3: Aweakly correct, secure, and Narrow-Destructive private RFID authentication protocol in
the random oracle model.
ăe proof of this theorem can be found in [Vau].
.. Narrow-Destructive Privacy Ěom the OSK Protocol
ăe next example we present is a modiđed version of the OSK protocol that includes a ran-
domized challenge sent by the reader. We keep the previous notation and let  and  be
two polynomials overN. ăe scheme further assumes the existence of one random function
G : f0; 1gkf0; 1g(k) ! f0; 1g(k) and one random permutationH : f0; 1gkf0; 1gk,
which will be modeled as random oracles. ăe protocol is shown in Figure . and described
here.
 Setup. ăe system does not use public-key cryptography, so this algorithm is void.
 SetupTag. To create a tag ID, pick uniformly a k-bit keyKID and set SID = KID. When
the tag is legitimate, the entry (ID; KID) is put in the database.
 Authentication. Tag authentication is performed by a challenge-response protocol
which works as follow.
– First, the reader picks a -bit string a and sends it to the tag.
– ăe latter computes c = G(KIDka) and replies with this value. In parallel, it
updates its state by replacingKID byH(KID).
– Finally, given a đxed threshold t, polynomial in the security parameter, the reader
looks in its database for apair (ID; KID) that satisđes the equality c = G(H i(SID)ka)
for some i 2 J1; tK. Once the entry is found, the database entry is updated and
KID is replaced byGi(SID). ăe protocol instance yields ID. If no entry is found,
the protocol ends in failure and the reader outputs?.
ăeorem .
If 2  and 2  are negligible in the security parameter k, then the scheme depicted in Figure .
describes a weakly correct, secure, and Narrow-Destructive private RFID scheme in the random
oracle model.
 . ’  
  
Tag System
State: pk; ID;KID Secret key: sk
Database: f: : : ; (ID;KID); : : : g
a          Choose a 2R f0; 1g
c = Encpk(IDkKIDka) c        ! Check that 9(ID;KID) 2 DB : Decsk(c) = IDkKIDka
Output: ID or? if not found
Figure 8.4: Acorrect, secure,Narrow-Strong, andForward privateRFIDauthentication protocol based
on an IND-CCA public-key encryption scheme.
We remark that the scheme’s privacy fails as soon as the adversary gains the ability to query
a R oracle as it was showed by Juels and Weis [JW]. To perform the attack, the ad-
versary desynchronizes a tag with the reader by interacting with it t+1 times causing a denial
of service. Having access to the result of the protocol then allows the adversary to later dis-
tinguish that tag from any other legitimate one. ăe attack is best described by the following
algorithm.
: CT(ID0)
: vtag0  DT(ID0)
: Simulate the reader during t+ 1 consec-
utive sessions
: F(vtag0)
: CT(ID1)
: vtag  DT(Pr[T (vtag) =
ID0] = Pr[T (vtag) = ID1] = 12)
: (; ) E(vtag)
: b R()
: Output b.
ăerefore, the scheme does not meetWeak privacy.
.. Narrow-Strong and Forward Privacy Using Public-Key Encryption
To achieve higher levels of privacy, Vaudenay assumes a public-key cryptosystem (KeyGen, Enc,
Dec) implemented in the tags. ăeprotocol in itself is rather simple. It is a two-pass challenge-
response protocol deđned as follows.
 Setup. ăis algorithm calls upon the encryption scheme’s KeyGen with the same secu-
rity parameter to produce a key pair (sk; pk) that is forwarded as the output.
 SetupTag. To create a tag ID, pick uniformly ak-bit keyKID and setSID = (pk; ID; KID).
When the tag is legitimate, the entry (ID; KID) is put in the database.
 Authentication. ăe protocol is shown in Figure . and detailled here.
– First, the reader picks an -bit string a and sends it to the tag.
– ăe latter computes c = Encpk(IDkKIDka) and replies with this value.
.  
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– Upon reception of c, the reader decrypts it, parses the plaintext as IDkKIDka0, and
checks the correctness of the challenge, i.e., whether a0 = a. In case of failure, the
reader aborts and outputs?. In the other case, it looks in its database for the pair
(ID; KID) and outputs ID in case of success. Otherwise, the reader outputs?.
It is possible to transform thisRFID scheme into a system that does not require any database
server. ăis is attained by tweaking the setup and adding a randomkeyK of a PRF to its secret
key. Tag creation is also altered so that instead of picking KID randomly, it is computed by
applying the PRF keyed withK on input ID, that is SetupTag setsKID = FK(ID). As long as
F is a good PRF, the later RFID system is indistinguishable from the former one. ăerefore,
all the results that follow are still valid for this variant.
ăeorem .
Assuming the public-key encryption scheme to be correct and IND-CPA secure, the protocol of
Figure . describes a correct and Narrow-Destructive private RFID scheme. Furthermore, if the
encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure, then the scheme is secure and Forward private.
8.5 Comparison with the extended-Juels-Weis Model
As we mentionned before, the initial privacy model of Juels andWeis [JW] considers nei-
ther correctness nor security. ăis hole was đlled by Damgård and Pedersen [DP] which
added a deđnition for completeness and two notions for security, named weak and strong
soundness. Essentially, strong soundness is equivalent to our security requirement and weak
soundnesswould be our same security property but restricted toWeak adversaries. Complete-
ness corresponds to ourweak correctness. Note thatweak soundness is not taken into account
by both Vaudenay’s and our models as we consider the eventuality that an adversary succeeds
in obtaining a tag’s secret.
Privacy in the eJW model is based on the notion of indistinguishability: a scheme is sup-
posed to preserve privacy if no adversary can guess the identity of given a tag, secretly chosen
among a pair of tags selected by the adversary herself. In this section, we show that Vaude-
nay’s weakest class of privacy with access to the result of the protocol, i.e., the class of Weak
adversaries, provides a stronger notion of privacy than the one of Juels andWeis.
ăeorem .
If an RFID scheme is weakly-correct, secure, and Weak private in our model then it is correct,
sound, and private in the eJWmodel.
Proof. Aĕer reducing eJW’s privacy experiment to simple privacy, the proof is straightfor-
ward when rewrote in our notation.
: CT(ID1); : : : ;CT(IDn)
: 8i 2 J1; nK : vtagi  DT(IDi)
 . ’  
  
: Interactwith ID1; : : : ; IDn through theL, ST, SR, andR
interfaces.
: 8i 2 J1; nK : F(vtagi)
: Pick two integers x; y 2 J1; nK
: vtag  DT(Pr[T (vtag) = IDx] = Pr[T (vtag) = IDy] = 12)
: 8i 2 J1; nK n fx; yg : vtagi  DT(IDi)
: Interact with vtag and all the vtagi’s through the L, ST, SR,
and R interfaces.
: Output a guess b 2 fx; yg.
: Get the table T and output whether T (vtag) = IDb.
Recall that a schemepreserves privacy in the sense of Juels andWeis if and only if there exists
an adversaryA and a non-negligible advantage  such thatPr[A ! 1]  12
 = :
At the same time, every blinded adversary wins the privacy experiment with probability 1/2
(ăat is because a blinded adversary needs to guess the real identity of a tag without having
access to any real protocol message). Hence, we deduce that
jPr[A ! 1]  Pr[AB ! 1]j = ;
which implies that the scheme does not provideWeak privacy.
Concerning the other direction, whether privacy in the eJW model implies Weak privacy,
we use the fact that any protocol achieving privacy in the zk-privacy model is private in the
eJW model [DLYZ]. Since we show in the next section that the former model does not
imply our notion of Weak privacy, the eJW model is strictly weaker than our Weak class of
privacy.
8.6 ZK-Privacy does not Imply Narrow-Weak Privacy
In this section, we present a generic transformation of a zk-private protocol to another pro-
tocol preserving zk-privacy but for which we can exhibit an eﬀective Narrow-Weak adversary.
For this transformation, we use pseudo-random functions.
Let us consider a correct, secure, and zk-private RFID authentication scheme augmented
in the following way: Along with the original internal states required for authentication, two
special tags, denoted  andhereaĕer, are assumed tohold two valuesK and in theirmemo-
ry. Upon set up, these tags have theirK set to a common and random valuewhile their is set
to their ID. Furthermore, we deđne the đve special messages for all the tags which implement
the protocol of Fig. ..
. -    - 
      
Tag  Tag 
Augmented State: K;  Augmented State: K; 
L        
pick a R:a       ! pick b
if x = FK(a; b) then c  L2:b;x         Compute x FK(a; b)
otherwise pick random c c       !
Figure 8.5: Augmented protocol for RFID tags.
 [L] is a protocol message for the tag upon which the latter responds with a [R : a]
message, a being a random value. ăe value of a is kept until the tag is cleaned, i.e.,
until the protocol đnishes.
 [R : a] is a protocol message for the tag that triggers the following procedure: if the
tag has a storedK , then it picks a value b at random and compute x = FK(a; b)where
FK is a pseudo-random function. Aĕer that, it erasesK and  from its memory. ăe
tag then answers by a message [L2 : b; x]. Note that if noK is stored, then the tag does
the same with a randomK . At the end of the procedure, the tag stays clean.
 [L2 : b; x] is a protocol message for the tag which sent an [R : a] message. If the tag
holds a pair (K; ) and x = FK(a; b), it sets c = , otherwise it sets c to a random
bit, erasesK and . ăe tag answers c and is cleaned.
 [LS : ] is special variant of [L2 : b; x] which makes the tag answer  and erase any
existing (K; ). It also cleans the tag.
 [RS : K; ; a] is a special variant of the [R : a] message in which the tag starts by
replacing its currentK and  by the ones contained in the message. It continues with
the procedure of [R : a].
Note that since the augmentedmessages and associated keys are not used for authentication,
the augmented scheme inherits the correctness and security of the original one.
Furthermore, the augmented scheme can be shown to still be zk-private: given an adversary
A, we construct a simulator S as follows: ăe simulator đrst simulatesA until he submits his
set of tags C. During the simulation, S has two additional tasks to perform. First, it has to
analyze the queries to đgure out whether the tags have a key stored or not. ăen, it needs to
check if an unerased keyK in any tag is known byA. ăat is, if there is corruption or a special
query to resetK ,K becomes known and remains so until it is erased. As soon as the set of
tags C is released, there are several cases to consider.
. C is empty.
ăe simulation ofA can go on. ăere is no query from any anonymous tag to simulate.
. C contains both tags. However, A can only play with only one of them. Since the
tags must be clean and uncorrupted, either they have erased their state or their key is
 . ’  
  
unknown.
ăe simulator picks a random keyK and simulate the anonymous tag as if it had this
key. Due to the PRF property, this simulation is indistinguishable.
. C contains a single tag and its state is known. (Namely: either the other tag was cor-
rupted or its state was erased.)
ăe simulation can be performed easily as the state of the anonymous tag is known.
. C contains a single tag, its state is unknown and not synchronized. (Namely, either the
other tag has erased its state or reset it.)
ăe simulator picks a random keyK and simulate the anonymous tag as if it had this
key. Due to the PRF property, this simulation is indistinguishable as even if the adver-
sary got hold of an (a; b; x) triplet, she cannot force the pair (a; b) to be reused.
. C contains a single tag, its state is unknown and is synchronized. Note that  is known.
ăe simulator acts in the same way except when it comes to interact with the non-
anonymous tag : ăe synchronized key is set to the selected one by using either the
[LS : ] or the [RS : K; ; a] variant.
ăe scheme is not Narrow-Weak private and illustrate an adversary that successfully defeats
the privacy of the scheme. Our adversary only creates the two special tags  and . Aĕer
that, she draws the two tags in random order, e.i., she does not know who is who. She then
makes them play the special protocol which reveals . At the end, and aĕer receiving the
table T , the adversary outputs 1 if the virtual tag that received the L2 message has identity
. By construction, this adversary always outputs . However, when blinded, the output is 1
with probability 1/2. Hence, the adversary is signiđcant and the scheme is not Narrow-Weak
private.
ăerefore, under the assumption that pseudo-random functions exist, there are zk-private
correct and secure schemes which are not Narrow-Weak private. ăe reason of this is the fact
that the notion of zk-privacy does not address concurrency, i.e., the adversary is not allowed
to interact with two anonymous tags simultaneously. Since the eJWmodel [JW] is weaker
than zk-privacy [DLYZ], this result also applies to their model.
8.7 Hermans et al.’s Variant
Recently, Hermans et al. [HPVP] proposed a variation of Vaudenay’s model that did not
make use of the notion of blinders and trivial adversaries. Considering these notions to be rel-
atively unused in cryptography, they proposed a more traditional approach based on leĕ-or-
right indistinguishability, i.e., indistinguishability between two tags. ăe model, that we de-
note HPVP hereaĕer, retains Vaudenay’s deđnitions of RFID system, correctness and securi-
ty. However, adversaries for privacy and security diﬀer, the diﬀerence lying in the DT
interface for adversaries playing the privacy game. Instead of drawing tags randomly sampling
.   .’ 
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following a distribution speciđed by the adversary, all DT queries get only two tags
as input and, according to a bit b chosen a the beginning of the privacy game, the challenger
consistently returns either the đrst or the second tag. Note that the adversary can still choose
to target a single tag ID by specifying the same tags for both arguments of DT, i.e.,
calling DT(ID; ID).
Deđnition . (Adversaries against privacy in theHPVP variant)
Ihe HPVP model, adversaries are deĖned as in Vaudenay’s model, i.e., following DeĖnition .,
except for DT, F and C that are altered in the following manner.
 ąeCT interface only creates legitimate tags.
 ąeDT interface takes only twoRFID tags for its input and is dependent on a secret
bit b. ąat is, on input two RFID tags ID0 and ID1, DTb(ID0; ID1) ! vtag consis-
tently returns either ID0, if b = 0 or ID1, if b = 1. It also inserts the triplet (vtag; ID0; ID1)
in a table D. Upon calling F(vtag), the corresponding entry in D is remoĂed. Note
that if one ofDT’s arguments is a tag ID that is listed inD, then the interface returns
?.
 Corruption queries are made on tag IDs and not on virtual identiĖers. ąat is, to corrupt
a tag ID, an adversary would query C(ID) (Instead of drawing it Ėrst and then
calling C with the received vtag).
As for the Vaudenaymodel, theHPVP variant considers four classes of adversaries (Strong,
Destructive, Forward andWeak) and their four Narrow counterparts, that have the same re-
strictions as the ones listed in Deđnition .. ăe privacy game is deđned as the inability to
guess DT’s bit bwith a signiđcant advantage. ăeHPVPmodel considers two Ĕavors
of privacy depending on whether the deđnition holds for polynomial-time or computational-
ly unbounded adversaries. For simplicity, we consider only polynomial-time adversaries and
we only deal with the former type of privacy.
Deđnition . (Computational Privacy in theHPVPModel)
Let be the following privacy experiment played by a polynomial-time adversaryA.
: Pick a bit b 2R f0; 1g
: InĂoke SetupReader(1k)! (sk; pk)
: ExecuteA(pk)! b0 with the DrawTag interface parametrized with b.
: Output whether b = b0
ąe scheme is said to be P private if for every adversary belonging to class P, it holds that
AdvApriv(k) = Pr[A ! 1] 
1
2
= negl(k)
By being free from the notion of blinders, the variant has the beneđt of simplifying secu-
rity reductions as many cryptographic functionalities are deđned in the same terminology.
Examples of such functionalities include pseudo-random functions and encryption schemes.
 . ’  
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For instance, the proof of the Narrow-Strong privacy of the scheme shown in Fig. . and in-
stanciated by an IND-CPApublic-key encryption scheme is easier to conduct if the adversary
accesses ciphertexts coming from one of two chosen tags. (ăis easily maps to the IND-CPA
gamewhere the adversary receives the encryption of one of twomessages she submits.) More-
over, they prove that Strong privacy is reachable in their model by using a challenge-response
protocol based on an IND-CCA public-key encryption scheme.
However, we note that the simpliđcations introduced to Vaudenay’s model causes substan-
tial diﬀerences. First, the adversary is not allowed anymore concurrent interaction with two
anonymous tags. ăis leads to the existence of a protocol similar to the one presented in Sec-
tion . for ZK-privacy that is private in their model and fails in ours. Second, only known
tags can be corrupted, i.e., the adversary is not allowed to get hold of a random tag and learn its
state. However, practical attack scenarios do not obey to this restriction. Finally, the HVPV
model does not tolerate the existence of illegitimate tags. As we stated before, in practice,
these are tags that follow the same protocol specs but belong to another system. We believe
that it is important to address the existence of such tags and the possibility of them commu-
nicating with a reader not belonging to their system. Moreover, no privacy is possible in the
HPVP model if any of the last two restrictions are waived, i.e., if the adversary can corrupt
anonymous tags or if illegitimate tags are introduced in the model.
.   .’ 
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As it was detailled in Section .., Vaudenay’s notion of Strong privacy is impossible to
achieve. ăis result is due to the fact that adversaries are able to send queries to which they do
already know the answer. From their side, blinders are unable to produce the exact same an-
swer that the RFID systemwould compute, and that the adversary expects unless they are able
to deduce that information from previous queries, which in itself results in a loss of privacy.
However, looking back at the proof we described in Section .., it becomes apparent that
the adversary did not break the privacy of the scheme in the sense that he did not use protocol
messages to compute its đnal statement. Still, this adversary has been shown to be signiđcant.
ăerefore, we claim that Vaudenay’s deđnitions do not correctly mirror the notion of privacy
it aims to capture.
ăis chapter is devoted to discuss solutions and tweaks in the model that aim to overcome
this limitation. Weđrst sketchNg et al.’s proposal [NSMSN] of denying the adversary from
issuing queries for which “they already know the answer” and show that the formalism given
for this statement is not satisfactory.
We then proceedwith our đx and argue that it reĔects the exact notion of privacy Vaudenay
aimed to capture. Our solution consists of merging the blinder and the adversary, i.e., hav-
ing blinded adversaries simulating protocol messages for themselves. Concretely, this trans-
lates into giving to the blinders access to all the adversary’s inputs, including its random tape,
which was missing from the original deđnition. We introduce other limitations to the sam-
pling queries of the adversary, rendering them such that they are “aware” of their samplings
(Essentially, we require that adversaries can produce a plausible guess on the real identity of a
drawn tag). ăe beneđt of all these modiđcations is that Strong privacy becomes achievable
using a challenge-response protocol built on a plaintext-aware public-key encryption scheme.
To show that this notion is almost necessary, we give a counter-example to prove that the
same protocol instantiated by an IND-CCA, but not plaintext-aware, cryptosystem is not
Strong private.
9.1 Ng et al’s Proposal: Wise Adversaries
Starting from the observation that the Destructive adversary in the impossibility proof of
Strong privacy is already aware of the answer the genuine R interface would produce
and only uses to distinguish in which world she is, Ng et al. [NSMSN] proposed to đx the
model by disallowing such queries. For this sake, they introduced the notion of “wise” adver-
saries. A wise adversary is deđned as an adversary who does not issue oracle queries for which
he “knows” the output. ăemain argument of [NSMSN] is the following: if the adversary
is wise, then he will never ask the interfaces about the outcome of a protocol session in which
he was either passive, active, or simulating a tag if he knows the result of the instance. In this
scenario, the universal adversary used by Vaudenay against Strong privacy becomes “unwise”
and is thus discarded.
 .   
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Although they claim to keepVaudenay’s framework and deđnitions, the way to prove priva-
cy is not resolved in [NSMSN]. Following their deđnition, an adversaryAmaking q (any)
Oracle accesses is wise if no adversary can achieve the same or a smaller probability of success
while making less than qOracle calls. It turns out that wisdom is a hard notion tomanipulate
and diﬃcult to prove.
Another issue is whether the notion “wise adversaries” đts in realistic scenarios. One may
argue that this kind of adversary seems equivalent in terms of result but, in fact, it is not clear
whywould an adversary denyhimself such advantage. In fact, this comes back to thedeđnition
of knowledge: what does it mean for an algorithm to know something.
9.2 Our Proposal: Incorporate the Blinder into the Adversary
ăesolutionwe propose diﬀers from the one proposed byNg et al. and the others described in
the end of Chapter  in that we do not alter the privacy game. In fact, modifying the privacy
game in those previous works provoked a loss in the privacy notion captured by the model
which unfortunately is not quantiđed. For instance, we can assume that an adversary defeats
privacy by being able to determine if one RFID tag belongs a group of them that had prior
communication with the reader. While it is possible that such statement is included in their
deđnitions, it is not clear from their work.
Our proposal is to make the blinder’s simulation run inside the adversary. ăat is, we ar-
gue that a blinder, acting for the adversary and not for the system, as Vaudenay’s deđnitions
suggest, should be executed by the former. Consequently, the blinder should be given all the
adversary’s knowledge, and in particular her random tape that was missing from the original
deđnitions.
Before going into the modiđcations we propose to Vaudenay’s deđnitions, we dedicate the
next three sections to introduce new concepts that will be proved to be later useful.
9.3 Sampling Algorithms and the ISH Hypothesis
Up to this point, we never fully deđned sampling algorithms but merely treated them as algo-
rithms implementing probability distributions. ăis section looksmore deeply in the subject.
Deđnition . (Sampling Algorithm)
An eﬃcient sampling algorithm for a probability distribution p is a polynomial-time probabilistic
algorithm, in k, denoted Samp, that, on input random coins  2 f0; 1g`(k), with `() being
a polynomial function, outputs vector elements Ěom X of dimension d(k), with d also being a
polynomial function, that satisĖes
8x 2 Xd : j Pr

[Samp() = x]  p(x)j = negl(k)
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ăedeđnition above only considers computational closeness from the original distribution.
Althoughwemighthave considered statistical or perfect distance, the reasonof this restriction
is that we will only be interested in sampling requests by polynomial-time algorithms. In this
context, extending to computational distance can only enlarge the set of distributions that an
algorithm can submit without aﬀecting the security proof of the scheme.
We also note that the restriction to polynomial-time algorithms for describing the sampling
algorithm is due to security considerations: It is oĕen the case in security reductions that the
whole environment adversary+system has to be executed by an adversary playing a classical
cryptographic game, such as IND-CCA or distinguishing a PRF from a random function.
Although Vaudenay overlooked this matter, we đnd it necessary for the proof of security for
simple and weakly-correct RFID schemes and the proofs of privacy of theWeak private pro-
tocol based on a PRF, and the Narrow-Strong private one based on an IND-CPA public-key
encryption scheme.
However, being able to simulate the adversary and her environment is not always suﬃcient
for the security proof. In many settings, it is the case that the simulator needs to obtain the
randomness of the system. For instance, this happens in complex zero-knowledge systems
where the simulator would need the random tape of the whole system. Damgård đrst men-
tioned this limitation when he considered adaptive corruption in multi-party computation
schemes [Dam]. As a solution he had to restrict the adversary to so-called “good-enough”
distributions. Amore formal treatment of the problemwas subsequently presented by Canet-
ti and Dakdouk [CD]. Concretely, they proposed the notion of inverse-samplable algo-
rithms which is centered around the idea that for every possible output of an algorithm, it is
possible to eﬃciently đnd, i.e., in a polynomial number of steps, a randomness that leads to
the same output.
In the sequel, we will be interested in a more speciđc class of sampling algorithms called
inverse-sampling algorithms. An algorithm Samp is said to be inverse-samplable if there exists
a polynomial-time inversion algorithm which, given a sample x from the output of Samp, ob-
tained using random coins  2 f0; 1g`(k), with `() being a polynomial function, outputs a
S that is consistent with x, i.e., it is such that Samp(S)! x. Moreover, the choice of  has
to be such that (S; x) is computationally indistinguishable from (; x) for a  uniformly dis-
tributed over f0; 1g`(k). We hereaĕer state the formal deđnition of such sampling algorithms,
as given by Ishai et al. [IKOS].
Deđnition . (Inverse-Sampling Algorithm)
Given a security parameter k, we say that an eﬃcient sampling algorithm Samp, in k, is inĂerse-
samplable if there exists a polynomial-time inĂerter algorithm Samp 1, in k, such that the fol-
lowing two games are indistinguishable
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Real game: Fake Game:
 2R f0; 1g`(k)  2R f0; 1g`(k)
x Samp() x Samp()
S  Samp 1(x)
Output (; x) Output (S; x)
ąat is, for every polynomial-time distinguisherD we require thatPr[DReal Game(1k)! 1]  Pr[DFake Game(1k)! 1] = negl(k)
Deđnition . (Inverse-SamplingHypothesis)
ąe inĂerse sampling hypothesis is that for every probability distribution there exists an inĂerse-
samplable algorithm.
ăis hypothesis states that for every sampling algorithm S1, including one-way sampling
algorithms, there exists an inverse-sampling algorithm S2 that can be shown to be indistin-
guishable from S1. ăe analysis of ISH by Ishai et al. [IKOS] shows that the existence of
non-interactively extractable one-way function family ensembles, a generalization of knowl-
edge assumptions, andnon-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems forNP in the common
reference stringmodel together imply that ISHdoes not hold. An interesting side eﬀect of this
result is that the existence of plaintext-aware encryption schemes and the validity of the ISH
hypothesis aremutually exclusive. ăis is a direct consequence of the fact that plaintext-aware
encryption schemes require knowledge extractors, by deđnition (cf. Deđnition .), and that
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems forNP in the CRSmodel can be constructed
fromany trapdoorone-waypermutation [FLS]. Aswewill latermakeuse of plaintext-aware
encryption schemes, we are obliged to make the assumption that ISH is wrong.
9.4 Knowledge Extractors and Non-Falsiable Assumptions
ăe notion of knowledge and awareness for interactive Turing machines are deđned in terms
of computations. ăat is, a machine is said to know x if it is able to compute f(x) for an arbi-
trarily chosen function f . Formalizing this notion has proven to be one of the most diﬃcult
tasks of theoretical computer scientists. In the end, the agreed deđnition is that a Turing ma-
chine knowsx if there exists another Turingmachine that runs in the same complexity class as
the former and takes its description along with all its inputs and outputs x. ăis last machine
is called a knowledge extractor.
To be more concise, we give a concrete example with extractable one-way functions which
were introduced by Canetti and Dakdouk [CD]. Besides complying to the classical one-
wayness property, such a functionhas to be such that the “only”way for an algorithm tooutput
an element that has a pre-image by this function is to pick an element from the domain of f
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and apply the function on it. Again, the term “only way” is formalized by requiring the exis-
tence, for every algorithmA, of a knowledge extractor that, having access to allA’s knowledge,
i.e., its random tape and a reference to the function thatA targeted, either outputs a preimage
ofA’s output or fails if the later is not in the image of the function. ăe reason for combining
those two notions in one primitive is that it yields a natural abstraction of several knowledge
extractor from the literature [Dam, BPa, PX], in much the same way as the notion
of one-way function is an abstraction of the Discrete Log assumption. We give the following
formal deđnition taken from [CD].
Deđnition . (Extractable One-Way Function Family Ensemble)
Let f : KD ! R be a family of one-way functions with respect to a security parameter k. We
say that f is an extractable one-way function family if it is one-way and for every PPT algorithm
A that uses (k) random bits, there is a PPT extractor algorithmA? such that
8k 2 N : Pr
2664 y 62 Img(f)_
f(x) = y

 2R K
 2R f0; 1g(k)
y  A(; )
x A?(; )
3775 = 1  negl(k)
Unfortunately, as for one-way functions, the existence of extractable one-way functions and
knowledge extractors can only be assumed (and even independently from the assumption that
one-way functions exist).
ăe đrst assumption in the literature related to the existence of knowledge extractors is
due to Damgård [Dam] and called the Diﬃe-Hellman Key (DHK) assumption (it has al-
so been termed the knowledge of exponent assumption by Bellare and Palacio [BPa]). In
short, this assumption states that the only mean for an adversary that is given an elementW
from a cyclic group in which g is a generator and wants to produce a valid Diﬃe-Hellman tu-
ple (W; gu;W u) is to pick u and that there exists an extractor that given the adversary’s input
and randomness recovers u. Although it was used in numerous applications, it is not clear
whether the assumption is true or false. Moreover, the assumption presents the particulari-
ty of being as hard to prove than to disprove and has consequently been the target of many
criticism [Nao]. ăat is, it is insuﬃcient to construct a counter-example to invalidate the
DHK assumption as it would be the case for classical computational assumptions such as the
discrete logarithmor factoring. In fact, to prove that the assumption does not hold onewould
need to prove that there exists an adversary for which there is no extractor. Yet, some variants
of the DHK assumption were deemed to be false [BPa]. Defenders of the assumption ar-
gue that it is proven to hold in the generic group model [Denb]. However, much like the
random oracle model, some computational assumptions hold in the generic groupmodel but
fail as soon as the group is instantiated in any representation [Den]. ăat said, much like
the random oracle model, no “concrete” example for the separation is currently known.
ăeDHK assumption was later expanded to cover general subsetmembership problems by
Birkett [Bir]. He called that generalization the subset witness knowledge (SWK) assump-
tion. Based on this assumption, hewas able to extend (and correct someparts of )Dent’s proof
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that the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem in a Diﬃe-Hellman group based on the DDH assump-
tion is plaintext-aware [Dena] to cover more underlying groups and assumptions such as
groups in which the quadratic residuosity or the higher residuosity problem is hard.
9.5 Plaintext-Awareness
.. DeĖnitions
Plaintext-awareness roughly states that if an adversary is able to produce a valid ciphertext
diﬀerent from?, then she should know the corresponding plaintextm. ăis translates into
saying that, for a plaintext-aware encryption scheme, the “only way” for this ciphertext creator
to produce a valid ciphertext is to encrypt a known messagem with the public key pk.
Formalizing this notion has proven to be a non-trivial task and has been the subject of sever-
al papers [BDPR, BPb, BRa, BDb, Dena]. In the end, several and separate levels
of plaintext-awareness were deđned, namely, in increasing strength, PA, and PA, and their
counterparts PA+ and PA+.
ăe diﬀerence between PA and PA lies in the attacker’s ability to get hold of ciphertexts
for which she does not know the decryption. In the settings of PA, this ability is imple-
mented by an oracle P(aux), called plaintext creator, that, on each query, picks a message
at random (or possibly according to a distribution partially deđned by its input aux) and re-
turns its encryption, i.e., it produces Encpk(P(aux)). Any ciphertext obtained through this
oracle is added to a list CList, the list of ciphertexts for which the adversary does not know the
corresponding plaintexts. An adversaryA, called ciphertext creator, interacts with the plain-
text creator and outputs ciphertexts to be submitted to a decryption oracle. ăe essence of
plaintext-awareness is the existence of a polynomial-time algorithmA?, whose construction
may depend on A, called plaintext extractor that successfully decrypts any ciphertext given
by the adversary that was not returned by the plaintext creator. In order to carry out the ex-
traction, A? is given the view of A (which includes CList and the random coins of A) and
the target ciphertext c to be decrypted. ăe initial deđnition of plaintext-awareness implies
that c should not be in CList as the adversary does not “know” the decryption of ciphertexts
returned byP . A scheme is thus said to be PA plaintext-aware if, for every polynomial-time
ciphertext creatorA, there exists a plaintext extractorA? that is, for all plaintext creators P ,
indistinguishable from a decryption oracle. Since PA adversaries have no ciphertext creator
at disposal, PA plaintext-awareness only requires indistinguishability between the knowl-
edge extractor and the decryption oracle with respect to adversaries who have no access to
Encpk(P()).
In order to capture any external knowledge the adversary can access, Dent [Dena] ex-
tended PA to PA+ for adversaries who can get hold of uniformly distributed bits from an
external source. Later, Birkett and Dent [BDb] introduced the analog notion of PA+ for
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PA plaintext-awareness. ăese last two notions were proven to be equivalent under the con-
dition that the encryption scheme is IND-CPA [Bir].
Deđnition . (Plaintext-Aware Encryption)
Let O1 denote an oracle that on each query returns a single uniformly distributed bit. We say
that a public key cryptosystem (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is PA+ plaintext-aware if, considering a ci-
phertext creator A, a plaintext extractor A?, a plaintext creator P , and a distinguisher D, all
being polynomial-time algorithms, we have
8A;9A?; 8P ;8D :Pr hDAEncpk(P());Decsk();O1 (pk)(1k)! 1 (sk; pk) KeyGen(1k)i
  Pr
h
DAEncpk(P());A
?(pk;;viewA);O1 (pk)(1k)! 1
 (sk; pk) KeyGen(1k)i = negl(k):
We also consider three variants.
 If the previous equality holds when the ciphertext creator A does not query O1, then the
scheme is said to be PA plaintext-aware.
 PA+ plaintext-awareness is the case in whichA is restricted tomake no query to the oracle
Encpk(P()).
 When both restrictions are put together, i.e., thatA neither queriesO1 nor Encpk(P()),
then the scheme is said to be PA plaintext-aware.
.. Instances of Plaintext-Aware Encryption Schemes
Aswewill later use plaintext-aware encryption schemes in a concrete protocol, we present two
schemes that satisfy our security requirements.
ăeCramer-Shoup Encryption Scheme Not only it is the đrst truly practical construction
of an IND-CCA public-key encryption scheme [CS], but the Cramer-Shoup encryption
scheme is also the đrst cryptosystem to have been proven to be PA+ and PA plaintext-
aware [Dena] (In that work, it was proven treating it as as a KEM instanciated in a Diﬃe-
Hellman group) and later generalized to any suitable group [Bir]. ăe scheme works as
follow.
 KeyGen. Oninput a security parameterk, the algorithmpicks a generatorg1 of a group
G with prime order q and a target collision-resistant hash function TCR : G2 ! Zq .
Aĕer that, it randomly selects w; x; y; z 2 Zq and let g2 = gw1 , e = gx1 , f = gy1 ,
h = gz1 . ăe public key is deđned as pk = (g1; g2; e; f; h) and the corresponding
secret key is sk = (w; x; y; z).
 Encapsulation. ăis algorithm works by picking r 2R Zq and computing c1 = gr1,
c2 = g
r
2, t  TCR(c1; c2), and  = ertf r. Letting C = (c1; c2; ) andK = hr, the
output is the pair (C;K).
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 Decapsulation. To extractK , parse C as (c1; c2; ) and recompute t  TCR(c1; c2).
If c2 = cw1 and  = cxt+y1 then output cw1 . Otherwise output?.
ăeorem . ([Bir])
Suppose the DDH problem is hard in the group G and the hash function TCR is target collision
resistant. If the groupG is a statistically simulatable group on which the DHK assumption holds,
then the Cramer-Shoup KEM is PA+ plaintext-aware.
ăeKurosawa-Desmedt Scheme Aĕer the publication of theCramer-Shoup public-key en-
cryption scheme, Kurosawa and Desmedt proposed a similar but more eﬃcient cryptosys-
tem and proved that it is IND-CCA secure [KD] (but the underlying public-key encryp-
tion scheme is proven to not be IND-CCA secure [CHH+]). Independently, Jiang and
Wang [JW] and Birkett [Bir] showed that the scheme is PA plaintext aware. Although
the last twoworks considered amore general variant of theCramer-Shoup cryptosystembased
on hash proof systems [CS], we present a simplest variant using a group in which theDDH
assumption can be assumed to be hard.
 KeyGen. On input a security parameter, pick two distinct generators g1 and g2 of a
groupG with prime order q and a target collision-resistant hash function TCR : G2 !
Zq . Aĕer that, randomly select x1; x2; y1; y2 2 Zq and let g = gx11 gx22 and h =
gy11 g
y2
2 . ăe public key is pk = (g; h; g1; g2) and the corresponding secret key is sk =
(x1; x2; y1; y2).
 Encapsulation. Pick r 2R Zq and compute c1 = gr1, c2 = gr2, t = TCR(c1; c2), and
K = cr1c
rt
2 . LetC = (c1; c2) and output (C;K).
 Decapsulation. To extract K , parse C as (c1; c2) and recompute t = TCR(c1; c2).
ăen recover the keyK = cx1+ty11 cx2+ty22 .
ăeorem . ([Bir, JW])
Suppose the DDH problem is hard in the group G and the hash function TCR is target collision
resistant. If the groupG is a statistically simulatable group on which the DHK assumption holds,
then the Kurosawa-Desmedt KEM/DEM is PA+ and PA plaintext-aware.
.. From PA+ to PA++ Plaintext-Awareness
We generalize this notion further and deđne PA++ and PA++ plaintext-awareness for ad-
versaries who can submit sampling request to an external oracle. On one side, eﬃciency con-
siderations restrict the sampling algorithms to be computable in polynomial-time. On the
other side, we will require the system composed of the adversary and its randomness oracle to
be simulatable by the plaintext extractor, that is because the plaintext extractor will need to
be able to đnd suitable random coins forOS . However, as we noted in Section ., assuming
the existence of plaintext-aware encryption schemes forces us to assume that the ISH hypoth-
esis is false so the restriction on the sampling algorithms becomes eﬀective. In a general sense,
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we conjecture that it is impossible to achieve plaintext-awareness for adversaries allowed to
submit non inverse-sampling algorithms.
Deđnition . (PA++ and PA++ Plaintext-Awareness)
Starting Ěom the notions of PA and PA plaintext-awareness, we deĖne two new conditions,
PA++ and PA++, by adding one randomness oracle OS . ąis oracle takes as input the de-
scription of an inĂerse-sampling algorithm, executes it using its own random tape, and returns its
output to the ciphertext creator.
We say that a public-key encryption scheme is PA++, respectively PA++, plaintext-aware if
DeĖnition . holds for PA, respectively PA, adversaries having access to the oracleOS .
Note that PA++ (resp. PA++) plaintext-awareness trivially implies PA and PA+ (resp.
PA and PA+) plaintext-awareness, since the ciphertext creator may simply not use the ran-
domness oracle or just query using a sampling algorithm from the uniform distribution over
f0; 1g. Actually, we can even show that these two notions are equivalent, i.e., any scheme that
is PA+ is PA++ and any scheme that is PA+ is PA++.
ăeorem .
Suppose a public key encryption scheme is PA+ (resp. PA+) plaintext-aware. ąen it is PA++
(resp. PA++) plaintext-aware.
Proof. We prove the theorem for the case of PA++. It can be easily modiđed so that it
applies to PA++. LetA be a ciphertext creator for the PA++ plaintext-aware encryption
scheme.
We construct a PA+ ciphertext creator B as follows: B takes input pk and simulates A,
forwarding all its decryption queries to the decryption oracle. In order to answerA’s queries
to the randomness oracle,B runs the provided sampling algorithm and query its randomness
oracle, that we denoteO1, every time a new random bit is asked for. Clearly, B terminates in
polynomial-time if all samplings can be performed in polynomial-time. Remark that B does
not use any internal randomness besides the one used to initializeA.
SinceB is a valid PA+ciphertext creator, we can assert the existence of a plaintext extractor
B? indistinguishable from a decryption oracle. We use B? to construct a plaintext extractor
A? forA. In the following, we assume thatA?maintains a state view0 initialized to viewA that
will be used to simulate B’s view. To answerA’s decryption queries,A? proceeds as follow:
. IfA queried the randomness oracle with an inverse-sampling algorithm Samp and re-
ceived x since the last invocation ofA?, thenA? computes S  Samp 1(x). Aĕer
that, A? updates the simulated view of B to include the random bits S , i.e., it sets
view0  view0kS . Due to the property of inverse-sampling algorithms, (S; viewA)
is indistinguishable from (; viewA), where  is the random string returned byOS for
the sampling request. ăus, a simple induction argument suﬃces to show that viewB
and view0 are indistinguishable.
ăis procedure is repeated for every new sampling query.
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. A? then calls uponB?(pk; c; view0) and forwards its output toA.
Since viewA is included in view0 and that this last variable is indistinguishable from viewB,Pr[DAB?(pk;;view0);OS (pk)(1k)! 1]  Pr[DAB?(pk;;viewB);OS (pk)(1k)! 1] = negl(k):
Recalling that B?(pk; ; viewB) is indistinguishable from a decryption oracle toA, we de-
duce thatA? is a valid plaintext extractor. In other words,Pr[DAB?(pk;;view0);OS (pk)(1k)! 1]  Pr[DADecsk();OS (pk)(1k)! 1] = negl(k):
ăis concludes the proof.
ăe following corollary is the combination ofăeorem . with the equivalence result be-
tween PA+ and PA [Bir], under the assumption that the scheme is IND-CPA secure.
Corollary .
If an encryption scheme is IND-CPA and PA plaintext-aware, then it is PA++ plaintext-
aware.
9.6 Adapting Vaudenay’s Deånitions
.. Limiting the Adversary’s Sampling Queries
In the sequel, we will restrict to adversaries who use distributions to theDT such that,
at any step, the tableT canbe successfully simulatedby an algorithmthat is only given the view
of the adversary as input. ăat is, we require adversaries to only submit sampling algorithms
that are inverse-samplable and allow them to compute a plausible guess for the identity of
drawn tags in polynomial-time. We refer to such adversaries as simulatable adversaries.
Deđnition . (Simulatable Adversary)
Let A be an adversary interacting with an RFID system. Let viewtA be the view of A at its t-
th step and let T t denote the table T of the DT oracle at step t of A. We say that the
adversary A is simulatable if all her sampling algorithms submitted to DT are inĂerse-
samplable and, for all t, there exists a polynomial-time algorithmA0, such that (viewtA; T t) and
(viewtA;A0(viewtA)) are indistinguishable.
Wenote thatwhen the adversary only drawsone tag at the time, or, in general, a vector of size
logarithmic in the security parameter, thenour restrictionsdonot aﬀect theoriginal deđnition
as any sampling algorithm over such a set is inverse-samplable. ăe diﬀerence may arise when
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the size of the returned vector is polynomial, making the probability space of exponential
size. However, it is not clear whether allowing the adversary to specify one-way sampling
algorithms make any practical sense.
To illustratewhat can a non-simulatable adversary be, assumewehave anRFID system com-
posed ofn tags with identiđers IDb;c;i, where i = 1; : : : ; n and b is a bit set to 1when the tag is
legitimate and to 0 otherwise. We further assume an adversary who issues DT queries
with a sampling algorithm that runs as follows. On input a random tape , this algorithm
uses an arbitrary function g and a one-way function f to compute (c1; : : : ; cn) = g() and
(b1; : : : ; bn) = f(c1; : : : ; cn). It then draws the n tags with identiđer IDbi;ci;i, for all i. As the
view of the adversary only includes b1; : : : ; bn, it is hard, due to the one-wayness of f , to đnd
a consistent c1; : : : ; cn.
.. Privacy
ăe intuition behind the privacy deđnition in the Vaudenay model is that any signiđcant ad-
versary against privacy should output a statement deduced Ěom the interactions between the
tags and the system. Unfortunately, the deđnition of blinders given by Vaudenay, Deđni-
tion ., fails to capture any information the adversary may get from other sources and use
it to produce its statement. ăis intrinsic limitation comes from the fact that the blinder, as
a separate entity, might not have access to all the adversary’s knowledge. Hence, it may be
possible for the latter to use that extra information as an advantage against the blinder. ăe
possibility of such senario caused Vaudenay’s impossibility result concerning Strong privacy
that we detailled in Section ...
In our deđnition hereaĕer, we correct this limitation by making the blinder being executed
by the adversary so that it is aware of any extra information she has in her possession. We
formalize this statement by giving the random tape of the adversary to the blinder. For reasons
that will be made clearer later, we also restrict the privacy game to simulatable adversaries.
Deđnition . (Blinder)
We deĖne a blinder B for an adversary A as a polynomial-time algorithm which sees the same
view asA (i.e, all the incoming messages and the random tape), records all the adversary’s Oracle
queries and simulates all the L, SR, ST, R oracles to A. ąe
blinder does not have access to the reader’s tape so does not know the secret key nor the database.
A blinded adversary AB is an adversary who does not produce any L, SR,
ST, R oracles query but has them simulated byB.
Deđnition . (Privacy and Trivial Adversaries)
Consider a two-stage simulatable adversary who starts with an attack phase consisting of only
oracle queries and some computations then pursuing an analysis phase with no oracle query. In
between phases, the adversary receives the hidden table T of the DT oracle then outputs
true or false. ąe adversary wins if the output is true.
 .   
  
An adversary is said to be trivial if there exists a blinderB for which j Pr[A ! 1] Pr[AB !
1]j is negligible.
We say that the RFID scheme is P private if all the adversaries Ěom the class P are trivial.
Clearly, combining Deđnitions . and ., yields a (slightly) weaker privacy notion than
the original one by Vaudenay. Since the adversary is not able to hide information from the
blinder anymore, its only advantage inwinning the privacy gamemust come from theprotocol
messages. For this reason, we argue that our proposed deđnition captures the exact notion of
privacy. It isworthmentioning that under this newdeđnition, theproof of the impossibility of
Strong privacy does not hold as the blinder in this case “knows” if the adversary is simulating
a forged tag or a legitimate one and can consequently predict the outcome of the protocol
instance.
Note that all schemes that were shown to achieve a certain level of privacy in the sense of
Vaudenay achieves the same level of privacy following our deđnition. ăis is because blinders
that comply to Deđnition . can be seen as a special case of the ones considered in this
chapter. In particular, all the results that we presented in Chapter  are still valid.
We further note that with these deđnitions the counter-example for the impossibility of
Narrow-Strong privacy and security in the case ofmutual authentication given byArmknecht
et al. [ASS+] does not hold anymore. We come back to discuss this result and its implica-
tions on mutual authentication protocols in Chapter .
9.7 IND-CCA2 is not Sufåcient for Strong Privacy
Consider the scheme of Figure . instantiated with an IND-CCA public-key encryption
scheme that we construct as follows. Starting from an arbitrary IND-CCA secure encryp-
tion scheme (KeyGen0, Enc0, Dec0), we deđne another cryptosystem (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) as fol-
lows.
 KeyGen. Run (sk0; pk0)  KeyGen0(1k). Pick an RSA modulusN = pq, i.e, s.t. p
and q are primes, and y; z 2 Z?N such that
 
y
N

= +1,

y
p

=  1, and   z
N

= +1.
ăe scheme’s key pair is pk = (pk0; N; y; z) and sk = (sk0; p).
 Encrypt. Deđne Epk(b) = ybr2 mod N where b 2 f0; 1g and r 2R Z?N . Pick
randomness  and compute the ciphertext
Encpk(x) = Enc0pk0 (Epk(x0); : : : ; Epk(xn 1))
where x0; : : : ; xn 1 is the binary decomposition of x.
 Decrypt. Deđne Dsk(c) = b such that ( 1)b =

c
p

. To decrypt, compute
Decsk(c) = Dsk(t0); : : : ;Dsk(tn 1);
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where t0; : : : ; tn 1 = Dec0sk0(c).
We can easily see that (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is still IND-CCA secure and that, regardless
of the properties of the initial scheme, it is not plaintext-aware since, given an integer z 2
Z?N , the ciphertext Enc0pk0 (z  Epk(x0) mod N; : : : ; z  Epk(xn 1) mod N) is, depending on
z
p

, a valid encryption of either x0; : : : ; xn 1 or x0; : : : ; xn 1. ăerefore, the existence of a
knowledge extractor induces the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm for distinguishing
quadratic residues from non-quadratic residues.
Finally, the following Strong adversary defeats privacy.
: CT(ID)
: vtag  DT(ID)
: IDkKID  C(vtag)
:   L
: a S(;; )
: Set x = IDkKIDka
: c Enc0pk (z  E(x0); : : : ; z  E(xn 1))
: SR(c; )
: b R()
: Output b
Clearly, an adversary outputs 1 if and only if

z
p

= +1. ăerefore, a blinder that fol-
lows the same distribution would break the quadratic residuosity problem, i.e., the problem
of distinguishing quadratic residues from non-quadratic residues.
9.8 Strong Privacy Using Plaintext-Awareness
In this section, we show that using the new deđnition of blinders, we can achieve Strong pri-
vacy using public-key cryptography. For this sake, we make use of the standard deđnitions of
public-key cryptosystems (PKC) and the notion of plaintext-aware encryption schemes.
We consider the same protocol based on a public-key cryptosystem, as depicted in Fig-
ure .. In this scheme, the state of the tags is composed of their ID and a uniformly distributed
-bit stringKID. Upon reception of an -bit string challenge a, a tag sends the encryption of
IDkKIDka under the public key pk to the reader. ăe latter decrypts the received ciphertext
using its secret key sk and checks that it is well formed, that a is correctly recovered and that
(ID; K) exists in the database. Note that  and  have to be polynomially bounded.
Although this challenge-response protocol has already been used by Vaudenay [Vau] to
achieve Narrow-Strong privacy under the assumption that the underlying encryption scheme
is IND-CPAsecure, our result requiresPA+plaintext-awareness fromthe encryption scheme.
Naturally, since our deđnition of security is unchanged from the original model, IND-CCA
security for the encryption scheme is suﬃcient to prove that the protocol is secure and we use
the original result of Vaudenay.
ăe next theorem establishes the correctness, security, and Strong privacy of the scheme.
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Tag System
State: pk; ID;KID Secret key: sk
Database: f: : : ; (ID;KID); : : : g
a          Choose a 2R f0; 1g
c = Encpk(IDkKIDka) c        ! Check that 9(ID;KID) 2 DB : Decsk(c) = IDkKIDka
Output: ID or? if not found
Figure 9.1: A correct, secure, and Strong-private RFID authentication protocol based on an IND-CPA
and PA+ plaintext-aware public-key encryption scheme.
ăeorem .
Assume that the public-key encryption scheme used in the RFID scheme of Fig. . is correct, PA+
plaintext-aware, and IND-CCA secure. If 2  and 2  are negligible, then the scheme is cor-
rect, secure, and Strong private.
9.9 Security Proof
.. Correctness
Correctness is trivially shown using the encryption scheme’s correctness and the fact that the
scheme is stateless.
.. Security
Since the scheme complies to Deđnition . for simple RFID protocols, we can apply sim-
ple security using an adversary who creates a single tag ID and makes 	(sk; a0; c0; ID0; KID0)
queries (with the restriction ID0 6= ID). ăese queries consist in checking whetherDecsk(c0) =
ID0kKID0ka0. We also let a be the output of SR(; ).
We construct an algorithm B who receives pk and simulates the RFID system, A, and all
oracle queries without sk. We further makeB outputA’s output. To handleA’s	 queries,B
is given an access to a decryption oracle that she queries with c0 and later checks whether the
plaintext is equal to ID0kKID0ka0. We now use a sequence of games in which Si denotes the
event that the adversary wins Game i.
Game . We let this game be the security experiment played by a đxedA that has her envi-
ronment simulated by B. Let S0 be the event that the adversary wins the security
experiment.
Game . We đrst make a change in Game  and deđne Game  as being the same except that
S( ; ) never produces an a that was sent before to the ST in-
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terface. In other words, we require thatA never guesses a. As a is chosen uniform-
ly, when A makes s calls to ST, the probability of this event happening is
bounded by s2  so that
j Pr[S0]  Pr[S1]j  s2 :
Since s is polynomially bounded, this probability is negligible when 2  is negligi-
ble.
Game . We deđne Game  in whichA never issues a SR(c; ) query for a c that
was obtained from a ST(a?; vtag) query. Since ST never received a,
the decryption of the ciphertext the adversary submitsmust fail tomatch the a cho-
sen by the reader for session  and the R interface answers with 0. ăerefore,
the adversary always loses the game when this event occurs and we have
Pr[S1]  Pr[S2] = 0
Game . InGame wemodify the ST(a; vtag) interface so that instead of encrypting
of IDkKIDka, it encrypts a randomR of the same length. (Recall that no suchoutput
is sent to the reader.)
We now construct a hybrid argument to show that j Pr[S3]   Pr[S2]j is negligi-
ble. For that, we đrst let B3(i) be an hybrid blinder that acts as follows: ăe i đrst
ST(ai; vtag) queries submitted by the adversary are treated by encrypting
IDkKIDkai and the rest by encrypting random strings. We let C denote an IND-
CCA adversary who plays the IND-CCA game, simulating B2(i)/B2(i + 1)
by submitting IDkKIDka (as in B2(i + 1)) andR (as in B2(i)) to the IND-CCA
challenger who randomly chooses one of the messages and returns its encryption.
C then continues B2(i)/B2(i + 1)’s execution and returns its output. ăe diﬀer-
ence in the output of B2(i) and B2(i + 1) can thus be expressed as a distinguisher
advantage for the IND-CCA game which is negligible by assumption. ăerefore,
we đnd that
j Pr[S3]  Pr[S2]j = negl(k):
At this point,A is receiving messages that are not related toKID. Clearly, the only
way for her to win the game is to guessKID which happens with probability 2 . In
other words,
Pr[S3] = 2 
ăerefore, the scheme is secure.
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.. Privacy
To conduct the proof, we consider a Strong adversary A and construct a blinder iteratively.
ăat is, we construct a sequence of partial blinders B1; : : : ; B5 and let Ai = ABii 1 with
A0 = A. ăe đnal blinder forA isB = B1      B5. By showing that the outcome ofAi
andAi+1 are computationally indistinguishable, we deduce thatB is indeed a full blinder for
A. So, the scheme is Strong private.
We will denoteE the event that an adversaryAwins the security experiment, i.e., manages
to make the reader accept an uncorrupted tag without matching conversation. We have that
Pr[E] = negl(k).
Game . We đrst đx an adversaryA0 playing the privacy game.
Game . We let Game  denote the privacy game performed by an adversary who simulates
every R on a session  with a transcript (a; c), such that c that has been ob-
tained by a previous ST(vtag; a0) query.
If a 6= a0, we are ensured that c does not decrypt to something containing a, so the
answer to R() must be . ăe simulation is easy and perfect. In the other
case, that is, if a = a0, the decryption of c will be parsed to a matching challenge
a and some entry IDkKID which is in the database if and only if vtag is legitimate.
Fortunately, the blinder has access to this latter information as it is returned in the
response of theDT oracle query drawing vtag. Again, the simulation is easy
and perfect. ăis fully deđnesB1 and we deduce that
Pr[A0 ! 1] = Pr[AB10 ! 1]
We can thus deđne the adversaryA1 that never queries R on an instance  in
which the response c was produced by a previous ST query.
Game . In this game, we make all ST queries being simulated by a partial blinder
B2. To achieve this, we let r be number of ST queries and make a sequence
of hybrid blinders B12 ; : : : ; Br+12 in which Bi2 simulates the i   1 đrst ST
queries. Note that B12 does not make any simulation so AB
1
2
1 is exactly A1. Con-
versely,ABr+12 has all its ST queries simulated. We can thus setB2 = Br+12 .
ăe hybridBi+12 simulates the i đrst encountered ST queries by encrypting
random strings of same length as IDkKIDka.
Toprove thatABi21 andAB
i+1
2
1 have computationally indistinguishable distributions,
we construct an adversaryC playing the IND-CCAgame. AdversaryC receives the
public key and runsABi21 orAB
i+1
2
1 , depending on the bit of the indistinguishability
game, while simulating the RFID system, except the i-th ST query. For that,
C must simulate the environment forABi21 /AB
i+1
2
1 . Since all algorithms and oracles
of the scheme, except forR, donot require the secret key,C can easily perform
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the simulation by itself. Regarding the R oracle, C just queries a decryption
oracle and checks whether the decrypted message matches.
ăeđrst i 1 STqueries aremade to the IND-CCAchallenger in a real-or-
random version. ăe challenge ciphertext c in the IND-CCA game is the answer
from the challenger. It is either a real answer (as in theABi21 simulation) or a simu-
lated one (as in theABi+121 simulation). Note that no R query is made on the
session in which the adversary sent c (this case has been taken care of in Game ).
So, C prefectly simulates either the game forABi21 or the game forAB
i+1
2
1 and is an
IND-CCA adversary. Since C produces the output ofABi21 /AB
i+1
2
1 , we obtain that
j Pr[ABi21 ! 1]  Pr[AB
i+1
2
1 ! 1]j  AdvIND CCA2(k);
and it results that
j Pr[A1 ! 1]  Pr[AB21 ! 1]j  r  AdvIND CCA2(k);
which is negligible as r is polynomially bounded and the scheme is IND-CCA
secure.
At this point, we can legitimately consider an adversaryA2whomakesnoST
queries.
Game . Wenowsimulate all remainingRqueries. Todo so, we construct an adversary
E playing the PA++ game.
ăis adversary takes the public key then simulates A2 interacting with the RFID
system. Recall that, like in Game , the algorithms and oracles of the scheme do
not depend on the secret key, except for the R queries that will be treated
hereaĕer. We let E simulate the RFID system toA2, handling her queries as follow:
 Assuming w.l.o.g. that session identiđers are not randomized, L is de-
terministically computed by E .
 Upon a CT(ID) query from A2, E inserts (ID; ) in a table DB1 if
the query asks for a legitimate tag. Otherwise, it inserts (ID; ) in a table DB0.
 E simulates SR queries by asking the oracle OS to sample from
the uniform distribution over f0; 1g. It then forwards the received answer
toA2.
 DT(Samp) queries are handled by asking the randomness oracle OS
to sample from the distribution speciđed by Samp to get one or more random
ID. If any of the returned identiđers corresponds to a drawn tag, E outputs?.
Otherwise, it generates, deterministically and for each returned IDi, a fresh
vtagi and inserts the pair (vtagi; IDi) into the table T . Aĕer that, and for each
IDi, it sets the bit bi to 1 if IDi is legitimate, and to 0 otherwise. At last, it
returns ((vtag1; b1); : : : ; (vtagn; bn)) toA2.
 .   
  
 C(vtag) makes E reveal ID = T (vtag). Moreover, E looks for the
entry (ID; KID) in DB0 and DB1. If that corresponding entry contains a KID
diﬀerent from 0 0, then it returns it. Otherwise, it queriesOS to sample from
the uniform distribution over f0; 1g and assigns the answer toKID. It sub-
sequently updates the entry (ID; ) to (ID; KID) and returns this last pair as
its answer. We further assume that whenever the tag ID is a legitimate one, E
inserts the entry (ID; KT (vtag)) in a table TE .
 To simulate the R() oracle for an instance  with transcript (a; c),
E sends c to the decryption oracle, checks that the recovered plaintext is of
the form IDkKIDka, that it matches a tag state IDkKID obtained from a pre-
vious C query on a legitimate tag. If this is the case, the answer to
R must be , otherwise, the simulated answer is . Note that when the
output of the E regarding a R query is , the genuine R query
would also have answered . ăis is because that, knowing a subset of the
database through corruption query, E can eﬀectively predict the answer when
the database entry lies in this subset. Errors in the simulation thus occurwhen
E predicts 0 and the genuine R query would also have outputted  in a
session without matching conversation. Clearly, the failure of one of E ’s sim-
ulations corresponds to the happening of the event thatA2 wins the security
game, that we denotedE in the previous section. In other words,Pr [A2 ! 1]  Pr AE2 ! 1  Pr[E]
Since we assumed the encryption scheme to be PA++ plaintext-aware, we can use
the plaintext extractor E? of E to replace the decryption oracle without signiđcant-
ly altering the outcome distribution. However, E? requires the view of E instead of
the view ofA2, so we cannot use it as an extractor forA2. Fortunately, it is possi-
ble to reconstruct that view given the adversary’s random tape and its queries. At
đrst, we note that E ’s random coins are only used to initializeA2. Furthermore, all
the randomness E obtains fromOS to process C queries is revealed toA2.
Moreover, sinceA2 is simulatable, we can use the algorithmA02, induced byDeđni-
tion ., to reconstruct, fromA2’s view, a table T 0 indistinguishable from T . Since
this table lists all the mappings between real and virtual identiđers, it is straightfor-
ward to reconstruct a randomness for E that she received to process theDT
queries using the Samp 1 algorithms corresponding to the sampling queries ofA2.
We let this whole operation be carried by a polynomial-time algorithmV that takes
as input the view ofA2 and usesA02 to reconstruct a view of E , i.e., it is such that
V(viewA2) and viewE are indistinguishable. It follows that E?(pk; ;V(viewA2))
and E?(pk; ; viewE) are indistinguishable.
At this point, we are able to deđneB3, the partial blinder for R queries. Sim-
ilar to E , we assume thatB3maintains a tableTB3 containing a list of pairs (ID; KID)
.  
      
for corrupted legitimate tags. In order to simulate a R query on an instance
 of transcript (a; c), the blinder proceeds as follow.
a) ăe blinder calls upon E?(pk; c;V(viewA2)) to get Decsk(c) = IDkKIDka0.
b) Aĕer that, it veriđes that a = a0 and outputs 0 in case of failure. Otherwise,
it continues.
c) ăen, it outputs 1 if the pair IDkKID is listed in TB3 . Otherwise, it outputs 0.
ăe probability that Step  fails can be expressed as a distinguisher advantage of the
PA++ game or between V(viewA2) and viewE , soPr AB32 ! 1  Pr AE2 ! 1  AdvPA1++(k) + negl(k):
At the same time, Step  fails when the eventE occurs, so using triangle inequalities
we conclude thatPr [A2 ! 1]  Pr AB32 ! 1  AdvPA1++(k) + Pr[E] + negl(k):
Recalling thatE occurs with negligible probability and that the scheme is PA++
plaintext-aware, the quantity above becomes negligible. Hence,B3 describes a suc-
cessful blinder for the R oracle.
Game . In this game, we get rid of SR queries. ăis can easily be achieved by
constructing a blinder B4 that returns uniformly distributed values from the set
f0; 1g. Clearly, simulation is perfect as both distributions are perfectly indistin-
guishable. Hence,
Pr [A3 ! 1] = Pr[AB43 ! 1]
Game . Finally, we have an adversaryA4 who only produces L queries. Since these
are generated deterministically, we can trivially simulate the L oracle using
a blinderB5. It follows that
Pr [A4 ! 1] = Pr[AB54 ! 1]
In the end, we have obtained an adversaryA5 = AB , withB = B1      B5, who does not
produce any oracle query that is such thatPr[A ! 1]  Pr[AB ! 1] = negl(k)
ăe scheme is thus Strong private.
 .   
  
9.10 Perspective and Future Development
Toovercome the limitationsputon samplingqueries, wemayuse a strongernotionofplaintext-
awareness by adding auxiliary inputs to the adversary in the plaintext-awareness deđnitions.
If an encryption scheme could ever be proved to be auxiliary-PA+ , then we would be able
to achieve Strong privacy against adversaries who have no restriction on the choice of the ef-
đcient sampling algorithms to use.
ăe diﬃculty in achieving this notion lies in how to simulate the avdersary’s behavior if it
depends on the system’s randomness. In such cases, the extractor would need to be able to
execute the adversasary “in the same way” it is executed in real conditions. Unfortunately,
giving to the extractor the history of queries of the adversary cannot help
.    
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Aĕer studying unilateral authentication protocols for RFIDs, we turn to the case of mutual
authentication where, in addition to the tag proving its identity to the reader, the latter is
also required to authenticate itself. ăis feature can be useful is many situations, especially
if the tag embeds a detection mechanism allowing it to trigger an alarm when its number of
unsuccessful authentications exceeds a certain threshold.
Our starting point is the paper of Paise and Vaudenay [PV] which extended Vaudenay’s
model to mutual authentication. Unfortunately, Armknecht, Sadeghi, Scafuro, Visconti, and
Wachsmann showed that some of their results are not sound [ASS+]. So, in order to over-
come the limitations induced by Paise and Vaudenay’s deđnitions, we consider a less restric-
tive, but meaningful, notion of security for the readers for which the analysis of Armknecht
et al. does not hold. Concretely, we restrict the security game to adversaries whose goal is
to make an uncorrupted tag accept the reader without any matching conversation. Previous-
ly, Paise and Vaudenay considered this notion for all tags, corrupted and uncorrupted ones.
We show that in these settings the results of the PV model concerning Weak privacy using
a PRF and Narrow-Destructive privacy in the random oracle model are valid. However, we
show that regardless of which security notion we take, the protocol based on an IND-CPA
public-key encryption scheme fails to be Narrow-Strong private.
We extend our deđnitionswith blinders having access to the adversary’s random tape tomu-
tual authentication and show that secure Strong privacy withmutual authentication is achiev-
able. As it was the case for simple tag authentication, we will use plaintext-aware encryption
schemes to achieve our goal.
10.1 Enriching The Deånitions
We đrst adapt the deđnitions of Chapters  and  to cover the case of mutual authentication.
We leave the extension of the deđnition of security for an RFD system to Section . and
relate it to the results of Armknecht et al.
.. RFID System with Mutual Authentication
ăedeđnition of anRFID systemwithmutual authentication is very similar toDeđnition .
with the diﬀerence that we introduce an output for the tag that is one bit equal to 1when the
latter authenticates the reader and 0 otherwise.
Deđnition . (RFID System withMutual Authentication)
An RFID system with mutual authentication is composed of the following three algorithms
. SetupReader(1k) ! (sk; pk):ąis Ėrst probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm is used
to initialize the reader. As such, it takes as input a security parameter k and outputs a
 .     
  
pair of secret/public key (sk; pk) for the reader (if no public-key cryptography is used in
the RFID scheme then pk is set to?).
. SetupTagpk(ID)! (KID; SID):ąis probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm creates a tag
with unique identiĖer ID. ąe state SID is stored inside the tag while an entry (ID; KID) is
inserted in the server’s database DB when the created tag is legitimate.
. A two-party game runbetween a reader and a tag ID, each one of them following an interac-
tive polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm, come to complete the deĖnition. Apart Ěom
the random bits, the algorithm for the tag takes as input the state SID while the algorithm
for the reader takes as input the database DB, and the reader’s secret key sk. In the end, the
reader ends up with a tape Output, set to? if the instance failed Ěom its perspective, and
the tag ID gets a tape OutputID that is set as follows:
 Aěer ID completes a session inwhich reader authentication succeeds, it setsOutputID =
1.
 If reader authentication failed, then OutputID = 0.
 When the tag receives amessage for a new protocol sessionmessage , it setsOutputID =
0.
A protocol execution with ID is called succeeded if it has a matching conĂersation with the
reader with output ID. For the ease of notation, we shall denote by Output() the output
of the protocol instance with identiĖer  and we writeOutputID() to refer to the output of
the tag aěer having completed a protocol instance with transcript  .
For mutual authentication protocols, we also deđne the class of simple protocols that com-
ply to Deđnition .. Adversaries are deđned like in the case of unilateral authentication, i.e.,
following Deđnition .. We also retain Deđnition . for the classiđcation of adversaries in
Weak, Forward, Destructive, and Strong classes and their Narrow counterparts.
.. Correctness
Correctness in its two variants also needs to be adapted by requiring the tag to authenticate
the reader every time both have a matching conversation, except with negligible probability.
ăat is, we have the following two deđnitions.
Deđnition . (Correctness of an RFID Scheme withMutual Authentication)
We say that an RFID scheme is correct if an undisturbed protocol instance run between the read-
er and a legitimate tag ID selected according to any distribution, even aěer a Strong adversary
interacted with the system, results in the reader outputting ID and the tag outputting 1, except
with negligible probability. When ID is illegitimate, the reader’s and tag’s outputs regarding the
instance has to be? and 0 respectively, except with negligible probability.
.   
      
Deđnition . (Weak Correctness of Simple RFID Schemes withMutual Authentication)
We say that a simple RFID system with mutual authentication is weakly-correct if there exists an
eﬃciently computable predicate	0(ID; t) such that t is the number previously completed successive
sessions aěer the last one in which ID accepted the reader. ąe predicate is such that if it yields
1, then a complete undisturbed run instance between ID and the reader results in both parties
accepting, i.e., the reader outputting ID and the tag 1, except with negligible probability. If the
predicate returns 0, then the instance’s output is ID for the reader and 0 for the tag, except with
negligible probability.
.. Privacy
Concerning privacy, we use the deđnitions we proposed inChapter , i.e., Deđnitions . and
..
10.2 Deåning Security for the Tags
On one hand, privacy, as a measure of information leakage from protocol messages, is unaf-
fected by whether the protocol consists of tag-to-reader or mutual authentication. On the
other hand, extending the deđnitions of correctness and weak correctness is rather straight-
forward.
ăus, the only property that remains to be adapted is security. Unilateral authentication
protocols have a security notion consisting in the inability of any Strong polynomial-time ad-
versary of making the reader accept a tag that did not have matching conversation. Security
for mutual authentication protocols would basically need to duplicate the requirements for
both sides. However, we remark that almost all protocols enabling mutual authentication are
such that the reader authenticates itself by proving that it has retrieved the partner tag’s secret
and ID (Hence, tag authentication happens đrst). Consequently, the question of whether to
restrict security on the tag side to only uncorrupted tags is irrelevant for this class of authen-
tication protocols.
For this reason, Paise and Vaudenay used the unrestrictive version of the deđnition of se-
curity. However, Armknecht et al. showed that using this deđnition leads to incompati-
bilities with the notion of Narrow-Strong privacy: No protocol can be both secure in the
stronger sense andNarrow-Strong private. ăeir result therefore invalidated Paise andVaude-
nay’s proof of achievingNarrow-Strong privacy and security for the tags. Moreover, it appears
that the proofs of security for their Narrow-Destructive and Weak private protocols is com-
promised under this deđnition. Nevertheless, Paise and Vaudenay’s results are valid under the
more restrictive deđnition. Since we will mainly use the weakest notion and use the strongest
one only for the Strong private protocol of Section ., we shall call secure a scheme that is
secure for the reader and for the tags in the strongest case strongly secure while secure refers
 .     
  
to a scheme that is secure for the reader and only secure for uncorrupted tags.
Deđnition . (Security for the tags)
We say that anRFID scheme is secure for the tags if no Strong adversary canmake an uncorrupted
tag ID output 1 for a session that did not have matching conĂersation with any of the reader’s
protocol sessions, except with negligible probability. ąe tag ID is called the target tag.
Deđnition . (Security of RFID Schemes withMutual Authentication)
An RFID scheme is secure if it is secure for both the tags, following DeĖnition . and for the
reader, following DeĖnition ..
In some case, security can be proven with respect to adversaries who can even corrupt the
target tag. We shall refer to protocols satisfying this notion as strongly-secure.
We can also show that the deđnition of security simpliđes when one restricts to simple and
weakly-correct RFID scheme.
Deđnition . (Simple Security for the Tags)
For simple and weakly-correct RFID schemes with mutual authentication, we consider the fol-
lowing simpliĖed security game for the tags for adversaries who are given access to an oracleO	
who checks the predicate	(sk; ; ; ).
: (sk; pk) SetupReader(1k)
: CT1(ID)
: vtag  DT(ID)
: RunAO	 interacting with L, SR, and ST.
: Let OutputID be the current output of the tag.
: Output 1 if OutputID = 1 and the last instance of tag ID had no matching conĂersation with
the reader.
ąe scheme is said to be simply secure for the tags if the winning probability of any adversary
playing the simple security experiment is negligible in the security parameter.
Deđnition . (Security of an RFID Scheme withMutual Authentication)
An RFID scheme is said to be simply secure if it is simply secure for the reader and for the tags.
We have the following lemma which mirrors Lemma . for the case of one-way authenti-
cation.
Lemma .
For simple and weakly-correct RFID schemes, simple security implies security.
Proof. ăe case of tag authentication follows from Lemma . so we only need to prove
simple security for the tags. ăat is, we consider an adversary playing the security game for
the tags and reduce it to an adversary who plays the simple security game for the tags.
.     
      
Game . ăis denotes the original security game played by a đxed Strong adversary A. We
let S0 be the event thatA succeeds. Recall thatA has access to all interfaces. We
assume, w.l.o.g., thatA stops as soon as it wins the security game, i.e., one tag ID has
OutputID = 1 aĕer completing a session without matching conversation.
Game . We add a new condition for A to win by requiring it to correctly guess the target
tag ID when created and the time at which OutputID = 1 aĕer a session without
matching conversation. If S3 is the event that the adversary wins this game, n are
the number of tags created, and q the number of sessions ID completed, we have
Pr[S2]  1
nq
Pr[S1]
Game . We now simulate the creation of all tags except the target one. ăat is, we pro-
cess all CT queries with a parameter diﬀerent from ID in the following
way. A calls on SetupTagpk() to generate the tag state and the key for the database.
If the query concerns a legitimate tag, A inserts the entry into a list of legitimate
tags Tags1. pair (ID?; S?) into a list Tags0. computed using sk,A2 can easily simu-
late ST SinceA has knowledge of all states of the tags, she can simulate all
ST queries related to any tag, except ID that is forwarded to the ST
interface (Recall thatAdraws tags herself so she knows the real ID of every tag). ăe
simulation is thus perfect.
We also need to show that Output, and thus R, can be simulated. To deter-
mine the outcome of a protocol session,A tests queriesO	 on every entry except
(ID; KID) to determine which entry satisđes	. As for (ID; KID),A assumes that	
would answer 0 if the instance does not have matching conversation with that tag.
Otherwise, it assumes it to be 1. ăerefore, when the predicate testedwith (ID; KID)
would have yield ,A perfectly simulatesOutput (ăe rest of the protocol messages
do not depend onKID if ID has not been identiđed). If the predicate would have an-
swered 1with (ID; KID) and without matching conversation, it should already have
been the target session and this is addressed with another selection in Game . So,
simulation is perfect and we đnd that
Pr[S4] = Pr[S3]
Note that the adversary submits its SR query if its simulated output is
ID so that the database entry can be correctly updated.
Finally, we notice that Game  is described by the simple security experiment. We therefore
conclude that simple security for simple and weakly-correct RFID schemes implies security.
 .     
  
10.3 Limitations of Mutual Authentication
Several possibilities can be considered to obtain reader authentication. In short, we have three
options: having both devices authenticating at the same time, having the tag authenticating
before the tag and vice-versa.
Unfortunately, the đrst option, which is clearly the best, cannot be achieved. ăat is, as
a fair-exchange protocol is unrealizable without the involvement of a trusted third party, we
cannot design solutions in which both a tag and the reader authenticate themselves “at the
same time”.
We turn to the case of the reader authenticating itself before the tag does. Clearly, this ap-
proach has the beneđt that tags would a priori know whether they are communicating with
a legitimate entity or an attacker and limit the later. However, authenticating the reader can
only be done through a primitive dedicated to that, i.e., either a MAC or a digital signature
and each solution suﬀers from disadvantages. Regarding MACs, since the reader does not a
priori know which tag it is authenticating to, it has to share a single symmetric key with all
the tags that belong to the system. In these settings, it is not hard to see that such a scheme
fails to be secure as any adversary who succeeds in tampering with one tag becomes able to
authenticate to other tags as the reader. On their side, digital signatures raise a privacy issue.
ăat is, a protocol in which the reader issues digital signatures can never achieve privacy as
the adversary knows its public-key. ăerefore, it is easy for her to distinguish the real mes-
sages from the ones produced by the blinder (as long as the signature scheme is unforgeable)
by running the signature’s veriđcation algorithm.
We are only leĕ with the second option ofmaking the reader authenticate itself aĕer the tag
did it. ăe beneđt from this approach is that the reader, having recovered its partner’s iden-
tity and associated secret, can make use of both information to securely authenticate itself.
However, this must come at the cost of adding messages to the protocol. In fact, Paise and
Vaudenay used that paradigm of enriching a two-message protocol to add a third “conđrma-
tion message” that is sent by the reader. As it turns out, the reader cannot be sure on whether
it was successfully authenticated or not, which is a classical fairness problem.
Not only that, but having more than two messages for mutual authentication schemes also
brings a disadvantage with regards to Forward adversaries. According to Deđnition ., cor-
ruption leaks the entire state of the tag to the attacker, including all the temporary variables
it has in store. Unfortunately, this model of corruption is too strong: No scheme achieves
reader security and Narrow-Forward privacy at the same time. Indeed, there exists a generic
attack in which an attacker blocks the last message of one protocol session and later corrupts
a tag to simulate its answer on the blockedmessage. It the tag would have accepted the reader,
then it must correspond to the anonymous tag that the attacker had in the đrst place. ăe
attack is best described in the following steps.
.    
      
Tag System
State: pk; ID;KID Secret key: sk
Database: f: : : ; (ID;KID); : : : g
Choose b 2R f0; 1g a          Choose a 2R f0; 1g
c = Encpk(IDkKIDkak) c        ! Check that 9(ID;KID) 2 DB : Decsk(c) = IDkKIDkakb?
b?          If not found, set b? 2R f0; 1g
Output: b = b? Output: ID or? if not found
Figure 10.1: A Public-Key BasedMutual Authentication Protocol.
: CT(ID0), CT(ID1)
: vtag  DT(Pr[T (vtag) =
IDb2f0;1g] = 12)
: Execute a protocol between vtag and
the reader but stop before the last
ST(vtag;m) query and storem.
: F(vtag)
: vtag0  DT(ID0)
: vtag1  DT(ID1)
: S0  C(vtag0)
: S1  C(vtag1)
: Set a bit b such that simulating a tag of
state Sb with the incoming message m
leads to output 1 (if no or both Sb work,
set b to a random bit)
: Get T and output whether T (vtag) =
IDb
Due to correctness of reader authentication, the tag outputs 1 with negligible probability
when fed with message diﬀerent fromm or with a non-đnal messagem and 0with negligible
probability when fed with the đnal messagem. So, if p is the probability for guessing the last
query right, the adversary wins with probability close to p.
For anyblinded adversary, tags runnoprotocol so there is a negligible probability for getting
anm leading to 1, the probability for winning is close to 1 . Hence, the advantage is p/2which
is non-negligible for any blinder. So, the adversary is signiđcant.
To overcome this limitation, Paise andVaudenay chose to alter the F interface andmake
it erase the tag’s temporary memory. As temporary memory typically needs a power source to
be maintained, it is reasonable to assume that its contents fade away when a passive tag is not
powered by the reader. For semi-active and active tags, we have to ensure that this content is
automatically and safely erased aĕer some delay without receiving the expected message.
10.4 Public-Key Based Mutual Authentication RFID Scheme
ăe rest of this chapter is dedicated at studying the privacy of the enriched public-key based
protocol of Section .. that we also used for Strong privacy in Section .. In short, we alter
the protocol in thatwemake the tag generate a random-bit string b and add it to themessage
that is encrypted and sent to the reader. Using its secret key, the reader recovers b and sends it
 .     
  
back to the tag. ăe latter authenticates the reader if the value it receives is consistent with its
b. ăe scheme in more details is deđned as follows.
. Setup. ăis algorithm calls upon the encryption scheme’s KeyGen with the same secu-
rity parameter to produce a key pair (sk; pk) that is forwarded as the output.
. SetupTag. To create a tag ID, pick uniformly ak-bit keyKID and setSID = (pk; ID; KID).
When the tag is legitimate, the entry (ID; KID) is put in the database.
. Authentication. As shown in Figure ., the protocol runs as follow.
a) First, the reader picks a -bit string a and sends it to the tag.
b) ăe later picks a random -bit string b and computes c = Encpk(IDkKIDkakb)
and replies with this value.
c) Upon reception of c, the reader decrypts it, parses the plaintext as IDkKIDka0kb0,
and checks the correctness of the challenge, i.e., whethera0 = a. In case of failure,
the reader aborts, outputs?. In the other case, it looks in its database for the pair
(ID; KID), outputs ID and sends b0 in case of success. Otherwise, the reader outputs
?. Note that anytime the authentication for the reader fails, it sends a uniformly
chosen -bit string b to the tag.
d) Finally, the tag authenticates the reader, i.e., outputs 1, if b0 = b. Otherwise, it
outputs 0.
In the next section, we challenge Paise andVaudenay’s result concerning theNarrow-Strong
privacy of the scheme when the encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure. At the same time, we
prove that it still meets Narrow-Forward privacy and thus Forward privacy if the scheme is
IND-CCA secure. Aĕer that, we instantiate the protocol with an IND-CCA and PA+
plaintext-aware encryption scheme and show that the resulting protocol is Strong private.
10.5 IND-CCA2 Security is Insufåcient for Narrow-Destructive Privacy
In this section, we show an attack against the privacy of the IND-CPAbased protocol, depict-
ed in Figure . but instantiated with an IND-CCA secure encryption scheme, that Paise
and Vaudenay proved to be Narrow-Strong private. Intuitively, the reason why this protocol
cannot achieve privacy is that, due to the bmessage, the reader is acting as a partial decryption
oracle for the queries of the adversary. ăerefore, the results of Paise and Vaudenay regarding
theNarrow-Strong privacy of their scheme does not hold. We stress that this result is not valid
when the blinder has access to the adversary’s randomness. ăe following theorem formalizes
the attack.
ăeorem .
ąere exists an eﬀective Narrow-Destructive adversary against the RFID scheme of Figure .
when the encryption scheme is only IND-CPA secure and blinders are not given the adversary’s
random tape.
. -     - 
      
Proof. Let us assume an adversaryA who creates a single tag and simulates it to the reader.
ăe adversary then outputs 1 if the veriđcation from the tag perspective succeeded. In other
words, we consider the following adversary,
: CT(ID)
: vtag  DT(ID)
: (ID; KID) C(vtag)
: L! 
: SR(; )! a
: pick b 2R f0; 1g
: compute c Encpk(IDkKIDkakb)
: SR(; c)! b^
: Output:(b b^)
As the reader correctly decrypts and recovers b, the adversary outputs 1 with probability 1.
On the other hand, Narrow-Destructive privacy implies the existence of a blinderB such that
AB outputs 1 with probability roughly equal to 1.
ăe blinder B is an algorithm which works as follow. It đrst receives a public key pk and
a pair (ID; KID) to generate a bit-string a. Aĕer that, it gets a ciphertext c whose underlying
plaintext is partially known and returns the decryption of the unknown part. In other words,
B is an algorithm which works in two phases. In the đrst phase, it takes as input a public key
pk and a pair (ID; KID) and returns a randomly chosen a. In the second phase, the blinder
receives the encryption of IDkKIDkakb denoted c, where b is a -bit string, and outputs b.
We now show that the existence of such blinder leads to a chosen plaintext attack against
the public-key encryption scheme. We consider an adversary playing the IND-CPA game.
It đrst picks a random ID and runs SetupTagpk(ID) ! (KID; SID). It then feeds B with the
pair (ID; KID) along with the public key pk and gets a in return. Aĕer that it pick two -
bit strings b0 and b1 and submits the messages IDkKIDkakb0 and IDkKIDkakb1 to the IND-
CPA challenger who tosses a coin  and returns c  Encpk(IDkKIDkakb). A forwards that
ciphertext to B and retrieves b . Finally, it outputs . Clearly, since the blinder recovers the
correct b with probability 1   negl, the adversary’s advantage is equal to 1/2   negl so the
scheme is not IND-CPA secure.
Note that this counterexample does not hold when the blinder is given the random coins of
the adversary. Indeed, a blinder would generate b likeA and output b. Nevertheless, the point
of this result is to show that Paise and Vaudenay’s proof of Narrow-Strong privacy is Ĕawed.
10.6 Narrow-Forward Privacy from IND-CCA2 Security
Despite not being Narrow-Strong private, we can still prove that the scheme of Figure . is
Narrow-Forward private when instantiated with an IND-CPA secure public-key encryption
schemeas thenext theoremsays. Nevertheless, it is rather easy tođnd that the resulting scheme
 .     
  
is not secure. Instead, we prove that security is satisđed when the encryption scheme is IND-
CCA secure and it also follows that the protocol becomes Forward private.
ăeorem .
If the encryption scheme of Figure . is IND-CPA secure then the scheme is correct andNarrow-
Forward private. Furthermore, if the cryptosystem is IND-CCA secure, then the scheme is secure
and Forward private.
We divide our proof in four parts. In the đrst part, we show that the scheme is correct and
secure for the reader. We then demonstrate that it is secure for the tags. Finally, we prove that
it is Narrow-Forward private. We conclude that it is Forward private using Lemma ..
.. Correctness and Security for the Reader
Correctness is trivially induced by the correctness of the public-key encryption. Regarding
security for the reader, it follows fromăeorem . based on IND-CCA security.
.. Security for the Tags
We let the security experiment played by a đxedA that has her environment simulated by B.
ăe later has access to a decryption oracle that it uses to simulate the queries that require the
secret key, namely SR(c; ) and R(). For that, it just queries the decryp-
tion oracle with c, gets a bit-string that it matches against IDkKIDka and returns the last  bits
of the recovered plaintext in case of success. Otherwise, it returns a random bit-string. ăe
same procedure is used to decide on the success of a protocol session.
Again, we let Si be the event that the adversary wins the security experiment in Game i.
Game . Let S0 be the event that the adversary wins the security experiment. Note that the
adversary does not issue a SR(c; ) on the target session  that induces
amatching conversation. (ăis is the unique value thatmakes the tag accept and the
adversary win so getting it from SR results in a matching conversation.)
Game . We make a change in Game  and deđne Game  as being the same except that all
queries S( ; )neverproduce ana thatwas sentbefore to theST
interface. In other words, we require that A never guesses a. As a is chosen uni-
formly, whenAmakes s calls to ST, the probability of this event happening
is bounded by s2  so that
j Pr[S0]  Pr[S1]j  s2 :
Since s is polynomially bounded, this probability is negligible when 2  is negligi-
ble.
. -   - 
      
Game . We now modify the way B handles SR(c; ) queries in instances that
have either no matching conversation but cwas the output of a ST query or
a matching conversation with an illegitimate tag. For those, B returns uniformly
distributed b?’s.
Simulation is perfect as illegitimate tags get rejectedwithprobability1 (ăedatabase
does not contain their corresponding entry) and ciphertexts that embed a reader
challenge diﬀerent from the one of the instance provoke the failure of the compar-
ison aĕer decryption. In other words,
Pr[S2] = Pr[S1]
Game . We further adapt B’s behavior regarding SR(c; ) queries for sessions
thathavematching conversationwith legitimate tags. SinceB is alsohandling S-
T queries, it knows the plaintext corresponding to the c sent in an instance with
matching conversation. We thus modify B so that it keeps a table of pairs (a; b)
for every ciphertext produced for a legitimate tag. ăis way,B does not need to ac-
cess its decryption oracle for c’s that were produced by legitimate tags in matching
sessions. Clearly, we have that
Pr[S3] = Pr[S2]
Game . We now alter the ST(a; vtag) interface so that instead of computing the en-
cryption of IDkKIDkakb, it encrypts a randomR of the same length. (Recall that no
such output is sent by B to the decryption oracle.)
We now construct a hybrid argument to show that j Pr[S4]  Pr[S3]j is negligible.
We construct the hybrids as follow: B(i) is an algorithm simulating A for which
the i đrst ST(ai; vtag) queries are treated by picking a random bi and en-
crypting IDkKIDkaikbi. ăe rest of the queries are processed by encrypting random
strings. We let C denote an adversary playing the IND-CCA game, simulating
B2(i)/B2(i+ 1), that submits IDkKIDkaikbi (as inB2(i+ 1)) andR (as inB2(i))
to the IND-CCA challenger who randomly chooses one of the messages and re-
turns its encryption. C then continues B2(i)/B2(i+ 1)’s execution and returns its
output. ăe diﬀerence in the output of B2(i) and B2(i + 1) can be expressed as a
distinguisher advantage for the IND-CCA game which is negligible by assump-
tion. ăerefore, we đnd that
j Pr[S4]  Pr[S3]j = negl(k):
At this point, A is receiving messages that are unrelated to b. ăerefore, the only way for
her to win the game is to guess b which happens with probability 2  . ăerefore, the scheme
is secure.
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.. Privacy
To prove privacy, we reduce a đxed Narrow-Forward adversary to a one playing against the
corresponding one-way authentication protocol, i.e., the same protocol without the last mes-
sage and reader authentication. Recall that this protocol is Narrow-Strong private. ăerefore,
we only need to construct a blinder for the SR(c; ) ! b interface. However,
keeping the soundness of the proof requires us to split this simulation in two steps: We đrst
take care of the case in which an instance fails. We then proceed as in
Basically, the blinder for SR returns uniformly distributed b’s. To show that this
simulation is indistinguishable from the b sent by the reader, we proceed in a number of games.
We denote by Si the event that the adversary wins Game i.
Game . Welet this gamebe theoriginal privacy gameplayedby aNarrow-Forward adversary
A. Recall that privacy requiresA’s STandSR, in its twovariants,
queries to be simulated.
Game . Weđrst eliminate the case inwhich the adversary submits a c thatwasnot the answer
of any STquery. Since the transcript of the instancewouldhavenomatching
conversation, security ensures that the reader outputs ? and chooses a random b?
for its answer. We đnd that
j Pr[S1]  Pr[S0]j  Pr[E]
ăerefore, we makeB outputting random -bit strings.
Game . We proceed similarly for the case in which c is the output of a ST(a?; vtag)
query in which vtag is an illegitimate tag (ăis information is yield by DT.)
or a? was not sent by the đrst SR query of the same session, i.e., the con-
versation (a?; c) is notmatching. Since decryption yields an a that is diﬀerent from
the one sent for the session, authentication fails with probability 1 so the reader
outputs a uniformly distributed b?. In this case, the blinder’s simulation is perfect.
Game . At last, we have an adversary who only sends c’s that were produced by legitimate
tags on sessions with matching conversation. Consequently, the answer from the
SR interface will consist of a b? that is equal to the b that was picked by
the tag. Clearly, the adversary has no information on this b except that it is con-
tained in the ciphertext c. More formally, we use the IND-CPA property of the en-
cryption scheme to change c to a randomvalue. In otherwords, we construct a blin-
der for both the ST interface and the remaining queries to the SR
interface.
We letB(i)be thehybrid blinder forwhich the iđrst queries ST(a; vtag)!
c and the eventual subsequent SR(c; ) ! b? queries are handled by
setting c to be the encryption of a random r of the same length as IDkKIDkakb and
b? is picked randomly while the rest of the queries are processed in the usual way.
. -   - 
      
Wenow construct an adversaryC playing the encryption scheme’s IND-CPAgame.
As it receives the public-key, C simulates the whole RFID system and runs either
AB(i) or AB(i+1) (Remark that no query requires the secret key). ăe đrst i  
1 ST queries are made to the IND-CCA challenger in a real-or-random
version. ăe challenge ciphertext c in the IND-CCA game is the answer from the
challenger. It is either a real answer (as in theABi21 simulation) or a simulated one
(as in the ABi+121 simulation). Note that no R query is made on the session
in which the adversary sent c (this case has been taken care of in Game ). So, C
prefectly simulates either the game forABi21 or the game forAB
i+1
2
1 and is an IND-
CCA adversary. Since C produces the output ofABi21 /AB
i+1
2
1 , we obtain that
j Pr[ABi21 ! 1]  Pr[AB
i+1
2
1 ! 1]j  AdvIND CCA2(k);
Game . We now simulate the remaining L and SR queries. Regarding
the former interface, the session identiđers are assumed to be deterministically gen-
erated so that it can be perfectly simulated. As for the latter one, we construct a
blinder that returns uniformly distributed -bit strings. It is not hard to see that
this simulation is perfect.
Forward Privacy Finally, Forward privacy follows from correctness and Narrow-Forward
privacy using Lemma ..
10.7 Strong Privacy with Mutual Authentication
Wenowconsider the sameprotocol of Section.with thepublic-key encryption schemebe-
ingPA+plaintext-aware and IND-CCsecure (Aswedetailled inSection.., theCramer-
Shoup andKurosawa-Desmetd encryption schemesmeet this level of plaintext-awareness and
security) and show that the resulting scheme is Strong private.
ăeorem .
Assume that the public-key encryption scheme used in the RFID scheme of Figure . is correct,
PA+ plaintext-aware, and IND-CCA secure. If 2 , 2  , and 2  are negligible, then the
scheme is correct, secure, and Strong private.
ăe security proof is rather similar to the one ofăeorem . but for the sake of complete-
ness we include it in here.
We split the proofs into three parts. In the đrst part, we argue that the scheme is correct and
secure for the reader using results from the corresponding one-way authentication protocol.
We then prove security for the tags and đnally Strong privacy.
 .     
  
.. Correctness and Security
Correctness is trivially induced by the correctness of the public-key encryption. Regarding
security, it follows fromăeorem ..
.. Strong Privacy
To conduct the proof, we consider a Strong adversary A and construct a blinder iteratively.
ăat is, we construct a sequence of partial blinders B1; : : : ; B5 and let Ai = ABii 1 with
A0 = A. ăe đnal blinder forA isB = B1      B5. By showing that the outcome ofAi
andAi+1 are computationally indistinguishable, we deduce thatB is indeed a full blinder for
A. So, the scheme is Strong private.
ăe outline of the proof is as follows. We đrst eliminate the case of instances matching
conversations whose result is trivially 1 or 0 depending on whether the tag is a legitimate one.
Game . We đrst đx an adversaryA0 playing the privacy game.
Game . We let Game  denote the privacy game performed by an adversary who simulates
every R on a session  with a transcript (a; c), such that c that has been ob-
tained by a previous ST(vtag; a0) query.
Ifa 6= a0, cdoesnotdecrypt to something containinga, so the answer toR()
must be 0. ăe simulation is easy and perfect. In the other case, that is, if a = a0,
the decryption of cwill be parsed to a matching challenge a and some entry IDkKID
which is in the database if and only if vtag is legitimate. Fortunately, the blinder has
access to this latter information as it is returned in the response of the DT
oracle query drawing vtag. Again, the simulation is easy and perfect. ăis fully de-
đnesB1 and we deduce that
Pr[A0 ! 1] = Pr[AB10 ! 1]
Clearly, the outcome ofA0 andA1 have identical distributions. We can thus deđne
the adversaryA1 that never queries R on an instance  in which the response
c was produced by a previous ST query.
Game . We let Game  denote the privacy game performed by an adversary who simulates
every R on a session  with a transcript (a; c), such that c that has been ob-
tained by a previous ST(vtag; a0) query.
Assume that the reader in instance  produced a challenge a. If a 6= a0, we are en-
sured that cdoesnotdecrypt to something containinga, so the answer toR()
must be . ăe simulation is easy and perfect. In the other case, that is, if a = a0,
the decryption of cwill be parsed to a matching challenge a and some entry IDkKID
which is in the database if and only if vtag is legitimate. Fortunately, the blinder has
.    
      
access to this latter information as it is returned in the response of the DT
oracle query drawing vtag. Again, the simulation is easy and perfect. ăis fully de-
đnesB1 and we deduce that
Pr[A0 ! 1] = Pr[AB10 ! 1]
Clearly, the outcome ofA0 andA1 have identical distributions. We can thus deđne
the adversaryA1 that never queries R on an instance in which the response
c was produced by a previous ST query.
Game . In this game, we make all ST queries being simulated by a partial blinder
B2. To achieve this, we let r be number of ST queries and make a sequence
of hybrid blinders B12 ; : : : ; Br+12 in which Bi2 simulates the i   1 đrst ST
queries. Note thatB12 does not make any simulation soAB
1
2
1 is exactlyA1 and that
Br+12 is a partial blinder the ST oracle that we set to beB2. ăe hybridBi+12
simulates the i đrst encountered ST queries by encrypting random strings of
same length as IDkKIDka.
Toprove thatABi21 andAB
i+1
2
1 have computationally indistinguishable distributions,
we construct an adversaryC playing the IND-CCAgame. AdversaryC receives the
public key and runsABi21 orAB
i+1
2
1 , depending on the bit of the indistinguishability
game, while simulating the RFID system, except the i-th ST query. For that,
C must simulate the environment forABi21 /AB
i+1
2
1 . Since all algorithms and oracles
of the scheme, except forR, donot require the secret key,C can easily perform
the simulation by itself. Regarding the R oracle, C just queries a decryption
oracle and checks whether the decrypted message matches.
ăeđrst i 1 STqueries aremade to the IND-CCAchallenger in a real-or-
random version. ăe challenge ciphertext c in the IND-CCA game is the answer
from the challenger. It is either a real answer (as in theABi21 simulation) or a simu-
lated one (as in theABi+121 simulation). Note that no R query is made on the
session in which the adversary sent c (this case has been taken care of in Game ).
So, C prefectly simulates either the game forABi21 or the game forAB
i+1
2
1 and is an
IND-CCA adversary. Since C produces the output ofABi21 /AB
i+1
2
1 , we obtain that
j Pr[ABi21 ! 1]  Pr[AB
i+1
2
1 ! 1]j  AdvIND CCA2(k);
and it results that
j Pr[A1 ! 1]  Pr[AB21 ! 1]j  r  AdvIND CCA2(k);
which is negligible as r is polynomially bounded and the scheme is IND-CCA
secure.
At this point, we can legitimately consider an adversaryA2whomakesnoST
queries.
 .     
  
Game . Wenowsimulate all remainingRqueries. Todo so, we construct an adversary
E playing the PA++ game.
ăis adversary takes the public key then simulates A2 interacting with the RFID
system. Recall that, like in Game , the algorithms and oracles of the scheme do
not depend on the secret key, except for the R queries that will be treated
hereaĕer. We let E simulate the RFID system toA2, handling her queries as follow:
 Assuming w.l.o.g. that session identiđers are not randomized, L is de-
terministically computed by E .
 Upon a CT(ID) query from A2, E inserts (ID; ) in a table DB1 if
the query asks for a legitimate tag. Otherwise, it inserts (ID; ) in a table DB0.
oracle implementing the uniform distribution over f0; 1g and assigns the
answer toKID.
 E simulates SR queries by asking the oracle OS to sample from
the uniform distribution over f0; 1g. It then forwards the received answer
toA2.
 DT(Samp) queries are handled by asking the randomness oracle OS
to sample from the distribution speciđed by Samp to get one or more ran-
dom ID. If any of the returned identiđers corresponds to a drawn tag, E out-
puts ?. Otherwise, it generates, deterministically and for each returned IDi,
a fresh vtagi and inserts the pair (vtagi; IDi) in the table T . Aĕer that, it
sets the bit bi to 1 if IDi is legitimate, or to  otherwise. At last, it returns
(vtag1; b1; : : : ; vtagn; bn) toA2.
 C(vtag) makes E reveal ID = T (vtag). Moreover, E looks for the
entry (ID; KID) in DB0 and DB1. If that corresponding entry contains a KID
diﬀerent from 0 0, then it returns it. Otherwise, it queriesOS to sample from
the uniform distribution over f0; 1g and assigns the answer toKID. It subse-
quently updates the entry (ID; ) to (ID; KID) and returns this last pair as its
answer. E received from OS for processing the CT(ID) query, are
also returned. We further assume that whenever the tag ID is a legitimate one,
E inserts the entry (ID; KT (vtag)) in a table TE .
 Tosimulate theR()oracle for a reader instancewith transcript (a; c),
E sends c to the decryption oracle, checks that the recovered plaintext is of
the form IDkKIDka, that it matches a tag state IDkKID obtained from a pre-
vious C(vtag) query, and đnally that the corresponding tag vtag is
legitimate. If this is the case, the answer to R must be 1, otherwise, the
simulated answer is . Note that when the output of the E regarding a R-
 query is 1, the genuine R query would also have answered 1. ăis
is because that, knowing a subset of the database through corruption query, E
can effectively predict the answer when the database entry lies in this subset.
Errors in the simulation occur when E predicts 0 and the genuine R
.    
      
query would also have outputted 1 in a session without matching conversa-
tion. Clearly, the failure of one of E ’s simulations corresponds to the happen-
ing of the event that A2 wins the security game, that we denoted E in the
previous section. In other words,Pr [A2 ! 1]  Pr AE2 ! 1  Pr[E]
ăis simulation is almost perfect since E occurs with negligible probability. Since
we assumed the encryption scheme to be PA++ plaintext-aware, we can use the
plaintext extractor E? of E to replace the decryption oracle without signiđcantly
altering the outcome distribution. However, E? requires the view of E instead of
the view ofA2, so we cannot use it as an extractor forA2. Fortunately, it is possi-
ble to reconstruct that view given the adversary’s random tape and its queries. At
đrst, we note that E ’s random coins are only used to initializeA2. Furthermore, all
the randomness E obtains fromOS to process C queries is revealed toA2.
Moreover, sinceA2 is simulatable, we can use the algorithmA02, induced byDeđni-
tion ., to reconstruct, fromA2’s view, a table T 0 indistinguishable from T . E re-
ceived fromOS using all the Samp 1 algorithms. the real IDof all the vtag and . Since
this table lists all the mappings between real and virtual identiđers, it is straightfor-
ward to reconstruct a randomness for E that she received to process theDT
queries using the Samp 1 algorithms corresponding to the sampling queries ofA2.
We let this whole operation be carried by a polynomial-time algorithmV that takes
as input the view ofA2 and usesA02 to reconstruct a view of E , i.e., it is such that
V(viewA2) and viewE are indistinguishable. It follows that E?(pk; ;V(viewA2))
and E?(pk; ; viewE) are indistinguishable.
interfaces CT, SR, and DT is obtained through the
randomness oracle. Moreover, all this randomness is given to the adversary through
the SR and C oracles (Here we make the assumption that the
adversary corrupts all theRFIDtags of the system. It easily generalizes to the general
case as the randomness needed for the creation of uncorrupted tags is not eﬀectively
used by E .). from the view ofA.
At this point, we are able todeđneB3, thepartial blinder forRqueries. adver-
sarymakes rRqueries anddeđne the successive blindersB(1); : : : ; B(r+1)
such thatB(i) simulates the i  1 đrst R queries. Again,B(1) does not sim-
ulate any query whileB(r+1) is a partial blinder for the R oracle. Similarly
to E , we assume thatB3maintains a table TB3 containing a list of pairs (ID; KID) for
corrupted legitimate tags. In order to simulate a R query on an instance  of
transcript (a; c), the blinder proceed as follow.
a) First, theblinder calls uponE?(pk; c;V(viewA2)) to getDecsk(c) = IDkKIDka0.
b) ăen it veriđes that a = a0 and outputs 0 in case of failure. Otherwise, it
continues.
 .     
  
c) At last, it outputs 1 if the pair IDkKID is listed in TB3 . Otherwise, it outputs 0.
ăe probability that Step  fails can be expressed as a distinguisher advantage of the
PA++ game or between V(viewA2) and viewE , soPr AB32 ! 1  Pr AE2 ! 1  AdvPA1++(k) + negl(k):
At the same time, Step  fails when the eventE occurs, so using triangle inequalities
we conclude thatPr [A2 ! 1]  Pr AB32 ! 1  AdvPA1++(k) + Pr[E] + negl(k):
Recalling thatE occurs with negligible probability and that the scheme is PA++
plaintext-aware, the quantity above becomes negligible. Hence,B3 describes a suc-
cessful blinder for the R oracle. In the following, we denoteAB32 byA3.
Game . We now alter the game so that no adversary issues SR(c; ) queries. For
that, we deđne a blinderB4 forA3 that returns uniformly distributed values from
the set f0; 1g . Recall that no STquery has been issued by the adversary so c
must have been produced by the adversary. We proceed as in Game  and makeB4
follow the same strategy ofB3 to recover c’s decryption and decide of the outcome
of the protocol session. IfB3’s decision for the result of the session is success, then
B4 outputs the last  bits of c’s decryption corresponding to b. Otherwise, it picks
a random b and returns it.
To show that the simulation is indistinguishable, we notice that when B4 gets the
correct decryption of c andB3 correctly computes R(), then it can perfectly
simulate the reader. ăerefore,Pr [A3 ! 1]  Pr AB43 ! 1  Pr [A2 ! 1]  Pr AB32 ! 1
= negl(k)
Game . In this game, we eliminate the remaining SR queries. ăis can easily
be achieved by constructing a blinderB5 that returns uniformly distributed values
from the set f0; 1g. Clearly, simulation is perfect as both distributions are per-
fectly indistinguishable. Hence,
Pr [A4 ! 1] = Pr[AB54 ! 1]
Game . Finally, we have an adversaryA5 who only produces L queries. Since these
are generated deterministically, we can trivially simulate the L oracle using
a blinderB6. It follows that
Pr [A5 ! 1] = Pr[AB65 ! 1]
.    
      
In the end, we have obtained an adversaryA6 = AB , withB = B1      B6, who does not
produce any oracle query that is such thatPr[A ! 1]  Pr[AB ! 1] = negl(k)
ăe scheme is thus Strong private.
 .     
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ăe RFID technology is promising with several upcoming evolutions that will hopefully
lead them to a widespread development and a general consensus on their beneđts. In partic-
ular, two aspects on which current RFID tags should be improved are security and privacy.
While the speciđc constraints put on these lightweight devices denied the use of classical cryp-
tographic primitives, we presented an assessment of the security of two original designs, HBž
and SõUASH. ăe second part of the thesis was dedicated to studying the level of privacy
RFID tags can oﬀer.
ăe main contributions of this thesis are summarized in the list below.
. We showed that the HBž protocol is insecure against man-in-the-middle attacks. ăis
gave a negative answer to a conjecture by Gilbert et al. that claimed otherwise.
. We invalidated SõUASH’s security argument bymounting an attack against its earlier
variant, SõUASH-0, that stands on the same security assumption. Although our at-
tack does not compromise the security of SõUASH’s đnal proposal, it showed that its
security is unrelated to factoring.
. To emphasize the need for a framework assessing privacy and the importance of study-
ing protocols in such a framework, we illustrated how several authentication protocols
dedicated to RFID tags compromise privacy. ăe list of these protocols include Pro-
bIP, MARP, Auth, YA-TRAP, YA-TRAP+, O-TRAP, RIPP-FS, and the Lim-Kwon
protocol.
. We also argued that protocols proven private in the UC-based model of Le, Burmester
and de Meideros, are still vulnerable to privacy attacks that have a practical sense. We
took for examples, O-FRAP and O-FRAKE.
. We reformulated Vaudenay’s deđnition of privacy. We also incorporated two Ĕavors of
correctness, depending on whether it is ensured in an absolute or contextual sense. We
also clariđed the way adversaries formally select tags.
. We studied the relationofVaudenay’smodelwith the extended-Juels-Weis privacymod-
el and the the ZK-privacy model. We did that by illustrating protocols that can be
proven to be private in their model, but fail to meet our standard notion of privacy.
. We also analyzed variants of Vaudenay’s privacy model that were meant to either sim-
plify the deđnitions, such as theHPVPmodel, or tomake Strong privacy possible such
as the proposal ofNg et al. We showed that the formermodel fails to capture real-world
attackers capabilities. We also argued that the notion of wise adversaries proposed by
Ng et al. fails to justify in practical attack scenarios.
. We correctedVaudenay’s deđnition of privacy and showed that with the new deđnition
Strong privacy is achievable. We then used encryptions schemes’ notion of plaintext-
awareness to instantiate a protocol achieving this level of privacy.
. We illustrated a separation between two notions of security for encryption schemes,
namely IND-CCA on one side and IND-CPA coupled with PA on the other side.
 . 
  
Albeit Bellare and Palacio showed that the two latter notions together imply the for-
mer, it was not clear whether plaintext-awareness could serve any purpose that IND-
CCA security could not meet. We proved that using an IND-CCA secure encryp-
tion scheme does not yield a Strong private protocol and instantiating the same proto-
col with an IND-CPA secure and PA plaintext-aware encryption scheme results in a
Strong private protocol.
. We extended our results to protocols oﬀering mutual authentication, i.e., in which the
reader is also required to authenticate to a tag. In these settings, we showed that our
deđnition of privacy invalidates the results obtained by Armknecht et al. concerning
the PVmodel. While they have demonstrated that no secure protocol can be Narrow-
Strong private with Vaudenay’s deđnitions, we showed that Strong privacy, in our set-
tings, with mutual authentication is achievable.
. We proposed a tradeoﬀ for Forward privacy by lowering its requirements by a small
margin to allow protocols using lightweight cryptography to achieve a certain form of
forward privacy. Concretely, these protocols ensure the privacy of all the tags’ actions
that occurred before their secrets leaked to the adversary except for the last session in
which a tag was involved before corruption if it did not end properly.
11.1 The Security of RFID Primitives
ăe đrst part of thesis was dedicated to analyzing the security of dedicated cryptographic
primitives for RFID tags.
.. Our Contributions
Regarding the security of primitives dedicated to RFID tags, we mainly gave two contri-
butions in analyzing the security of the protocol HBž and the message authentication code
SõUASH.
ăeSecurity of theHBž Protocol. We đrst challenged the conjecture establishing the secu-
rity of HBž against man-in-the-middle adversaries. We showed that if an adversary can alter
all messages transiting through the wireless channel set between a tag and a reader and if she
has access to the result of each protocol session, she can recover the tag’s secret without tam-
pering. We provided complexity analysis of the attack and showed a bound on the parameter
that separated the case in which the attack is asymptotically polynomial from exponential.
ăe đrst parameter set proposed by the authors of HBž fell into the case in which the attack
is polynomial andwe showed that the tag’s secret can be retrieved by solving a system of linear
equations aĕer disturbing messages in 220 protocol instances. ăe attack complexity for pa-
rameter set II is higher as the attack is exponential in the security parameter. Nevertheless, we
.     
      
were still able to retrieve the secret aĕer disturbing 235 protocol sessions and solving a system
of linear equations.
Possible đxes to render HBž immune to man-in-the-middle attacks were also analyzed. We
looked at the possibility of lowering the error threshold or to bound the number of errors the
prover introduces in its answer so that it always gets accepted. Unfortunately, both solutions
turned out to be also vulnerable to variants of the attacks on HBž.
SõUASH. ăe second primitive we studied is the message authentication code SõUASH.
Weconcentratedon its security arguments and its connection to theRabin encryption scheme.
We separated the security of the two primitives by mounting an attack against the earlier ver-
sion of SõUASH that enables an adversary who has access to an oracle returning theMACof
messages it receives to recover the secret key. ăis attack scenario readily applies to challenge-
response protocols based on a MAC where the challenger, i.e., the reader in the context of
RFIDs, sends a message to the prover, i.e., the tag in the context of RFIDs, which replies with
the MAC of the received message.
In the end, our attack strategy allowsus to recover SõUASH’s secret keys using210messages
if themodulus 21277 1 is used for Rabin’s function. Replacing SõUASH-’sNLFSRwith
a linear one, we were able to recover the secret key using 64 queries to the MAC oracle.
.. FurtherWork
Although new protocols based on the LPN problem were proposed and even proven secure
against man-in-the-middle attacks, they rely on other components than simple XOR opera-
tions. For instance, the MAC constructed by Kiltz et al. uses a secret pairwise independent
permutation which in itself needs a large secret key to be added to the one for LPN problem.
Basically, the reason for the introduction of this component is to break the linearity of the
protocol and thwart the kind of attacks we succeeded in mounting. In this sense, the MAC
and subsequent protocol they propose is not entirely built around the LPN problem as HB-
related protocols are. Although linearity provides nice implementation properties, our attack
proved it to be a bad feature for security. ăerefore, in order to obtain a secure version of
an HB protocol, it is necessary to design a variant that uses non-linear components. For ef-
đciency purposes, the perfect protocol would not rely on any other primitive than the LPN
problem.
ăis linearity property is also at the center of our attack on SõUASH. As a consequence,
it is very probable that SõUASH could be broken if a linear approximation of the mixing
function could be found. Still, as we have shown that SõUASH’s security is unrelated to
Rabin’s, it would be interesting to compare SõUASH’s security with a version stripped from
Rabin’s squaring, i.e., a MAC that outputs a window of bits from an NLFSR initialized with
the key and a message.
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11.2 Privacy in RFID Protocols
ăe second part of this thesis was devoted to developing our privacymodel for RFID systems.
.. Our Contributions
In this part of the dissertation, we concentrated on privacy issues related to RFID systems
and developed a model for assessing which level of privacy, if any, an RFID authentication
protocol achieves.
ăe Need for a Privacy Model. ăe đrst step toward proposing our privacy model was to
emphasize the need for having one. For that, we used a basic ad hoc model, inspired by the
literature of key-exchange protocols and the work of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway. ăat
model only captured the notion of unlinkability, i.e., that a protocol is private if no adver-
sary can give a relation between tags that were involved in protocol instances with the reader.
In line with cryptography’s classical adversarial models, the adversary is assumed to have full
control over the communication channel.
Despite working with an incomplete model, we were able to use it to show that several pro-
tocols, namely ProbIP, MARP, Auth, YA-TRAP, YA-TRAP+, O-TRAP, RIPP-FS, and the
Lim-Kwon protocol, fail to be privacy concealing.
ăeShortcomings of the LBdMPrivacyModel. We also used thatmodel to study two pro-
tocols that were proven to be forward private in the LBdMmodel, namely O-FRAP and O-
FRAKE. As it turns out, both protocols fail to meet this notion in our model, hereby raising
doubts on the pertinence of the LBdMmodel.
Vaudenay’s Privacy Model. We clariđed some notions in Vaudenay’s privacy model such as
how tags are selected by the adversary. For that, Vaudenay used a vague term of distribution
that is queried to an interface. We formalized this capability by saying that the adversary sub-
mits the description of a sampling algorithmwhich running time is bounded by a polynomial
in the security parameter. We also gave two deđnitions for the correctness of an RFID pro-
tocol. ăe stronger notion states that whatever happens in a system, a tag running an undis-
turbed protocol instance with the reader will end up being authenticated by the latter. ăe
weaker version, proposed to reĔect on several protocols proposed in the literature, requires
correctness to only hold if the tag has not been involved in more than a certain number of
consecutive sessions without being authenticated by the reader.
Relation with Other Models and Variants We compared Vaudenay’s model with several
other privacy models dedicated to RFIDs. We looked at the relationship between Vaudenay’s
privacy model and both the Juels-Weis and zk-privacy model. We showed that the former is
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superseeded by one of the weakest adversarial classes of Vaudenay’s model. ăe latter was also
shown to have issues related to concurrent attacks, i.e., privacy attacks in which the adversary
interacts with more than one tag to compromise privacy. Using that, we were able to show
the existence of authentication protocols that would be considered as private in the sense of
zk-privacy but fail to be so in Vaudenay’s model.
We also studied the HPVP variant of Vaudenay’s model that was meant to simplify its for-
mulation while retaining its semantic. However, we found that the variant cannot stand the
existence of more than one RFID system, i.e., it does not tolerate the possibility of tags that
do not belong to that RFID system. Vaudenay’s model takes this eventuality into account.
Moreover, adversaries cannot tamper with unknown tags: ăis means that the model denies
the possibility of an adversary getting a random tag on which she has no information and
extracting its secret. ăis prohibition fails to justify in practical scenario attacks.
ăeExact Notion of Privacy. We argued that Vaudenay’s deđnition of privacy is too strong
for the notion it aims to formalize and that this mismatch is the cause of the impossibility of
Strong privacy. We corrected this deđnition by requiring the entity responsible for producing
fake messages to the adversary that would be unnoticeable to the adversary to have access to
all the adversary’s knowledge. In particular, this includes her random tape, which wasmissing
from Vaudenay’s deđnition. With our new deđnitions, Vaudenay’s impossibility results does
not hold and we showed that it is possible to achieve the strongest notion of privacy using a
secure and plaintext-aware encryption scheme. At the same time, we proved that an IND-
CCA secure encryption is insuﬃcient for Strong privacy.
We also discussed an earlier attempt to obtain Strong privacy due to Ng et al., which in-
troduced the rather artiđcial class of wise adversaries that do not issue queries for which they
already know the answer. Besides being hard to deđne and manipulate, the notion of wise
adversaries is hard to motivate.
From Unilateral to Mutual Authentication. We extended our results to cover protocols
which oﬀer mutual authentication. In this regard, the corrected formulation of privacy dis-
cards the results of Armknecht et al. relative to the impossibility of achieving Narrow-Strong
privacy. Moreover, we show that Strong privacy with mutual authentication is achievable us-
ing plaintext-aware encryption schemes.
We also revisited Paise andVaudenay’sNarrow-Strong private protocol, which security the-
oremwas invalidated byArkmecht et al., and showed that the protocol is still Forward private.
.. FurtherWork
Further extensions to the model for diverse concrete senario can explored. For instance, we
assume in our model that the adversary is able to learn the outcome of authentication. How-
ever, several deployed RFID applications give more information to the adversary in leaking
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the identiĖer of the tag it authenticated. Although this is an undeniable privacy loss, we could
study the impact of learning such an information on other ones that the adversary can try to
obtain without relying on the reader.
An extension towards addressing read/write only tags can also be envisaged for that these
types of tags are still the most commonly used in real-world applications. Such type of tags
only provide two interfaces that can be remotely accessed, one for reading the contents of its
memory and another one to set it to a value speciđed in the command. It is rather easy to
see that from a classical cryptographic point of view, no privacy can be achieved if the tag
performs no computations unless we assume that the adversary does not completely control
the communication channels. ăe goal of the model in here would be to measure the best
privacy protection such tags can oﬀer.
11.3 Final Notes
ăe notion of blinder is a powerful tool for assessing the privacy of an RFID system. Yet, we
believe that it could be used for other types of cryptographic protocols. At đrst, it could be
used in key exchange protocols. For the similarities these latter share with RFID protocols,
it would be rather straightforward to translate the deđnitions from one setting to the other.
ăe paradigm could also be used to deployed key establishment Internet protocols such as
SSL/TLS. Similarly, we can strengthen zero-knowledgeprotocolswith requiring thatnot only
the veriđer learns anything from a protocol execution but also that no other party can deduce
any information.
Onanother side, thedeđnitionsof plaintext-awarenessmaybe improved tomake theknowl-
edge extractor able to đlter the eventual auxiliary information the ciphertext creator gets.
.  
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